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ABSTRACT
ATTITUDES DE SE AND LOGOPHORICITY
MAY 2018
YANGSOOK PARK
B.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
M.A., SEOUL NATIONAL UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Rajesh Bhatt and Professor Vincent Homer

This dissertation investigates two related notions that represent attitudes and perspectives, de se attitudes and the notion of logophoricity, based on the case study of the longdistance reflexive caki in Korean, which specifically encodes attitudes towards oneself
in attitude reports and co-refers with individuals whose point of view or perspective is
represented in a sentence.
The main claim of this thesis is that there are distinct but related semantic/syntactic
mechanisms for the obligatory de se interpretation of the long-distance reflexive caki on
the one hand, and the long-distance binding of caki on the other. Specifically, for the
semantics of the de se, I provide a unified account of the obligatory de se interpretation
of the long-distance reflexive caki and (null and overt) controlled subjects, based upon
Lewis (1979) and Chierchia (1989). For the long-distance binding of caki in both attitude
vi

and non-attitude environments, I take a local logophoric binding approach (Koopman
and Sportiche 1989, Adesola 2005, Anand 2006, Nishigauchi and Kishida 2008, Sundaresan 2012, Nishigauchi 2014, Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, a.o.). Based on the idea that caki
is uniformly bound by a local logophoric binder in both attitude and non-attitude environments, I further propose the link between de se and logophoric binding mechanisms.
Our two-layered system of de se and logophoric binding ensures that the antecedent of
caki must be the perspective holder of a clause containing caki, while caki denotes the de
se counterpart of its antecedent under attitude verbs.

vii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

iv

ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii

LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi

CHAPTER

1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.1

1.2

1.3

1

Two main interests: de se ascription and logophoricity . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1.1

Attitude reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

1.1.2

The notion of logophoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

5

1.1.3

The link between de se attitude reports and logophoricity . . . . . .

7

A case study of the Korean long-distance reflexive caki . . . . . . . . . . . 10
1.2.1

Novel observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

1.2.2

Central claims . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

Overview of the dissertation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

2 BACKGROUND ON LONG-DISTANCE ANAPHORS . . . . . . . . . . . .

viii

18

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2.2

Long-distance anaphors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

2.3

The long-distance reflexive caki in Korean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2.4

2.3.1

Basic properties of caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

2.3.2

Local binding of caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

2.3.3

Local vs. long-distance caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

3 DE SE ATTITUDE REPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

34

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

3.2

Background on de se attitude reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

3.3

The long-distance reflexive caki in attitude reports . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

3.4

3.5

3.6

3.3.1

No locality restriction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

3.3.2

(Non-)Subject-orientation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

3.3.3

Obligatory coreference between multiple caki’s . . . . . . . . . . . 43

3.3.4

Sloppy readings under ellipsis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Obligatory de se interpretations of caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.4.1

Obligatory de se in CP complements of attitude verbs . . . . . . . . 51

3.4.2

Obligatory de se in NP complements of attitude verbs . . . . . . . . 59

3.4.3

Obligatory de se under negative attitude verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . 60

Deriving obligatory de se interpretations of caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
3.5.1

A dedicated de se LF: The Lewis-Chierchia’s property approach . . 64

3.5.2

A proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.5.2.1

Basic assumptions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

3.5.2.2

Two licensing conditions for caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75

3.5.3

Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

3.5.4

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

Comparison with previous accounts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
ix

3.6.1

The indexical approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83

3.6.2

The de se-as-a-special-de re analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90
3.6.2.1

The concept-generator analysis: Percus and Sauerland
(2003) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

3.6.2.2
3.7

3.8

Landau (2015): De se-as-a-special-de re . . . . . . . . . . . 98

An extension: Caki in other attitude environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.7.1

Attitudes without attitude verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102

3.7.2

Backward binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

3.7.3

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 108

4 INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DE SE ELEMENTS IN CONTROL CONSTRUCTIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
4.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

4.2

Basic properties of obligatory control constructions in Korean . . . . . . . 111

4.3

4.4

4.5

4.2.1

Obligatory control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

4.2.2

Logophoric control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115

Overt controlled subjects in Korean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
4.3.1

Pronouns and caki as controlled subjects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118

4.3.2

Controlled vs. non-controlled pronouns/reflexives . . . . . . . . . . 121

4.3.3

Controlled caki vs. OC PRO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122

4.3.4

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124

OC PRO vs. LD caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
4.4.1

Clausemate OC PRO and LD caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

4.4.2

Clausemate controlled and non-controlled LD caki . . . . . . . . . 129

4.4.3

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130

De se construal in obligatory control constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
4.5.1

Structural conditions of OC constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
x

4.6

4.5.2

Overt OC subjects under the property approach . . . . . . . . . . . 134

4.5.3

Interactions between PRO and LD caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136

4.5.4

The dual property of controlled LD caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137

4.5.5

Potential problems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140

5 DE SE AND DE DICTO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
5.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142

5.2

LD caki in relative clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
5.2.1

Non-obligatory de se interpretations under attitude verbs . . . . . . 143

5.2.2

A similar environment: Gapless relative clauses . . . . . . . . . . . 148

5.2.3

Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

5.3

Intensional status of relative clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

5.4

The relationship between de se and de dicto attitude reports . . . . . . . . . 156
5.4.1

Generalizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156

5.4.2

Doubly-embedded sentences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

5.5

Disjoint readings of multiple caki’s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171

5.6

Obligatory non-de se readings of the 3rd person pronoun . . . . . . . . . . 174

5.7

5.6.1

Competition between a dedicated and a non-dedicated de se LF . . 175

5.6.2

Competition between the 3rd person pronoun and caki . . . . . . . 178

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180

6 LOGOPHORIC BINDING . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182
6.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 182

6.2

Background on logophoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
6.2.1

The notion of logophoricity: Clements (1975) and Sells (1987) . . . 185

6.2.2

Logophors and awareness . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189

6.2.3

Logophoricity vs. empathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 192

xi

6.3

The long-distance reflexive caki and logophoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.3.1

6.3.2

6.3.3
6.4

6.5

LD caki in attitude environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
6.3.1.1

Source or self antecedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197

6.3.1.2

Awareness condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198

LD caki in non-attitude environments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
6.3.2.1

Pivot antecedents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200

6.3.2.2

No awareness condition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 202

6.3.2.3

Adjunct clauses under attitude verbs . . . . . . . . . . . . 205

Logophoricity and the (non-)de se interpretation of caki . . . . . . . 207

Logophoric operators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 214
6.4.1

Syntactic analysis: Local logophoric operators . . . . . . . . . . . . 214

6.4.2

Semantic analysis: Perspective predicates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 216

6.4.3

Consequences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 221
6.4.3.1

Caki in complements of attitude verbs . . . . . . . . . . . 221

6.4.3.2

Caki in (gapless) relative clauses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 226

7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232

xii

LIST OF TABLES

2.1

The comparison between Local caki and LD caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

4.1

Interim summary: PRO, (non-)controlled pronoun, and (non-)controlled
LD caki . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125

4.2

Summary: PRO, (non-)controlled pronoun, and (non-)controlled LD caki . 130

xiii

LIST OF FIGURES

1.1

The relationship between de se and logophoricity . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

xiv

9

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

3

3rd

acc

accusative

adn

adnominalizer

anaph anaphor
asp

aspect

cl

classifier

comp

complementizer

dat

dative

decl

declarative

f

feminine

gen

genitive

hor

hortative

imp

imperative

int

interrogative

log

logophor

m

masculine

neg

negation

nom

nominative

obl

oblique

perf

perfective

xv

prog progressive
prs

present

pst

past

sg

singular

top

topic

vol

volitional

xvi

CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

1.1

Two main interests: de se ascription and logophoricity

The main goal of this dissertation is to study how attitudes and perspectives are represented in grammar. Under this broad interest, this thesis investigates two specific topics: 1) the semantics of attitude reports with linguistic expressions that encode attitudes
towards oneself (i.e., de se attitudes) and 2) the notion of logophoricity, which denotes
individuals whose speech, thought, or point of view is represented in a sentence.

1.1.1

Attitude reports

Since the 1960−1970’s, the special properties of de se attitudes have received much attention in the philosophical literature (Castañeda 1966, Lewis 1979). In the linguistic literature, the issue of de se ascriptions has become a focus of the debate on de se. An attitude
report with a pronoun can felicitously report one’s de se or de re attitude. Consider the two
contexts in (1). In S1, John has an attitude about himself in the first-person way, as noted
by the first person pronoun used in his direct speech, and thus, he has a de se attitude. On
the other hand, in S2, John has an attitude about the guy on TV who happens to be himself, but he is not aware that the guy he has attitude toward is him himself. In this case,
John has a de re (but not de se) attitude. In either context, John’s attitude can be reported
by the same sentence in (1) containing the third person pronoun in the embedded clause.

1

(1)

Attitude reports with the third person pronoun
(de se)

S1: John says, "I should be elected."

S2: John is so drunk that he has forgotten that he is a candidate in the election.
He watches someone on TV and finds that that person is a terrific candidate, who
should definitely be elected. Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is watching
(de re)

on TV is John himself.
John hopes that he will be elected. [!S1, !S2]

How can a sentence like (1) be true under both S1 and S2? One possible view is that
attitude reports like (1) have coarse truth-conditions derived from one LF (a de re LF) that
are true in both contexts (Kaplan 1989). Under this view, we do not need a special LF for
the reports of one’s first-personal attitudes. Instead, just one and the same LF may be
enough to derive the meaning of the sentence like (1) that is true in either de se or de re
context. Let’s say a de re attitude is such that an attitude holder ascribes some property
to an entity that the attitude holder bears some particular relation to, and the entity has
that property in every possible world that is compatible with what the attitude holder
believes in the actual world. Given this, let us consider some rough truth-conditions of
the sentence in (1) that can be derived from a de re LF as following.

(2)

[[(1)]] = T iff There is a relation R that John bears some unique relation to himself
in the actual world, and in every possible world that is compatible with what John
hopes in the actual world, the person who John bears the relation to will be elected.

The truth-conditions in (2) do indeed hold in both ‘S1’ and‘ S2‘ in (1), because there is a
unique relation that John bears to himself (first-personal vs. the guy he saw on TV and
found terrific) and he ascribes the property of winning the election to the guy he bears
each unique relation to. Under this kind approach, the third person pronoun happens to
be interpreted de se when the attitude holder bears the first-personal relation to himself.
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Another possible view is to have distinct LFs for the same sentence in (2) for each
case (de re vs. de se). If there is a dedicated LF only for de se, we would expect some cases
where an element only gets a de se but not de re interpretation. In fact, given that the
third person pronoun in English can receive a de se or a (non-de se) de re interpretation in
attitude reports, it has been controversially discussed whether the de se interpretation of
the third person pronoun is derived by a dedicated machinery or it is a special case of de
re (Chierchia 1989, Schlenker 1999, Percus and Sauerland 2003, Anand 2006, Maier 2011,
among many others).
In contrast to the third person pronoun, however, a number of elements in various
languages are unambiguously interpreted as those whom an attitude holder identifies as
himself/herself in attitude reports, such as obligatory control PRO, logophoric pronouns,
long-distance reflexives, shifted indexicals, etc. (Chierchia 1989, Schlenker 1999, Huang
and Liu 2001, Schlenker 2003, Anand and Nevins 2004, Anand 2006, a.o.). For example,
obligatory control PRO, the long-distance reflexive ziji in Chinese, and the logophor oun
in Yoruba can be used in attitude reports only when the content of subordinate clauses
containing these expressions are expressed by the attitude holder using the first person
pronoun, as shown in (3)−(5).

(3)

Obligatory control PRO in English
S1: John says, "I should be elected."
S2: John is so drunk that he has forgotten that he is a candidate in the election.
He watches someone on TV and finds that that person is a terrific candidate, who
should definitely be elected. Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is watching
on TV is John himself.
John hopes PRO to be elected [!S1, #S2]

3

(Schlenker 2003)

(4)

The Chinese long-distance reflexive ziji
S1: Zhangsan says, "That thief stole my purse!"
S2: Zhangsan says, "That thief stole that purse!" Unbeknownst to Zhangsan, it is
his purse.
Zhangsan shuo pashou
tou-le
ziji-de pibao.
Zhangsan say pickpocket steal-Perf ziji-DE purse
‘Zhangsani said that the pickpocket stole hisi purse.’ [!S1, #S2]
(Huang and Liu 2001)

(5)

The Yoruba logophoric pronoun oun
S1: He says, "I saw John."
S2: He says, "That guy saw John." (Unbeknownst to him, that guy is him himself.)
ói so pé ouni rí John.
o say that oun see John
‘Hei said that hei saw John.’ [!S1, #S2]

(Anand 2006)

Assuming the sentences in (3)–(5) have similar truth-conditions as shown in (2), then
we would expect that these sentences would be true in both contexts. However, given
that these sentences can only be true under the scenario where the attitude holder has a
first-personal belief, some specific LF for de se seems to be necessary.
Regarding the de se attitude reports with these particular elements, most of the debate in the semantics literature has centered around (i) whether we need any dedicated
semantic representations for obligatory de se attitude reports (e.g., Chierchia 1989, Percus and Sauerland 2003), and (ii) if so, how many different mechanisms are needed (e.g.,
Anand 2006, Maier 2011). As first discussed by Chierchia (1989), an unpronounced subject in the control infinitives, namely PRO, has been analyzed as a de se expression, given
the fact that it is unambiguously interpreted de se. In fact, the semantics of de se attitude
reports has been largely developed based on the silent element PRO. However, PRO is
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subject to stringent positional restrictions: that is, (i) it can only appear as the subject of
an infinitival clause, (ii) a multiple occurrence of PRO in the same clause is impossible,
and (iii) it must be locally bound. Although significant insights into the semantics of de
se attitude reports have accumulated over the years, there are some important questions
that have not been fully addressed, mainly due to the lack of empirical evidence. Those
are listed below.

(6)

Empirical and theoretical questions of de se attitude reports
a.

How do multiple (same or different kinds of) de se expressions behave and
interact with each other in one language?

b.

As widely assumed, can a de se interpretation of any element be freely derived
via a de re LF?

c.

What are the relationships between de se ascriptions and other notions that
reflect perspective in grammar?

1.1.2

The notion of logophoricity

Another focus of this thesis is on the notion of logophoricity, which reflects both attitudes
and perspectives. This notion was originally introduced by Hagège (1974) and Clements
(1975) for logophoric pronouns in some African languages. Logophoric pronouns are
elements that appear in indirect discourse and must be co-referential with the one "whose
speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported" (Clements 1975,
p.141). Based on the later attempts to account for LD reflexives in other languages with
logophoricity (e.g. Maling 1984), Sells (1987) defines the notion of logophoricity with three
primitive notions shown in (7). Under his analysis, when an element such as a logophoric
pronoun or a LD reflexive is sensitive to logophoricity, the referent of the element should
be understood as at least one of these three following primitive notions.
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(7)

The three primitive notions of logophoricity
source: one who is the intentional agent of the communication
self: one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes
pivot: one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated

(Sells 1987, p.457)

The term "logophor" has also been used for anaphors that are exempt from Condition A of the binding theory (Chomsky 1981). It has been well-known that anaphors
in English can be exempt from syntactic constraints on binding in certain environments,
e.g. picture-noun reflexives (Postal 1971, Kuno 1972b, Pollard and Sag 1992, Reinhart and
Reuland 1993, a.o.). Pollard and Sag (1992) argue that such exempt anaphors often find
an "individual whose viewpoint or perspective is somehow being represented" (Pollard
and Sag 1992, p.274) as their antecedents, which resembles the notion of logophoricity.
In a series of work (Reinhart and Reuland 1991, 1993), Reinhart and Reuland also distinguish "logophors" from anaphors in that the former is not governed by Condition A
but discourse-oriented. Under their account, an anaphor can be used as a logophor only
when it is not subject to grammatical constraints, that is, the c-command relationship and
locality condition.
Although the same term "logophor" has been used for long-distance reflexives, logophoric pronouns, and exempt anaphors in various languages, there exist a number of
differences among these elements. For instance, an attitude holder can always be understood as the one whose (mental) perspective is being represented, and thus, a subject of
speech or attitude verbs perfectly qualifies as an antecedent of a logophoric pronoun or
long-distance reflexive. However, an individual whose physical perspective is taken in a
sentence can serve as an antecedent of some LD reflexives but not of logophoric pronouns.
Moreover, when an anaphor appears in an embedded object position of an attitude verb,
it cannot be used as a logophor and find the matrix subject as its antecedent in English
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(8a), although it can sometimes be exempt from Condition A and find an attitude holder
as its long-distance antecedent, as in (8b).1

(8)

a. *Johni thinks Mary likes himselfi .
b.

1.1.3

Maxi boasted that the queen invited Lucie and himselfi for a drink.

The link between de se attitude reports and logophoricity

Given our brief discussion on de se attitude reports and the notion of logophoricity, one
may have noticed that there appears to be a close relationship between the two notions.
A number of elements that are known to be subject to the notion of logophoricity receive an obligatory de se expressions in attitude envrionments, such as the Chinese LD
reflexive ziji (Huang and Liu 2001), the Japanese LD reflexive zibun (Oshima 2004), exempt
anaphors in English and French (Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, Charnavel 2017), the Tamil
LD reflexive ta(a)n (Sundaresan 2012), etc. Anand (2006) explores distinct mechanisms for
de se ascriptions and proposes three different ways, as shown in (9). According to him,
context-overwriting is responsible for shifted indexicals2 , while some de se pronouns need
to be bound by a syntactic operator, such as a logophoric operator.
1

The example in (8b) is from Zribi-Hertz (1989).
Shifted indexicals refer to indexical expressions appearing in an embedded clause of a speech/attitude
verb that are interpreted relative to the context of reported speech instead of the utterance context. For
example, the first person pronoun in Zazaki can not only refer to the speaker of the utterance but also the
speaker of the reported utterance, which is the matrix subject of the sentence, as shown in (i). It has been
reported in the literature that shifted indexicals in languages like Amharic, Zazaki, etc. receive obligatory
de se readings (Schlenker 1999, 2003, Anand 2006, among others).
2

(i)

HEsenij
(m1k -ra) va kE Ezj/k dEwletia
Hessen.obl (I.obl-to) said that I
rich.be-pres
‘Hensen said that {I am, Hesen is} rich.’
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Zazaki
(Anand and Nevins 2004)

(9)

a.

Default (de re ascription): pronouns

b.

Semantic (context-overwriting): shifted indexicals, Mandarin1 ziji, Malayalam
taan

c.

Syntactic (binding by operator): Yoruba oun, English dream-selves, Icelandic
sig, Japanese zibun, Mandarin2 ziji

(Anand 2006, p.11)

Note that the third type of de se ascriptions under Anand’s system includes the elements
that are closely related to logophoricity: the logophor oun in Yoruba, the logophoric LD
reflexives sig in Icelandic, zibun in Japanese, and ziji in Chinese. In other words, one and
the same machinery is responsible for both logophoricity and de se ascription for these
elements under Anand’s system. However, although it is (mostly) true that logophors or
LD reflexives in many languages must be interpreted de se under an attitude verb, they
can also occur in non-attitude environments, which are not attitude reports (therefore, no
de se ascription). For instance, in (10), the LD reflexive zibun in Japanese is co-referent
with the matrix subject Takasi, an individual from whose point of view the report is made
by the speaker (Sells 1987). We can understand that zibun, coreferring with a perspective
holder, is still subject to logophoricity in this case, but it has nothing to do with a de se
interpretation since this sentence is not an attitude report.

(10)

The Japanese zibun in a non-attitude environment
Takasii -wa [Yosiko-ga mizu-o
zibuni -no ue-ni kobosita-node]
Takasi-top [Yosiko-nom water-acc self-gen on-loc spilled-because]
nurete-simatta.
wet-got
‘Takasii got wet because Yosiko spilled water on himi .’

(Sells 1987)

Since zibun does not receive a de se interpretation in (10), the so-called "syntactic de se
route" proposed by Anand (2006) cannot be adopted to the cases like this.
Given this fact, we can summarize the behavior of these logophoric elements (i.e.,
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elements that are subject to the notion of logophoricity in coreference resolution) in terms
of the two notions: they must receive a de se interpretation when they appear in attitude
environments, while they can also appear in non-attitude environments with no relavant de se interpretations. Figure 1.1 illustrates the relationship of de se attitudes and
logophoricity.3

Logophoricity
De se
attitude
environments

non-attitude
environments

Figure 1.1: The relationship between de se and logophoricity
In the semantics literature, the semantics of the obligatory de se interpretation of
these elements has received focused attention, while little attention has been paid to the
fact that the same elements can also appear in non-attitude environments. In the syntax
literature, on the other hand, most attention has been given to syntactic mechanisms for
long-distance binding with or without adopting the notion of logophoricity. Although the
long-distance dependency between certain logophoric elements and their antecedents in
both attitude and non-attitude environments may be accounted for under the syntactic
approaches, the obligatory de se interpretation of these elements in attitude reports cannot be. In light of this, this dissertation aims to provide a syntactico-semantic mechanism
that can account for (i) the long-distance dependency in both attitude and non-attitude environments and (ii) the relationship between the logophoric elements and their obligatory
de se interpretations only in attitude environments.
This representation may not be suitable for a logophoric element if it does not receive an obligatory de
se interpretation in attitude envrionments. One example would be the logophor yè in Ewe, which also allows
a de re reading under attitude verbs, according to Pearson (2015). In such cases, we need to understand de
se and logophoricity as distinct but overlapping notions.
3
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In order to investigate the semantics of obligatory de se expressions and the relationship between de se attitudes and the notion of logophoricity, this dissertation provides
a case study of the long-distance reflexive caki in Korean. The Korea LD reflexive caki is
an element that must get a de se interpretation in attitude reports, while it can also appear
in non-attitudinal environments such as relative clauses and adjunct clauses, in which de
se interpretations are irrelevant. We will also examine the interactions between the LD
reflexive caki and other elements that can or must be interpreted de se in attitude reports,
such as the third person pronoun and obligatory control PRO. An extensive work on the
LD reflexive and their relationships with other de se elements will play a major role in
developing the semantic mechanism underlying de se attitude reports and the syntacticosemantic analysis of long-distance anaphor binding in terms of the notion of logophoricity.

1.2
1.2.1

A case study of the Korean long-distance reflexive caki
Novel observations

Long-distance (henceforth LD) reflexives in many languages have often been reported to
require de se readings in attitude environments, similar to obligatory control PRO (Kuno
1972b, Chierchia 1989, Pan 1997, Huang and Liu 2001). In contrast to PRO, however, LD
reflexives usually appear in a much wider range of environments, and multiple reflexives
can co-occur in the same clause. In addition, LD reflexives can also co-occur with other de
se elements, including PRO and shifted indexicals. Moreover, some languages like Korean
allow LD anaphors in the subject position of obligatory control constructions. Owing to
these properties, an extensive work on LD reflexives and their relationships with other de
se elements can shed important light on the semantics of de se ascriptions, especially with
respect to the questions listed in (6), which is repeated below.
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(11)

Empirical and theoretical questions of de se attitude reports
a.

How do multiple (same or different kinds of) de se expressions behave and
interact with each other in one language?

b.

As widely assumed, can a de se interpretation of any element be freely derived via a de re LF?

c.

What are the relationships between de se ascriptions and other notions that
reflect perspective in grammar?

The Korean LD reflexive caki must receive a de se interpretation under attitude verbs,
as the LD reflexives ziji in Chinese and zibun in Japanese (Kuno 1972b, Pan 1997, 2001,
Huang and Liu 2001, Anand 2006, a.o.).

(12)

The Korean long-distance reflexive caki
S1: John says, "Bill stole my wallet!"
S2: John says, "Bill stole that wallet!" Unbeknownst to John, it is his own wallet.
John-i
Bill-i
caki-uy cikap-ul hwumchyessta-ko malhayssta.
John-nom Bill-nom self-gen wallet-acc stole-comp
said
‘Johni said that Bill stole hisi purse.’ [!S1, #S2]

Based on this quite well-known fact about the LD reflexives in East Asian languages, this
dissertation presents a number of novel properties of caki that will be crucial to address
the questions in (12). First, the reflexive caki can interact with other elements that can or
must be interpreted de se in attitude environments. For example, the null subject PRO in
an obligatory control construction unambiguously gets a de se interpretation in Korean
as well and can appear with caki in the same clause. One of the interesting interactions
between a null obligatory control subject and the reflexive caki is that they do not need to
find the same reference within the same embedded clause, while multiple caki’s need to.
That is, while both PRO and caki in the example (13) must be interpreted de se with respect
11

to its reference, the relationships between multiple caki’s and between the reflexive and
PRO appear to be different.

(13)

Obligatory coreference between multiple clausemate LD caki’s
John-i
[Bill-i
[caki-uy emmeni-ka caki-uy pwuin-ul cohahanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom self-gen mother-nom self-gen wife-acc like-comp
sayngkakhanta-ko] malhayssta.
think-comp
said
a.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother liked hisi wife.’

b.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother liked hisj wife.’

c. *‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother liked hisj wife.’
d. *‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother liked hisi wife.’
(14)

Disjoint reference possible between PRO and LD caki
Johni -un [Billj -i [PRO∗i/j/∗k cakii/j/∗k -uy cip-ulo ka-keyss-ta]-ko
caki-gen
house-to go-vol-decl-comp
John-top Bill-nom PRO/he
yaksokhayssta]-ko sayngkakhayssta.
promised-comp
thought
Lit. ‘Johni thought that Billj promised to go to hisi/j house.’

While the obligatory control subject must be controlled by the subject in the immediately
embedding clause, LD caki in the same embedded clause can refer to either the matrix or
intermediate subject. These data raise a question about the de se mechanism for at least
two different de se elements in one language: do we need the same or different ways to
derive the unambiguous de se interpretations of controlled subjects and LD caki? We will
discuss the interactions between the LD reflexive caki and controlled subjects in obligatory
control constructions in detail in Chapter 4.
Second, caki appearing in a relative clause behaves differently from the reflexive
directly embedded under an attitude verb: it does not have to receive an obligatory de se
reading under an attitude verb.
12

(15)

Caki in a relative clause
(de se)

S1: John thinks, "That woman who hit me is actually kind."

S2: John thinks that a girl he has newly met in class is very kind and nice. Unbeknownst to John, however, they met at a party the other night and she hit him
(non-de se)

while he was so drunk.

Johni -un [[cakii -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top self-acc hit-adn woman-nom kind-comp think
‘Johni thinks that the woman who hit himi is kind.’ (!S1, !S2)
The sentence with caki in a relative clause in (15) can felicitously report John’s attitude
even in the context where the reference of caki, the matrix subject John, does not hold a
de se attitude (‘S2’). This striking observation will be discussed thoroughly in Chapter 5.
Third, the LD reflexive caki is subject to the notion of logophoricity even when it is
not interpreted de se. It is obvious that antecedents of caki in attitude environments can
always be understood as a logophoric center because they are the ones who is the speaker
of the reported utterance (that is, source) or an attitude holder (self). We will see that the
antecedent of caki with a non-de se interpretation can still be understood as a logophoric
center, the one whose spatio-temporal perspective is taken in the clause containing caki
(pivot). For example, locative spatial phrases like ‘in front of’ and ‘on the left’, etc. can
usually be interpreted with respect to the perspective of the speaker of the utterance or
an internal protagonist whose perspective is taken. Interestingly, however, when caki
co-occurs with those phrases, they must be interpreted relative to the antecedent of caki,
who is the perspective center.

(16)

Perspective holder as the antecedent of caki
Context: John thinks that a woman he met at a party the other day is very kind
and nice. Unbeknownst to John, the woman who is sitting on his right side is the
(non-de se)

woman he met at the party.
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Johni -un [[cakii -uy olunccok-ey ancu]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko
John-top self-gen right-at
sit-adn woman-nom kind-comp
sayngkakhanta.
think
‘Johni thinks that the woman who is sitting on hisi right is kind.’ (from John’s
perspective)
*‘Johni thinks that the woman who is sitting on hisi right is kind.’ (from the
speaker’s perspective)

Although caki does not receive a de se interpretation in (16), the antecedent of the reflexive
must be understood as the perspective holder, and thus, a logophoric center based on Sells
(1987)’s notions, as witnessed by the interpretation the perspective-sensitive expression
‘on the right’.
To summarize, the LD reflexive caki is subject to the notion of logophoricity in both
attitude and non-attitude environments. Moreover, it must get an obligatory de se interpretation in attitude environments, with an exception under relative clauses. These are
the brief highlights of the case study of the LD reflexive caki in Korean in terms of the de
se interpretation and logophoricity. Based on these novel empirical data, we will develop
analyses on LD binding of caki as well as the source of the obligatory de se interpretation
in attitude environments.

1.2.2

Central claims

The main claim of this thesis is that there are distinct semantic/syntactic mechanisms for
the obligatory de se interpretation of caki on the one hand, and the long-distance binding
of caki on the other.4 Specifically, for the semantics of the de se, I will provide a unified
account of the obligatory de se interpretation of the LD reflexive caki and (null and overt)
Even though our final analysis that will be presented in Chapter 6 distinguishes the de se mechanism
from the LD binding mechanism, we will assume that the de se machinery is responsible for the LD binding
of caki until Chapter 5. Even with the new proposal regarding LD binding, our analysis of de se will not
change.
4
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controlled subjects, based upon Lewis (1979) and Chierchia (1989). That is, these are the
elements that need to be bound by an individual abstractor, which is introduced by an
attitude verb, and end up being interpreted as the de se counterpart of the attitude holder,
the referents of these elements, given certain semantics of attitude verbs. Following Lewis
(1979) and Chierchia (1989), we will argue that de se attitude reports denote self ascription
of a property. While the core machinery that derives the obligatory de se interpretations
of the so-called de se elements like LD reflexives and obligatory control subjects is same,
they do not necessarily behave in the identical way because of the additional inherent
properties of each element. Another theoretical claim that we will draw from our empirical data is that de se cannot always be derived as a special case of de re (contra Perry 1977,
and many others).
For the long-distance binding of caki in both attitude and non-attitude environments, we will take a local logophoric binding approach (Koopman and Sportiche 1989,
Adesola 2005, Anand 2006, Nishigauchi and Kishida 2008, Sundaresan 2012, Nishigauchi
2014, Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, a.o.). Based on the idea that caki is uniformly bound by
a local logophoric binder in both attitude and non-attitude environments, we will further
propose the link between de se and logophoric binding mechanisms. Our two-layered system of de se and logophoric binding will ensure that the antecedent of caki must be the
perspective holder of a clause containing caki and caki denotes the de se counterpart of
its antecedent under attitude verbs.

1.3

Overview of the dissertation

Before we discuss our two main interests (de se ascription and logophoricity) with the LD
reflexive caki in Korean, Chapter 2 provides a general background of LD anaphors and the
Korean reflexive caki. Although the same reflexive can find a local or LD antecedent and
share some basic properties, I will show that caki can be distinguished into two different
types based on the distance to its antecedent (long-distance vs. local), and we will focus
15

on the long-distance cases throughout the remainder of the dissertation.
Chapter 3 is devoted to a discussion of the semantics of attitude reports with the
embedded reflexive caki that can only be interpreted as de se. I will follow a particular semantic mechanism for de se elements, namely, the property approach of Lewis (1979) and
Chierchia (1989), and propose specific binding conditions for LD caki that are developed
based on the property approach to de se and the inherent properties of the reflexive.
In Chapter 4, we will expand our discussion of the semantics of de se attitude reports by focusing on another type of obligatory de se expression in Korean: obligatory
control (OC) subjects. I will defend a unified view for the two types of de se elements in
Korean based on novel empirical evidence. While we maintain the property approach as
the de se mechanism, it will be shown that additional structural conditions of OC constructions and lexical properties of caki can derive some distinguishable properties between (null and overt) controlled subjects and LD caki as well as between (controlled and
non-controlled) LD caki and other OC subjects (null PRO and pronouns).
Chapter 5 presents a novel environment in which LD caki need not receive a de
se interpretation even within the scope of an attitude verb. That is, when LD caki occurs
in a relative clause that is embedded under an attitude verb, it is exempt from the de se
requirement. The main discovery of this chapter will be a new relationship between the
(non-)de se interpretation of caki and the de dicto reading of the predicate in the same
clause. Owing to the special intensional property of relative clauses, LD caki receives
a non-de se interpretation only in a relative clause, especially when the predicate of the
relative clause is not interpreted de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki. In addition,
two pragmatic competitions regarding de se will also be presented with supporting data.
Chapter 6 turns our attention to both attitude and non-attitude environments of the
reflexive caki and develops the account of logophoric binding based on data that show LD
caki is subject to the notion of logophoricity in both environments. The new account will
diverge from our previous analysis in which the binder of caki is responsible for both its de
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se interpretation and LD dependency. Under our new account, long-distance binding and
the obligatory de se reading of caki are derived by two separate binders: a local logophoric
binder for LD dependency and a de se binder.
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CHAPTER 2

BACKGROUND ON LONG-DISTANCE ANAPHORS

2.1

Introduction

As mentioned in the Introduction (Chapter 1), this dissertation is based on a thorough
case study of the Korean long-distance reflexive caki with a focus on its (non-)de se interpretation, distribution, and interactions with other elements, including the third person pronoun and obligatory control PRO. As a first step, this chapter provides the reader
with basic background information regarding long-distance (LD) anaphors in general and
the Korean LD reflexive caki in detail. Section 2.2 presents an introductory overview on
anaphoric elements that form a long-distance dependency with their antecedents. It will
be shown that there are certain typological patterns of the long-distance reflexives across
languages. In Section 2.3, I begin by describing basic properties of the LD reflexive caki in
Korean, such as the person and animacy restrictions. I will then distinguish between the
reflexive caki with local and long-distance antecedents and will focus on the latter case
throughout the rest of the dissertation.

2.2

Long-distance anaphors

In a number of languages, anaphoric elements can find either a local or long-distance
antecedent; for instance, ziji in Chinese (Tang 1989, Huang and Tang 1991), sig in Ice-
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landic (Thráinsson 1976), proprio in Italian (Giorgi 1984), zibun in Japanese (Kuno 1972a),
dirinya in Malay (Cole and Hermon 1998), among many others.1 For instance, the Chinese
reflexive ziji can take a local subject or a matrix subject as its antecedent, as illustrated in
(1).

The long-distance anaphor ziji in Chinese

(1)

Zhangsani renwei [Lisij hai-le zijii/j ].
Zhangsan think Lisi hurt-asp self
‘Zhangsani thought that Lisij hurt himselfi/j .’

(Huang and Tang 1991, p.263)

These so-called “long-distance reflexives” in a number languages have been extensively discussed in the literature as a challenge to the canonical Binding Theory (Chomsky 1981). While there is a general similarity among various LD anaphors with respect
to their long-distance dependency with their antecedents, contrary to anaphors that are
strictly subject to the Binding Theory, there are also significant differences between such
elements across languages.
Based on an overview of typological properties of LD reflexives by Cole et al. (2001b),
1

There is another type of anaphoric expressions that only allow a long-distance dependency with their
antecedents; for example, zich in Dutch (Reinhart and Reuland 1993), ta(a)n in Tamil (Sundaresan 2012), etc.
(i)

The long-distance anaphor ta(a)n in Tamil
Ramani
[Seethaj
tann-æi,∗j kaadali-kkir-aaí-ǔnnǔ] kaïãupiãi-tt-aan.
Raman[nom] Seetha[nom] anaph-acc love-prs-3fsg-C
find.out-pst-3msg
‘Ramani found out that Seethaj loved himi,∗j .’

(Sundaresan 2012, p.9)

The so-called logophoric pronouns (or logophors) used in reported speech in some African languages,
such as yè in Ewe (Clements 1975), âi in Mupun (Frajzyngier 1993), etc., must also co-refer with an argument
in the matrix clause.
(ii)

The logophoric pronoun yè in Ewe
a.

b.

*Kofii lÕ yèi .
Kofi love log
‘*Kofii loves himselfi .’
Kofii be yèi -dzo.
Kofi say log-leave
‘Kofii said that hei left.’

(Clements 1975, p.150)
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I will point out two patterns of LD reflexives from a cross-linguistic perspective.2 The
first pattern regards the characterization of LD reflexives as bound anaphors or pronouns.
Bound anaphors usually require c-commanding antecedents, do not allow extra-sentential
antecedents, and yield only sloppy readings under VP ellipsis. On the other hand, pronouns do not require c-commanding antecedents, allow extra-sentential antecedents, and
yield both sloppy and strict readings under VP ellipsis. Given these contrasting properties of bound anaphors and pronouns, Cole et al. (2001b) present (at least) three patterns
of LD reflexives in terms of their anaphoric or pronominal characterization: (i) used as
bound anaphors (in Chechen/Ingush, Chinese, Hindi-Urdu, Kannada), (ii) used as bound
anaphors locally and as pronominals non-locally (in Turkish and Malay), and (iii) used
primarily as bound anaphors but as pronominals in specific syntactic and discourse contexts (the Chinese reflexive ziji with extra-sentential antecedent, Icelandic subjunctives,
and exempt anaphors in English).
The second pattern of LD reflexives concerns the role of discourse. Based on prior
studies, Cole et al. (2001b) show that certain discourse factors play an important role in
licensing LD reflexives in many languages, although specific discourse conditions that
matter may vary across languages. That is, LD reflexives require an antecedent who is
aware of the content of the clause containing the reflexive or whose perspective is represetned in the clause in languages like Kannada (Amritavalli 2000), Singapore Teochew
(Cole et al. 2001c), Chinese (Huang and Liu 2001), etc.3 To capture the fact that many LD
reflexives need to be associated with individuals that satisfy certain discourse roles with
respect to logophoricity, perspective, or point of view, syntactic approaches that encode
discourse-related factors structurally have also been proposed in the literature (Huang and
Liu 2001, Nishigauchi 2005, Nishigauchi and Kishida 2008, Nishigauchi 2014, Sundaresan
2012, Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, among others).
2

I refer the reader to Cole et al. (2001b) for further details.
Cole et al. (2001b) point out that LD refleixves are not subject to any discourse conditions in Turkish
and Malay, based on Cole and Hermon (1998) and Kornfilt (2001).
3
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In the remainder of this chapter and Chapter 3, I will show that the LD reflexive caki
in attitude environments behaves as a bound anaphor. On the other hand, we will see in
Chapter 6 that caki also exhibits pronominal properties when it appears in non-attitude
environments, such as relative and adjunct clauses. Moreover, it will be shown that caki
is subject to a discourse factor, namely, the notion of logophoricity, both in attitude and
non-attitude environments.

2.3

The long-distance reflexive caki in Korean

In this section, I will provide background information on the LD reflexive caki in Korean,
which can take a local or a long-distance antecedent. Section 2.3.1 presents basic common
properties of caki, which must hold regardless of the location of its antecedent. Section
2.3.2 points out some interesting properties of caki when it takes a local antecedent. Lastly,
we focus on differences between local and long-distance uses of caki in Section 2.3.3.

2.3.1

Basic properties of caki

Let us begin by examining some basic properties of the Korean reflexive caki. In Korean,
as in Chinese and Japanese, the LD reflexive caki allows either a local or long-distance
dependency with its antecedent. An illustrative example is given in (2). In (2), caki in
the embedded clause can not only refer to the embedded subject, but also to the matrix
subject.

(2)

The local and long-distance uses of caki
Johni -i
[Tomj -i cakii/j -lul silhehanta-ko] sayngkakhanta.
John-nom Tom-nom self-acc dislike-comp think
‘Johni thinks that Tomj dislikes himi /himselfj .’
Regardless of whether caki finds a local or long-distance antecedent, two general

restrictions hold for the reflexive caki in Korean: i) caki cannot have a 1st or 2nd person
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pronoun as its antecedent, and ii) it requires an animate antecedent (Lee 1973, Yang 1983,
Yoon 1989, Kang 1998, Kim and Yoon 2009, a.o.).4
Given the first general property of caki with respect to the person feature, the existence of the first or second person pronoun can disambiguate the referent of caki. As
shown in (3), caki can only co-refer with the 3rd person NP Tom, no matter it is a local or
LD antecedent.

No first or second person antecedent for caki

(3)

a.

Nai -nun [Tomj -i caki∗i/j -lul silhehanta-ko] sayngkakhanta.
I-top
Tom-nom self-acc
dislike-C
think
‘I think that Tomj dislikes himselfj /*me.’

b.

Tomi -un [nej -ka cakii/∗j -lul silhehanta-ko] sayngkakhanta.
Tom-top you-nom self-acc
dislike-Comp think
‘Tomi thinks that you dislike himi /*yourself.’5

Another Korean LD reflexive casin allows the 1st or 2nd person pronoun as its antecedent, in contrast
to caki, as shown in (i).
4

First or second person antecedent for casin

(i)

a.

b.

Nai -nun casini -ul mitnunta.
I-top
self-acc trust
‘I trust myself.’
Nei -nun casini -ul mite-yahanta
You-top self-acc trust-should
‘You should trust yourself.’

However, casin behaves like caki when it takes a long-distance antecedent. That is, the 1st or 2nd person
pronoun cannot serve as a long-distance antecedent of casin (Sohng 2004). This contrast is illustrated in (ii):
the first person pronoun in the matrix subject position cannot be a long-distance antecedent of casin, while
the local subject ‘I’ can.
No first or second person long-distance antecedent

(ii)

a.

b.

Nai -nun [Tomj -i casin∗i/j -ul silhehanta-ko] sayngkakhanta.
I-top
Tom-nom self-acc
dislike-C
think
‘Ii think that Tomj dislikes himselfj /*mei .’
Tomi -un [nayj -ka casini/j -ul silhehanta-ko] sayngkakhanta.
Tom-top I-nom
self-acc
dislike-Comp think
‘Tomi thinks that Ij dislike himi /myselfj .’

5

As Huang (1984) originally observed, an intermediate potential antecedent with a different person feature from the lower antecedent blocks any higher potential antecedents to bind the LD reflexive ziji in Chi-
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Moreover, it is not surprising that caki can never refer to the speaker or hearer of the
context of utterance, owing to the third-person restriction. As noted by previous authors
(e.g., Yang 1982, Park 1986, a.o.), caki can sometimes find an inter-sentential antecedent,
the one who is salient in the discourse. In such cases, the speaker or hearer of the utterance
context can still not be qualified as an antecedent of caki. Consider the following examples.

(4)

(5)

Third-person inter-sentential antecedent of caki
A:

John1 -i salam-ul ponay-ss-ni?
John-nom man-acc send-pst-int
‘Did John send a man?’

B:

Ani, caki1 -ka cikcep o-ass-e.
no self-nom in.person come-pst-decl
Lit. ‘No, self came in person.’

(Yang 1982)

No first or second person inter-sentential antecedent
A:

Ne1 -nun ecey
salam-ul ponay-ss-ni?
You-top yesterday man-acc send-pst-int
‘Did you send a man yesterday?’

B: #Ani, caki1 -ka cikcep ka-ss-e.
no self-nom in.person go-pst-decl
Lit. ‘#No, self went in person.’
B’: Ani, nay1 -ka cikcep ka-ss-e.
no I-nom in.person go-pst-decl
‘No, I went in person.’

In (4), caki can take an individual from the previous sentence, John, as its inter-sentential
nese, so-called ‘Blocking effects’. The examples in (3) show that there is no blocking effect by the 1st /2nd
person pronoun in Korean, unlike in Chinese.
(i)

Blocking effects in Chinese
a.

b.

Zhangsani renwei Lisij zhidao Wangwuk xihuan zijii/j/k .
Zhangsan think Lisi know Wangwu like
self
Lit. ‘Zhangsani thinks Lisij knows Wangwuk likes selfi/j/k .’
Zhangsani renwei woj zhidao Wangwuk xihuan ziji∗i/∗j/k .
Zhangsan think I
know Wangwu like
self
Lit. ‘Zhangsani thinks Ij know Wangwuk likes self∗i/∗j/k .’ (Cole and Sung 1994, p.92-93)
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antecedent. On the other hand, caki cannot be used to refer to the speaker of the utterance
in (5). Instead, the first person pronoun must be used, as shown in (5).6
The second general property of caki regrading animacy also restricts the possible
reference of the reflexive. In (6), the embedded subject ciek sinmwun ‘the local newspaper’
is not qualified as an antecedent of caki due to its inanimacy. Therefore, only the animate
subject John can be qualified as an antecedent of caki.
No inanimate antecedent for caki

(6)

Johni -i
[ciyek sinmwunj -i
cakii/∗j -lul piphanhayssta]-ko malhayssta.
John-nom local newspaper-nom caki-acc criticize-comp
said
‘Johni said that the local newspaper criticized himi .’
To summarize, we have seen that caki displays the following two general properties:
(i) caki cannot be coreferent with the first or second person pronoun under any circumstances, thus, (ii) it cannot refer to the speaker or hearer of the utterance context when it
is syntactically unbound, and (iii) the antecedent of caki must be animate.
6

LD reflexives in some languages do not exhibit the third person restriction. For example, unlike the person restriction on caki, there is no such restriction for the Chinese reflexive ziji. Therefore, the first/second
person pronoun can freely be a referent of ziji, as shown below.
(i)

No person restriction for the Chinese ziji
Woi juede [Lisij zai piping zijii/j ].
I
think Lisi at criticize self
‘Ii think that Lisij is criticizing mei /himselfj .’

(Huang and Liu 2001, p.162)

Furthermore, the syntactically unbound ziji can also refer to the speaker of the utterance (Yu 1992, Huang
and Liu 2001).
(ii)

First-person inter-sentential antecedent of ziji
Zhe-ge xiangfa, chule ziji, zhiyou san-ge ren
zancheng.
This-CL idea,
besides self only three-cl people agree
‘As for this idea, besides myself, only three other people agree.’ (Huang and Liu 2001, p.157)

According to Huang and Liu (2001), the sentence-free ziji in (ii) can be replaced with the first person pronoun
wo ‘I’.
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2.3.2

Local binding of caki

We have seen that caki can have either a local or a long-distance antecedent and there are
at least two general properties of caki. This subsection provides a brief discussion of the
properties of ‘local caki’.7
It is commonly assumed that when a LD reflexive finds a local antecedent, it is used
as a syntactic anaphor that needs to be bound by a c-commanding NP within a local
domain (e.g., Cole et al. 2001a, Huang and Liu 2001). It is true that caki exhibits some
properties that seem to obey Condition A like English-type anaphors when it is locally
bound (Lee 1973, Yang 1983, 1991, among many others). First, caki must be bound by a
c-commanding NP when it finds a local antecedent.

(7)

C-commanding antecedents
a.

Johni -i
cakii -lul piphanhayssta.
John-nom self-acc criticized
‘John criticized himself.’

b.

[[Johni -ul piphanha-n] Maryj ]-ka caki∗i/j -to piphanhayssta.
John-acc criticized-adn Mary-nom self-also criticized
‘Maryj , who criticized Johni , also criticized herselfj /*himi .’

In (7b), John inside the subject phrase cannot be an antecedent of caki because it does not
c-command caki, unlike Mary.
Second, local caki only allows a sloppy reading but not a strict reading under VP
ellipsis (Cho 1996).

7
For purposes of discussion, I will refer to caki associated with a local antecedent as ‘local caki’ and caki
with a long-distance antecedent as ‘long-distance (LD) caki’.
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Only sloppy readings under VP ellipsis

(8)

John-i
caki-lul kwasihayss-ko, Mary-to kule-hayssta.
John-nom self-acc overtrusted-and Mary-also did.so
‘John overtrusted himself, and Mary did, too.’
(= Mary overtrusted herself.)
(6= Mary overtrusted John.)

(Cho 1996, p.631)

Following Heim and Kratzer (1998), I will tentatively assume that caki is a variable that needs to be bound by a legitimate local binder.8 Given the requirement of a
c-commanding antecedent and a sloppy reading under ellipsis, we can characterize local
caki as a bound anaphor.
Although local binding of caki is not the main concern of this thesis, I will point
out some problematic properties of local caki that need to be accounted for. First, it has
been observed that only a subject can be an antecedent of the local anaphor caki (and ziji
in Chinese).9 Given that both a subject and an indirect object c-command a direct object,
both of them can bind the anaphor in the direct object position in English (Larson 1988).
However, in Korean (and Chinese), only a subject is qualified as an antecedent of caki (Lee
1973).

(9)

Johni introduced Tomj to himselfi/j .

(10)

Maryi -nun Johnj -eykey cakii/∗j -uy chayk-ul cwuessta.
Mary-top John-dat caki-gen book-acc gave
‘Maryi gave Johnj heri /*hisj book.’

Next, although it violates the c-commanding requirement, a possessor in a possessive NP subject can bind caki when the head noun is inanimate. As Tang (1989) first
observed for Chinese, the Chinese reflexive ziji can be bound by an NP contained in an
Alternative semantic analyses for local binding of caki may be possible. At this moment, I am not
arguing for any particular approach to local binding of caki.
9
According to Giorgi (2006), the subject orientation is only subject to LD anaphors but not to local
anaphors in Italian.
8
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NP that c-commands ziji. In other words, in some cases, an NP can bind ziji even though it
does not directly c-command the anaphor.10 The same contrast holds for Korean as well.
Consider the examples in (11) and (12).

(11)

(12)

Sub-commanding antecedents in Chinese
a.

[[Zhangsani de] baba]j dui ziji∗i/j mei xinxin.
Zhangsan DE father to self no confidence
‘Zhangsani ’s fatherj has no confidence in himself∗i/j .

b.

[[Zhangsani de] jiaoao]j hai-le
zijii/∗j
Zhangsan DE arrogance harm-perf self
‘Zhangsani ’s arrogance hurt himi/∗j .’

(Tang 1989)

Sub-commanding antecedents in Korean.
a.

[[Johni -uy] apecij ]-ka caki∗i/j -lul mangchiessta.
John-gen father-nom self-acc ruined
‘Johni ’s fatherj ruined *himi /himselfj .’

b.

[[Johni -uy] kyomanham]-i cakii -lul mangchiessta.
John-gen arrogance-nom self-acc ruined
‘Johni ’s arrogance ruined himi .’

The examples in (11) and (12) show that the possessor NP can bind ziji/caki only when the
head noun of the possessive clause is inanimate. Thus, zijii in (11a) and caki in (12a) can
only refer to the animate head noun ‘father’ instead of the possessor Zhangsan or John.
With respect to this behavior of ziji, Tang (1989) argues that ziji must be bound
by a "sub-commanding" binder that is not contained in another potential binder of ziji.
Sub-command is defined as below.

10

It has been pointed out to me by Rajesh Bhatt (p.c.) that an English anaphor can sometimes be used in
a similar way.
(i)

How Mark Zuckerberg’s Altruism Helps Himself
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(The New York Times, Dec. 3 2015)

(13)

β sub-commands α iff
a.

β c-commands α, or

b.

β is an NP contained in an NP that c-commands α or that sub-commands α,
and any argument containing β is in subject position.

(Tang 1989, p.101)

According to Tang, a potential binder of ziji is an NP that satisfies all conditions to be a
binder of ziji. Given the fact that the antecedent of ziji must be animate in Chinese, the
closest potential binder of ziji in (11a), then, is the NP baba ‘father’ instead of Zhangsan,
while it is Zhangsan in (11b) instead of ‘arrogance’. Since Zhangsan is not contained in
an NP that is a potential binder of ziji and sub-commands ziji in (11b), it can serve as an
antecedent of ziji.
The antecedent of caki can be deeply embedded in an NP if there is no other animate
NPs that can serve as an antecedent of caki. Also, there is no further semantic restriction
for inanimate nouns, such as inalienability, to allow sub-commanding.

(14)

[Johni -uy cha]-nun [cakii -uy pwuin-uy kes]-pota cakta.
John-gen car-top caki-gen wife-gen thing-than small
‘Johni ’s car is smaller than hisi wife’s car.’

(15)

[[Johni -uy cha]-uy saykkkal]-un [cakii -uy pwuin-uy kes]-kwa kathta.
John-gen car-gen color-top
caki-gen wife-gen thing-with same
‘The color of Johni ’s car is same as hisi wife’s car’s.’

To my knowledge, there is no satisfactory semantic account of these properties of local
binding of caki that (i) caki only finds a subject NP as its antecedent, and (ii) an animate
NP inside an inanimate NP can bind caki. Although the remainder of this dissertation
will mainly focus on LD binding of caki, especially with respect to its de se interpretation
and the notion of logophoricity, these properties should also be explained for a better
understanding of binding mechanism of the reflexive caki.1112
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2.3.3

Local vs. long-distance caki

Having presented the basic properties of caki and the local caki binding case, we will
now discuss issues of how to treat local caki and LD caki in this subsection. One of the
important issues surrounding LD reflexives is whether local and long-distance binding
cases of a LD reflexive should be treated uniformly or dichotomically, given the fact that
the same element can be either locally or long-distance bound. I will first present evidence
against the unified approach. Then I will argue that LD caki should be distinguished from
local caki in Korean.
One way to account for the local and long-distance binding cases of caki is to treat
them uniformly. For example, Han and Storoshenko (2012) propose a unified semantic
account of the LD reflexive caki. Specifically, they argue that caki is a bound variable that
12

It is worth noting that a seemingly similar phenomenon can be found in a quite unrelated construction
in English. That is, in control constructions, an animate possessor inside some inanimate NP can anomalously control PRO (Manzini 1983, Landau 1999). The contrast between Bill’s development and Bill’s friend
in that only Bill in the former can control PRO in (i) looks somewhat similar to the contrast we saw for
caki/ziji binding by a sub-commanding NP.
(i)

a.
b.

It would help [Bill1 ’s development] [PRO1 to behave himself1 in public].
*It would help [Bill1 ’s friends] [PRO1 to behave himself1 in public].
(Manzini 1983, Landau 1999)

Landau (1999) points out that not every NP embedded in a non-possible controller NP can control PRO.
Rather, he argues that only a small number of nouns that "denote abstract notions that reflect the individuality of the controller", such as career, status, confidence, performance, development, etc., allow this kind of
control. In other words, X in X’s NP, which he dubs a ‘logophoric extension of X’, can control PRO, when
an NP falls under this kind of special nouns. According to him, since the ‘logophoric extension of X’ is
not distinct from X, X can be a possible controller. Given this, he accounts for the contrast between Bill’s
development in (ia) and Bill’s car in (ii). That is, Bill’s development is a logophoric extension of Bill so that it
does not introduce a new individual, whereas Bill’s car, which is not a logophoric extension of Bill, denotes
two distinct individuals in the discourse, i.e. Bill and his car. Therefore, neither Bill nor Bill’s car can be a
controller.
(ii)

*It would help [Bill1 ’s car] [PRO1 to plan his itinerary in advance].

(Landau 1999)

One clear distinct property of caki binding by a sub-commanding NP is that the head inanimate nouns
that contain the antecedent of caki are not as restricted as the nouns that can be a logophoric extension of
the controller X, that is, NP in X’s NP. Unlike in English, where car is not a logophoric extension so it does
not allow its possessor to be a possible controller, the possessor John of the head NP cha ‘car’ can still be an
antecedent of caki, as shown in (14).
12
See also Pollard and Xue (1998) for a proposal that sub-commanding cases are subject to nonsyntactic
constraints.
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requires a semantic binder, which can vary across different structures. In other words,
local and LD caki are one and the same element under their account that can and must
be bound by any possible semantic binder. As shown in (16) and (17), the local and longdistance binding of caki are dealt with in the same way.13

(16)

Local semantic binding of caki
a.

[John-i
[1 [t1 caki1 -lul piphanha-yess-ta]]].
[John-nom
self-acc criticize-pst-decl
Lit. ‘Johni criticized selfi .’

b.

λP.P(j)(λx.x criticized x)
= j criticized j

(17)

(Han and Storoshenko 2012, p.781)

Long-distance semantic binding of caki
a.

[Motwu-ka
[1 [t1 [John2 -i caki1 -lul salangha-n-tako]
[everyone-nom
John-nom self-acc love-prs-C
sayngkakha-n-ta]]].
think-prs-decl
Lit. ‘Everyonei thinks that John loves selfi .’

b.

λP.∀y[y is a person][P(y)](λx.x thinks that John loves x)
= ∀y[y is a person][y thinks John loves y]
(Han and Storoshenko 2012, p.780)

In both of the local and long-distance binding cases above, caki is directly bound by a
binder introduced by QR of the antecedent NPs.
However, there is evidence against this unified approach to caki. The first piece of
evidence comes from a special interpretation of caki in long-distance binding cases. As we
discussed in the Introduction, the Korean LD reflexive caki is unambiguously interpreted
de se under attitude verbs, while no such interpretation is relevant in local binding cases.
Therefore, among two possible scenarios in (18), the sentence in (17) with LD caki can
13

Note that they treat proper names as generalized quantifiers that undergo QR. Therefore, the LF would
be same even when the universal quantifier in the matrix subject position in (17) is replaced with a proper
name.
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only be used in S1, where everyone has a de se belief.

(18)

Context: Mary, Sue, and Jane are talking about who John loves.
S1: Mary, Sue, and Jane each thinks, “John loves me.”
S2: Mary, Sue, and Jane each points out one girl in a photo and thinks, “John loves
this girl.” Unbeknownst to them, each girl pointed out herself.
Motwu1 -ka
[John2 -i caki1 -lul salangha-n-ta-ko] sayngkakha-n-ta.
[everyone-nom John-nom self-acc love-prs-decl-comp think-prs-decl
Lit. ‘Everyonei thinks that John loves selfi .’ [!S1, #S2]

On the other hand, the truth-conditions of this sentence shown in (17) predict for the
sentence to be true both in S1 and S2, contrary to the fact. This tells us that another LF
that derives stronger truth-conditions of (18) is required to capture the obligatory de se
interpretation of LD caki, while such an LF is not necessary for local caki. Therefore, in
order to pursue a unified account for caki, it must be accounted for why and how caki
receives an obligatory de se interpretation only when it is long-distance bound under
attitude verbs.
A piece of strong evidence supporting a dichotomy approach to local and LD caki
is obtained from interpretations of multiple caki’s appearing in the same clause. Under
multiple embeddings, multiple caki’s have three possible antecedents: two long-distance
antecedents and one local one. Since caki is only required to be bound by a semantic binder
with no further restrictions under the unified approach proposed by Han and Storoshenko
(2012), we would expect that there are nine different possible readings of the sentence
in (19) with the multiple occurrence of caki in the most embedded clause. Contrary to
the prediction, however, two particular readings are not available from this sentence (as
originally observed by Pan (1997) for the Chinese reflexive ziji): that is, multiple caki’s
cannot take different LD antecedents.
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(19)

Multiple clausemate caki’s
John-i
[Tom-i [Mary-ka caki-uy chayk-ul caki-uy chinkwu-eykey
John-nom Tom-nom Mary-nom self-gen book-acc self-gen friend-to
cwuessta-ko] sayngkakhayssta-ko] malhayssta.
gave-comp thought-comp
said
Lit. ‘John said that Tom thought that Mary gave self’s book to self’s friend.’
a.

‘...Mary gave self (=Mary)’s book to self (=Mary)’s friend.’

b.

‘...Mary gave self (=Tom)’s book to self (=Tom)’s friend.’

c.

‘...Mary gave self (=John)’s book to self (=John)’s friend.’

d.

‘...Mary gave self (=Mary)’s book to self (=Tom)’s friend.’

e.

‘...Mary gave self (=Tom)’s book to self (=Mary)’s friend.’

f.

‘...Mary gave self (=Mary)’s book to self (=John)’s friend.’

g.

‘...Mary gave self (=John)’s book to self (=Mary)’s friend.’

h. *‘...Mary gave self (=Tom)’s book to self (=John)’s friend.’
i.

*‘...Mary gave self (=John)’s book to self (=Tom)’s friend.’

The unavailable readings of multiple caki’s in (19h) and (19i) cannot be explained under
the assumption that both local and LD caki are a semantic variable that requires any
suitable semantic binder. For instance, it is mysterious why an LF like (20a) would be
possible, while one in (20b) would not.

(20)

a.

John λ1 t1 said that Tom λ2 t2 thought that Mary λ3 t3 gave self1 ’s book to
self3 ’s friend

b.

*John λ1 t1 said that Tom λ2 t2 thought that Mary λ3 t3 gave self1 ’s book to
self2 ’s friend

Our data support the view that LD caki behaves differently from local caki in terms of
binding. While it may be true that caki in both local and LD cases need a semantic binder,
as Han and Storoshenko (2012) argue, a simple unified account that caki can be bound by
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any possible binder appears to be too weak to capture the obligatory de se interpretation
of LD caki and the restriction on interpretations of multiple caki’s in the same clause.
Given how LD caki is interpreted, it seems that LD caki must be bound by some particular
binder, as opposed to any possible binder. Thus, a special treatment for LD caki needs to
be provided. Throughout this thesis, I will assume that a semantic mechanism for LD caki
is distinct from that of local caki, based on evidence presented in this section.

2.4

Conclusion

This chapter has provided a brief background on LD anaphors and introduction to the
LD reflexive caki in Korean for a detailed discussion on the interpretation and binding
mechanism of caki that will be given throughout the remainder of this dissertation. First,
I have shown that there are two general properties of caki: it must take a third-person and
animate antecedent. Second, while local caki behaves like a locally bound anaphor, LD
caki exhibits distinctive characteristics in terms of its de se interpretation and interaction
with a clausemate caki. The key similarities and differences between local caki and LD
caki are summarized in 2.1.
Table 2.1: The comparison between Local caki and LD caki

Third person
Animacy
Obligatory de se
Obligatory coreference with a clausemate caki

Local caki
!
!
%
%

LD caki
!
!
!
!

In the next chapter, given that binding of LD caki appears to be more restricted
than local caki, I will put forth an account of long-distance binding of LD caki in attitude
environments. It will be shown that LD caki must be bound by a suitable binder that
satisfies its binding conditions as opposed to any semantic binder.

33

CHAPTER 3
DE SE ATTITUDE REPORTS

3.1

Introduction

As I have mentioned in Chapter 1 and Chapter 2, the LD reflexive caki in Korean receives
an obligatory de se interpretation in attitude reports. In light of this, this chapter is devoted
to a discussion of the semantics of attitude reports with the embedded reflexive caki that
specifically encodes de se attitudes.
In this chapter, I will mainly propose binding conditions for LD caki that are developed based on a particular semantic mechanism for de se elements, namely, the property
approach of Lewis (1979) and Chierchia (1989). In particular, I will argue that LD caki
is a bound variable that requires a specific binder, a closest abstractor that is introduced
by an attitude verb that bears a special feature [log]. While the de se interpretation of
caki can naturally be derived by it being bound by an individual abstractor under attitude
verbs (with certain semantics of attitude verbs), other properties of caki, such as no locality condition and obligatory coreference between multiple caki’s, can be explained by our
proposed binding conditions for caki, that is, the locality and feature-match conditions.
The organization of this chapter is as follows. In 3.2, I will begin by briefly considering de se attitude reports, especially those with elements that obligatorily receive a de se
interpretation. In 3.3, I draw attention to the interesting properties of LD caki appearing
under attitude verbs. Section 3.4 then shows that LD caki consistently receives an unam34

biguous de se interpretation in attitude reports. After laying the empirical groundwork
in Sections 3.3 and 3.4, Section 3.5 proposes a de se binding account of the reflexive caki
on the basis of the dedicated de se construal. Section 3.6 provides comparisons between
our proposal and two existing approaches and illustrates the advantage of our proposal.
Finally, Section 3.7 discusses other constructions that involve attitudes and shows that LD
caki is unambiguously interpreted de se in those constructions as well.

3.2

Background on de se attitude reports

Since the 1960−1970’s, certain mental attitudes toward oneself, i.e. de se attitudes, have
received much attention in the philosophical literature (Castañeda 1966, Lewis 1979). In
the linguistic literature, the issue of de se attitude ascriptions has become a focus of the
debate on de se.
In his seminal work on the semantics of de se attitude reports, Chierchia (1989) has
shown that there are expressions in natural language that can only be used in certain attitude reports that describe someone’s attitudes toward oneself, i.e. de se attitudes. One
of the most well-known examples of linguistic expressions that specifically encode de se
attitudes involves obligatory control PRO, as noted by Chierchia (1989). Consider the following contrast between the third person pronoun and obligatory control PRO in English.

(1)

The third person pronoun vs. PRO in English
S1 (de se): John says: "I should be elected."
S2 (de re): John is so drunk that he has forgotten that he is a candidate in the
election. He watches someone on TV and finds that that person is a terrific candidate, who should definitely be elected. Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is
watching on TV is John himself.
a.

John hopes that he will be elected. [!S1, !S2]

b.

John hopes PRO to be elected. [!S1, #S2]
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(Schlenker 2003)

In the situation S1 in (1), John holds an attitude about himself in a first-person way, using
the first person pronoun in his direct speech. By contrast, in S2, although John has an
attitude about himself, he is not aware that his attitude is toward himself. In other words,
John has a (non-de se) de re attitude in S2 and a de se attitude in S1 toward himself. As
shown in (1a), the attitude report sentence containing the third person pronoun can describe both of the situations in S1 and S2, indicating that the third person pronoun can be
interpreted de se or (non-de se) de re. On the other hand, the obligatory control construction with the null subject PRO in (1b) can only be used under the scenario in S1, where
John holds a de se attitude. Contrary to the third person pronoun, obligatory control PRO
in attitude reports is unambiguously interpreted de se.
In addition to PRO, it has been found in the literature that there are other linguistic expressions in a number of languages that are obligatorily interpreted de se in attitude reports, such as logophoric pronouns, long-distance reflexives, shifted indexicals,
etc. (Chierchia 1989, Schlenker 1999, Huang and Liu 2001, Schlenker 2003, Anand and
Nevins 2004, Anand 2006, Pearson 2013, among many others). For instance, the longdistance reflexive ziji in Chinese, the logophor oun in Yoruba, and a shifted indexical in
Zazaki are felicitous in attitude reports only when the attitude holder has a de se attitude,
as shown in (2)−(4).

(2)

The Chinese reflexive ziji as a de se expression
S1: Zhangsan says: "That thief stole my purse!"
S2: Zhangsan says: "That thief stole that purse!" (Unbeknownst to Zhangsan, it’s
his own purse.)
Zhangsan shuo pashou
tou-le
ziji-de pibao.
Zhangsan say pickpocket steal-perf ziji-DE purse
‘Zhangsani said that the pickpocket stole hisi purse.’ [!S1, #S2]
(Huang and Liu 2001, p.158)
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The Yoruba logophor oun as a de se expression

(3)

S1: He says: "I saw John."
S2: He says: "That guy saw John." (Unbeknownst to him, that guy is him himself.)
ói so pé ouni rí John.
o say that oun see John
‘Hei said that hei saw John.’ [!S1, #S2]

(Anand 2006, p.56)

A shifted indexical in Zazaki as a de se expression1

(4)

S1: Hensen says: "I am rich."
S2: Hensen says: "That guy is rich." (Unbeknownst to him, that guy is Hensen
himself.)
HEsenij
(m1k -ra) va kE Ezj dEwletia.
Hessen.obl (I.obl-to) said that I rich.be-prs
‘Hensen said that he is rich.’ [!S1, #S2]

(Anand and Nevins 2004)

One of the key issues of de se attitude reports in the semantics field, especially with
those elements with the obligatory de se interpretation, is their LFs and truth-conditions.
In particular, prior authors draw attention to questions such as: do we need distinct LFs
for de se attitude reports?; if so, how many different LFs are needed for attitude reports
with a number of different de se expressions? It has been widely assumed that attitude
reports that contain the third person pronoun have truth-conditions, derived from some
coarse de re LF, that are true both when the attitude holder has a (non-de se) de re or de
se attitude (Chierchia 1989, Percus and Sauerland 2003, Anand 2006, Maier 2011, a.o.).
However, dedicated de se LFs that are distinct from de re LFs have also been proposed,
motivated by the elements that are unambiguously interpreted de se in attitude reports
(Chierchia 1989, Percus and Sauerland 2003, Anand 2006, a.o.). Anand (2006) explores
distinct mechanisms for de se ascriptions and proposes three different ways, as shown in
1

Since indexical shift is optional in Zazaki, the first person pronoun in (4) can also refer to the speaker
of the utterance context.
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(9). Besides those elements that can receive a de se or (non-de se) de re interpretation like
pronouns, Anand (2006) divides various unambiguous de se elements into two types: (i)
the semantic type, which is affected by the context-shift operator, and (ii) the syntactic
type, which is bound by a syntactic operator.

(5)

Anand’s three distinct ‘routes to de se’
a.

Default (de re ascription): pronouns

b.

Semantic (context-overwriting): shifted indexicals, Mandarin1 ziji, Malayalam
taan

c.

Syntactic (binding by operator): Yoruba oun, English dream-selves, Icelandic
sig, Japanese zibun, Mandarin2 ziji

(Anand 2006, p.11)

Roughly speaking, it is assumed that the lexical meanings of de se expressions that fall
under the "semantic" type are like indexicals so that their meanings are determined with
respect to certain aspects of the context, such as speaker, time, location, etc. (Kaplan 1989).
On the other hand, the elements in the "syntactic" type are treated as a variable that
needs to be bound by a suitable operator, which turns propositions into properties, at LF
(Chierchia 1989). For purposes of discussion, I will refer to the former kind of approach as
the ‘indexical approach’ and the latter type as the ‘property approach’. A more detailed
examination of these approaches will be provided later in this chapter.
The Korean reflexive caki is one of the expressions that require a de se interpretation
in attitude environments, as illustrated below.
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(6)

The Korean reflexive caki as a de se expression
S1: John says: "Mary likes me."
S2: John says: "Mary likes this guy in the photo." Unbeknownst to John, the guy in
the photo is John himself.
John-i
[Mary-ka caki-lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta.
John-nom Mary-nom self-acc like-comp
said
‘John said that Mary likes him.’ [!S1, #S2]

Attitude reports with the third person pronoun in Korean, on the other hand, can describe
a de se or a (non-de se) de re attitude of the attitude holder, as in English.

(7)

The Korean third person pronoun ku
S1: John says: "Mary likes me."
S2: John says: "Mary likes this guy in the photo." Unbeknownst to John, the guy in
the photo is John himself.
John-i
[Mary-ka ku-lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta.
John-nom Mary-nom he-acc like-comp
said
‘John said that Mary likes him.’ [!S1, !S2]

While LD caki exhibits a broad distribution in attitude reports, it must obtain a de se
interpretation. Accordingly, the remainder of this chapter will be devoted to a distribution
and interpretation of LD caki in attitude reports. To highlight unique properties of LD caki,
a comparison with the third person pronoun will also be made.

3.3

The long-distance reflexive caki in attitude reports

In this section, I will present data showing that the Korean LD reflexive caki embedded
under attitude verbs is obligatorily interpreted de se. I will present four main properties
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of the reflexive caki when it takes a long-distance antecedent: namely, no locality restriction, (non-)subject-orientation, obligatory coreference between multiple LD caki’s, and
obligatory sloppy readings under ellipsis.

3.3.1

No locality restriction

The Korean reflexive caki occurring in complements of attitude verbs can find its antecedent from any embedding clause, as illustrated below.2

LD caki in subject and object position

(8)

a.

Maryi -ka [John-i
cakii -lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta.
Mary-nom John-nom self-acc like-comp
said
‘Maryi said that John likes heri .’

b.

Maryi -ka [cakii -ka John-lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta.
Mary-nom self-nom John-acc like-comp
said
‘Maryi said that shei likes John.’

Under our assumption that LD caki, which is associated with a long-distance antecedent, is distinguished from local caki, which behaves as a typical anaphor that obeys Condition A, one may wonder
whether caki in an embedded subject position should be considered as a local or LD caki when it refers to
a subject in the immediately embedding clause, as in (8b), given that the immediately embedding clause
containing a subject can be understood as a local binding domain for an anaphor in subject position (e.g.
Huang 1983, Chomsky 1986). In fact, a local anaphor cackicasin in Korean can indeed appear in subject
position and co-refer with a subject of the immediately embedding clause.
2

(i)

No long-distance dependency for the Korean anaphor cakicasin
Johni -un [Maryj -ka cakicasin∗i/j -ul salanghanta-ko] sayngkakhanta.
John-top Mary-nom ana-acc
love-comp
think
‘Johni thinks that Maryj loves herselfj /*himi .’

(ii)

Cakicasin in subject position
Johni -un [cakicasini -i ttokttokhata-ko] sayngkakhanta.
John-top anaph-nom smart-comp
think
‘Johni thinks that hei is smart.’

Assuming that a local anaphor must be bound by a legitimate local binder, I will show later that the closest
legitimate binder for a local anaphor in subject position is the binder that derives a de se interpretation.
Therefore, even a local anaphor must be interpreted de se in attitude reports when it appears in the embedded
subject position.
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There is no locality restriction on the binding domain of LD caki. That is, caki can corefer with a subject in any superordinate clause. Thus, in (9), caki can find its antecedent
in either the matrix clause, i.e. Tom, or the intermediate clause, i.e. Mary.3

No locality restriction

(9)

3.3.2

a.

Tomi -un [Maryj -ka [John-i
cakii/j -lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta-ko]
Tom-top Mary-nom John-nom self-acc like-comp
said-comp
sayngkakhanta.
think
‘Tomi thinks that Maryj said that John likes himi /herj .’

b.

Tomi -un [Maryj -ka [cakii/j -ka ttokttokhata-ko] malhayssta-ko]
Tom-top Mary-nom self-nom smart-comp
said-comp
sayngkakhanta.
think
‘Tomi thinks that Maryj said that hei /shej is smart.’

(Non-)Subject-orientation

LD reflexives or logophors are strictly subject-oriented in some languages (e.g., Chinese
ziji or Italian LD anaphors), and thus they can never co-refer with a non-subject element.
In most cases, it is unavailable for the Korean LD reflexive caki to refer to a non-subject
NP as well, as illustrated in (10).

(10)

Subject-orientation
a.

Johni -i
Maryj -eykey [Tom-i
cakii/∗j -lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta.
John-nom Mary-to
Tom-nom self-acc
like-comp
said
‘Johni said to Maryj that Tom likes himi /*herj .’

b.

Johni -i
Maryj -eykey [cakii/∗j -ka ikyessta-ko] malhayssta.
John-nom Mary-to
self-nom won-comp said
‘Johni said to Maryj that hei /*shej won.’

However, it has been reported that there are certain cases where caki (as well as
Japanese zibun) can refer to a non-subject element (e.g., Kuno 1972b, Sells 1987, Yoon
3

In addition, caki can also be bound by the local subject John.
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1989). For instance, when the embedding verb is tutta ‘hear’, caki can take not only the
matrix subject, but also the oblique source NP as its antecedent.4 The examples in (11)
and (12) illustrate that caki, either in the embedded subject or object position, can refer to
a non-subject NP only when the matrix verb is tutta ‘hear’, but not malhata ‘say’.5
‘Say’ vs. ‘Hear’ in Korean with caki in subject position

(11)

a.

Johni -i
Maryj -eykey [cakii/∗j -ka am-ila-ko]
malhayssta.
John-nom Mary-to
self-nom cancer-be-comp said
‘Johni said to Maryj that hei /*shej has cancer.’

b.

Johni -i
Maryj -lopwute [cakii/j -ka am-ila-ko]
tulessta.
John-nom Mary-from
self-nom cancer-be-comp heard
‘Johni heard from Maryj that hei /shej has cancer.’
(Yoon 1989)

In contrast to Korean or Japanese, the LD reflexive ziji in Chinese is strictly subject-oriented with no
exceptions.
4

(i)

Strict subject-orientation in Chinese
Zhangsani cong Lisij chu tingshuo Wangwuk bu xihuan zijii/∗j/k .
Zhangsan from Lisi place hear
Wangwu not like
self
‘Zhangsani heard from Lisij that Wangwuk didn’t like himi/∗j /himselfk .’
(Pollard and Xue 1998, p.296)

5
The same contrast is found in Ewe (the logophor yè) and Japanese (the LD reflexive zibun) (Clements
1975, Sells 1987). Although both Clements (1975) and Sells (1987) report that there are some speakers who do
not allow the coreference reading between the logophori/LD reflexive and the non-subject NP even under
the verb ‘hear’ in Ewe and Japanese, the contrast is still robust, according to them.

(i)

‘Say’ vs. ‘Hear’ in Ewe
a.

b.

(ii)

Tsali gblO na-e be ye-e dyi yè gake yè-kpe dyi.
Tsali say to-he that he beget log but log-be victor
‘Tsalii told himj that hej begot himi , but hei was the victor.’
Ama se tso Kofu gbo be yè-xO
nunana.
Ama hear from Kofi side that log-receive gift
‘Amai heard from Kofij that shei /hej had received a gift’

(Clements 1975, p.154, (31))

(Clements 1975, p.159, (45))

‘Say’ vs. ‘Hear’ in Japanese
a.

b.

Takasii -wa Tarooj -ni [Yosiko-ga zibuni/∗j -o nikundeiru-koto]-o hanasita.
Takasi-top Taroo-dat Yosiko-nom self-acc
be-hating-comp-acc told
‘Takasii told Tarooj that Yosiko hated himi/∗j .’
(Sells 1987, p.453, (28))
Tarooi -wa Takasij -kara [Yosiko-ga zibuni/j -o nikundeiru-to] kiita.
Taroo-top Takasi-from Yosiko-nom self-acc be-hating-comp heard
‘Tarooi heard from Takasij that Yosiko hated himi/j .’
(Sells 1987, p.454, (31))
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(12)

‘Say’ vs. ‘Hear’ in Korean with caki in object position
a.

Johni -i
Maryj -eykey [Tom-i
cakii/∗j -lul silhehanta-ko] malhayssta.
John-nom Mary-to
Tom-nom self-acc
dislike-comp said
‘Johni said to Maryj that Tom dislikes himi /*herj .’

b.

Johni -i
Maryj -lopwute [Tom-i
cakii/j -lul silhehanta-ko] tulessta.
John-nom Mary-from
Tom-nom self-acc dislike-comp heard
‘Johni heard from Maryj that Tom dislikes himi /herj .’

Therefore, although it is true that a subject can always be an antecedent of caki, we cannot
generalize that LD caki is strictly subject-oriented whatsoever. How can we account for
the contrast seen above, then? The only difference between Mary in (11a) and (12a), on the
one hand, and (11b) and (12b), on the other, is that she can be understood as the reported
speaker in the latter cases, e.g. Mary says, ‘I have cancer’ or ‘Tom dislikes me’. Thus, we
may conclude that LD caki must co-refer with a subject NP of an attitude verb or a nonsubject NP when it can be understood as the reported speaker or attitude holder—that is,
the embedded clause containing caki expresses a speech act or attitude of the non-subject
NP.6

3.3.3

Obligatory coreference between multiple caki’s

Next, LD caki shows an interesting property when multiple LD caki’s co-occur in the same
clause, as already mentioned in Section 2.3.3. For the LD reflexive ziji in Chinese, Huang
and Liu (2001) present a restriction on clausemate ziji’s in a doubly embedded sentence,
which was originally observed by Pan (1997): that is, more than one LD ziji in the same
embedded clause must find the same long-distance antecedent. In the example below with
Not surprisingly, an NP inside a non-subject NP cannot be understood as an antecedent of caki, as
shown in (i).
6

(i)

Johni -i [Maryj -uy enni]k -lopwute [cakii/∗j/k -ka am-ila-ko] tulessta.
John-nom Mary-gen sister-from self-nom cancer-be-comp heard
‘Johni heard from Maryj ’s sister that hei /*shej /shek has cancer.’

Since only the subject John and the entire non-subject NP ‘Mary’s sister’ can be understood as the reported
speaker in (i), the genitive NP Mary cannot serve as an antecedent of caki.
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a multiple occurrence of ziji in the most embedded clause, a disjoint reading is possible
only when one of the ziji’s is bound by the local subject WW, as shown in (13b)–(13c).
However, in order for both of the ziji’s to take a long-distance antecedent, they must
refer to the same individual, either ZS or LS, as in (13a). Therefore, the interpretations in
(13d)–(13e), where the multiple ziji’s refer to the different long-distance antecedents, are
unavailable.

(13)

Obligatory coreference between multiple ziji’s in Chinese
ZS renwei [LS zhidao [WW ba ziji1 de shu song-gei-le ziji2 de
ZS think LS know WW BA self gen book gave-to-perf self gen
pengyou.]]
friend
Lit. ‘ZS thinks that LS knows that WW sent self’s book to self’s friend.’
a.

ziji1 = ziji2 = WW or LS or ZS

b.

ziji1 = WW, ziji2 = LS or ZS

c.

ziji1 = ZS or LS, ziji2 = WW

d. *ziji1 = ZS, ziji2 =LS
e. *ziji1 = LS, ziji2 =ZS
Similarly, multiple LD caki’s in the same embedded clause under attitude predicates
must be co-referential. Consider the interpretations of the following sentence with more
than one caki in the most embedded clause.
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(14)

Obligatory coreference between multiple caki’s
John-i
[Bill-i
[caki-uy emmeni-ka caki-lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom self-gen mother-nom self-acc hate-comp
sayngkakhanta-ko] malhayssta.
think-comp
said
a.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himi .’

b.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himj .’

c. *‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himj .’
d. *‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himi .’
e.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that [hisi mother]k hates herk .’

f.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that [hisj mother]k hates herk .’

The readings in (14a)–(14d) show that multiple caki’s must find the same long-distance
antecedent in Korean, as observed in Chinese (Pan 1997, Huang and Liu 2001). The unavailable readings in (14c) and (14d) indicate that once there is a long-distance dependency between one caki and a LD antecedent that is closer to caki than other possible antecedents, then another clausemate caki must be associated with the same LD antecedent
(e.g., Bill in (14)). By contrast, we can also observe from (14e)–(14f) that the two caki’s
can have different antecedents when one caki is locally bound while the other caki takes
a long-distance antecedent, indicating that a mechanism for long-distance binding of caki
may be distinguished from the one for local binding of caki. The possible and impossible readings of the sentence with the multiple clausemate LD caki’s are schematically
illustrated in (15).

(15)

a.

!Coreference of multiple caki’s I

[CP 1 N P1 ...[CP 2 N P2 ...[CP 3 caki2 ... caki2 ]]]
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b.

!Coreference of multiple caki’s II
[CP 1 N P1 ...[CP 2 N P2 ...[CP 3 caki1 ... caki1 ]]]

c.

%Disjoint reference of multiple caki’s I
X

∗[CP 1 N P1 ...[CP 2 N P2 ...[CP 3 caki1 ... caki2 ]]]
d.

%Disjoint reference of multiple caki’s II
X

∗[CP 1 N P1 ...[CP 2 N P2 ...[CP 3 caki2 ... caki1 ]]]
The ‘coreference restriction’ on multiple clausemate caki’s holds for cases where
there is more one possible LD antecedent in the same clause. Recall that caki, unlike ziji
in Chinese, can refer to a non-subject NP if the referent of the NP can be understood as
the speaker in the reported context with the verb ‘hear’. Since a subject NP can always
be an antecedent of caki, there are two possible antecedents in the matrix clause with the
attitude verb tutta ‘hear’, as shown in (16). In this case, when multiple caki’s occurring in
the embedded clause take a long-distance antecedent, they still have to find the same LD
antecedent: either the matrix subject John or the oblique NP Mary, who can be understood
as the reported speaker.

(16)

John-i
Mary-lopwuthe [caki-uy emmeni-ka caki-lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Mary-from
self-gen mother-nom self-acc hate-comp
tulessta.
heard
a.

‘Johni heard from Maryj that hisi mother hates himi .’

b.

‘Johni heard from Maryj that herj mother hates herj .’

c. *‘Johni heard from Maryj that hisi mother hates herj .’
d. *‘Johni heard from Maryj that herj mother hates himi .’
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(17)

a.

!Coreference Reading I

[CP 1 N P1 ... N P2 ... [CP 2 caki1 ... caki1 ]]]

b.

!Coreference Reading II

[CP 1 N P1 ... N P2 ... [CP 2 caki2 ... caki2 ]]]

The data presented so far indicate that multiple caki’s in the same domain must
be associated with the same referent, only when caki takes a long-distance antecedent.
Multiple caki’s in different domains, on the other hand, are not subject to the coreference
restriction. Although nothing blocks the possibility of coreference between multiple caki’s
in the different clauses, they can also find an antecedent independently from a higher
clause, as shown below.7

(18)

Disjoint Reading of multiple caki’s
John-i
[Bill-i caki-eykey [Mary-ka caki-lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom self-to
Mary-nom self-acc hate-comp
malhayssta-ko] sayngkakhanta.
said-comp
think

(19)

a.

‘Johni thinks that Billj told himi that Mary hates himi .’

b.

‘Johni thinks that Billj told himi that Mary hates himj .’

!Disjoint reference of multiple caki’s in different clauses

[CP 1 N P1 ...[CP 2 N P2 ... caki1 ... [CP 3 ...caki2 ...]]]

The reading where both caki’s refer to the intermediate subject Bill is also available. In this case, however, caki in the intermediate clause is bound by the local subject, i.e. local binding, while the lower caki is
long-distance bound by Bill.
7
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Further suppose that the sentence in (18) is embedded under another attitude verb.
As expected, then, caki in the lower clause cannot find its antecedent from a clause higher
than the clause containing the antecedent of the higher caki. Assuming that the lower
caki in (19) finds an antecedent above CP2 , then NP1 in CP1 becomes the only possible
antecedent, because both caki’s are now in the same domain and they must find the same
antecedent. In other words, unless the lower caki finds an antecedent in CP1 in a configuration like (20), the multiple caki’s are in the same domain and need to refer to the same
long-distance antecedent, i.e., NP0 or NP1 in (20). Thus, a disjoint reading is not available,
as shown in (20).

(20)

%Disjoint Reading of multiple caki’s in different clauses
X

[CP 0 N P0 ...[CP 1 N P1 ...[CP 2 N P2 ... caki1 [CP 3 ...caki0 ...]]]]

By contrast, multiple clausemate third person pronouns do not need to find the same
referent. For example, in a doubly embedded sentence in (21), multiple pronouns in the
complement of the verb ‘think’ can be disjoint in reference.

(21)

!Disjoint reference of multiple pronouns
John-i
[Bill-i
[ku-uy emmeni-ka ku-lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom he-gen mother-nom he-acc hate-comp
sayngkakhanta-ko] malhayssta.
think-comp
said
a.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himi .’

b.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himj .’

c.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himj .’

d.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himi .’

The contrast between the LD reflexive caki and the third person pronoun would follow
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from an assumption that only caki is subject to certain restrictions on its dependency with
a long-distance antecedent.
In this subsection, we have seen that multiple LD caki’s in the same clause must
be coreferent, unlike the third person pronoun. More concretely, if there is any longdistance dependency between one reflexive caki and its antecedent, any other caki in the
same clause or in any lower clause cannot find an antecedent from a clause higher than
that antecedent NP.

3.3.4

Sloppy readings under ellipsis

Cole et al. (2001c) point out that only a sloppy reading is available for the Chinese reflexive
ziji under VP ellipsis, similar to PRO. Consider the contrast between (22) and (23). The
LD reflexive ziji in (22) only gets a sloppy reading in VP ellipsis, whereas the third person
pronoun ta in (23) allows both a strict and a sloppy reading.

(22)

Zhangsani shuo [Lisi changchang kuidai zijii ], Wangwu ye yiyang.
Zhangsan say Lisi always
mistreat self Wangwu also the-same
‘Zhangsani says that Lisi always mistreats himi ; so does Wangwu’
a.

[says Lisi mistreats Wangwu].’

(sloppy reading)

b. *[says Lisi mistreats Zhangsan].’
(23)

(*strict reading)

Zhangsani shuo [Lisi changchang kuidai tai ], Wangwu ye yiyang.
Zhangsan say Lisi always
mistreat he Wangwu also the-same
‘Zhangsani says that Lisi always mistreats himi ; so does Wangwu’
a.

[says Lisi mistreats Zhangsan]

b.

[says Lisi mistreats Wangwu]

(strict reading)
(sloppy reading)

Similarly, LD caki under attitude verbs only gets a sloppy interpretation under VP
ellipsis (e.g., Cho 1996, Kim and Yoon 2009, Han and Storoshenko 2012).8

8

Strictly speaking, the sentence in (24) contains a VP proform for non-action predicates kule-hata.
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(24)

John-i
caki-ka ceyilila-ko sayngkakhayss-ko, Bill-to kule-hayssta.
John-nom self-nom best-comp thought-and
Bill-also so-did
Lit. ‘Johni thought that selfi was the best and Bill did, too.’
a.

Bill thought that Bill was the best, too.

(sloppy reading)

b. *Bill thought that John was the best, too.

(*strict reading)
(Cho 1996, p.631)

In contrast to the LD reflexive caki, the third person pronoun in Korean allows both a
sloppy and strict reading under VP ellipsis, as in many languages.

(25)

John-i
ku-uy emeni-ka
ceyilila-ko sayngkakhayss-ko, Bill-to
John-nom he-gen mother-nom best-comp thought-and
Bill-also
kule-hayssta.
so-did
Lit. ‘Johni thought that hisi mother was the best and Bill did, too.’
a.

Bill thought that Bill’s mother was the best, too.

b.

Bill thought that John’s mother was the best, too.

(sloppy reading)
(strict reading)

The contrast between caki and ku ‘he’ indicates that LD caki under attitude verbs is not
merely coreferential with its antecedent, but needs to be bound by a semantic binder,
unlike the third person pronoun.
In this section, we have seen that LD caki embedded under attitude verbs exhibits
the following properties: (i) caki can refer to any attitude holder in a multiple embedded
sentence, (ii) it can sometimes refer to a non-subject NP when the NP can be understood
as a reported speaker, (iii) multiple clausemate LD caki’s must find the same long-distance
antecedent, and (iv) LD caki only allows a sloppy reading under ellipsis.

3.4

Obligatory de se interpretations of caki

Having presented the properties of LD caki, this section will show that LD caki in the
complements of attitude verbs that we saw in the preceding section consistently exhibits
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a property that it must receive a de se interpretation.9 In this section, I will provide a
careful examination of the de se requirement for LD caki.
Obligatory de se in CP complements of attitude verbs

3.4.1

Prior studies on logophors/LD reflexives have shown that these elements must be interpreted de se in a number of languages (Kuno 1972b, Chierchia 1989, Pan 1997, 2001, Huang
and Liu 2001, Anand 2006, a.o.).10 Before the term “de se” was widely used in the linguistics literature, Kuno (1972b) proposed that some complement clauses are derived from a
direct discourse representation, and LD reflexives like zibun in Japanese in such complement clauses are stated as the first person pronoun in the direct discourse by the bearer of
attitude, namely, the antecedent of the LD reflexive. According to Kuno, then, the Japanese
LD reflexive can only be used when its referent is aware of the state or action represented
by the complement clause so that she refers to herself using the first person pronoun in
her speech act. This observation captures one of the core properties of LD reflexives in
various languages that they obligatorily receive a de se reading in the complement clauses
of attitude verbs.
It is also well known that the LD reflexive ziji in Chinese must be interpreted de se
under attitude predicates (Pan 1997, 2001, Huang and Liu 2001, Anand 2006, a.o.). Thus,
ziji in (26) is only felicitous under a context like ‘S1’ in (26), where the direct speech of
the attitude holder Zhangsan contains the first person pronoun. Under a context like ‘S2’
in (26), on the other hand, ziji cannot be used to refer to the attitude holder in the attitude
report, because the attitude holder is not aware that the stolen purse was actually his own
purse.
In fact, in Chapter 5, we will see a novel exceptional case of LD caki in which LD caki does not require
a de se interpretation in attitude reports. Specifically, I will show that the LD reflexive caki cannot be
interpreted de se only in cases where the predicate in the same clause is not read de dicto with respect to
the antecedent of caki.
10
Pearson (2013, 2015), however, recently argues that the logophor yè in Ewe allows a (non-de se) de re
reading based on her fieldwork.
9
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(26)

Obligatory de se interpretation of the Chinese reflexive ziji
S1: Zhangsan says: "That thief stole my purse!"
S2: Zhangsan says: "That thief stole that purse!" (not aware that it was his purse)
Zhangsan shuo pashou
tou-le
ziji-de pibao.
Zhangsan shuo pickpocket steal-Perf ziji-DE purse
‘Zhangsani said that the pickpocket stole hisi purse.’ [!S1, #S2]
(Huang and Liu 2001, Anand 2006)

It is also true in Korean that LD caki embedded under attitude predicates receives an
unambiguous de se interpretation. Like ziji in (26), caki in (27) cannot refer to the bearer
of attitude under the context in which the attitud holder does not know that the stolen
purse is in fact his own purse. In other words, caki can refer to John only when he uses
the first person pronoun to refer to himself in the direct discourse, as in ‘S1’ below.

(27)

Obligatory de se interpretation of the Korean reflexive caki
S1: John says: "That thief stole my wallet!"
S2: John says: "That thief stole that wallet!" (not aware that it was his wallet)
John-i
[somaychiki-ka caki-uy cikap-ul hwumchy-ess-ta-ko]
John-nom pickpocket-nom self-gen wallet-acc steal-pst-decl-comp
malhay-ss-ta.
say-pst-decl
‘John said that the pickpocket stole his wallet.’ [!S1, #S2]

In fact, the sentence in (27) can be used when John’s direct speech contains the content of
the embedded clause containing caki in a first-person way—that is, using the first person
pronoun—like That pickpocket stole my wallet or My wallet was stolen by that pickpocket,
regardless of the actual state of affairs.11 Suppose that John is watching a surveillance
video and says, ‘That thief stole my wallet’, after watching one scene where a nice man
This use of LD caki is subject to the same condition not just under speech verbs but under any other
attitude verbs.
11
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picked up someone else’s (not John’s) wallet to put it in a lost and found box. In this
particular situation, one can report John’s speech as in (27). Moreover, imagine another
situation where John said, ‘That pickpocket stole my tablet’, after watching a surveillance
video. In fact, I know that it wasn’t his tablet but his wallet that was stolen. In this case,
the sentence in (27) cannot be used to report John’s direct speech because the phrase ‘my
wallet’ appearing in the attitude/speech report was not contained in John’s speech act.
These data suggest an important fact that LD caki in the complements of attitude verbs
must be interpreted de se, while the immediate clause that embeds caki (e.g., the noun
phrase ‘self’s wallet’ in (27)) is interpreted de dicto.
This behavior of caki with respect to the obligatory de se interpretation clearly contrasts with the third person pronoun in Korean. In contrast to caki, the third person
pronoun ku ‘he’ can be interpreted (non-de se) de re or de se in attitude reports.

(28)

Optional de se interpretation of the Korean 3rd person pronoun ku
S1: John says: "That thief stole my wallet!"
S2: John says: "That thief stole that wallet!" (not aware that it was his wallet)
Johni -i
[somaychiki-ka kui -uy cikap-ul hwumchy-ess-ta-ko]
John-nom pickpocket-nom he-gen wallet-acc steal-pst-decl-comp
malhay-ss-ta.
say-pst-decl
‘John said that the pickpocket stole his wallet.’ [!S1, !S2]

The phrase containing the third person pronoun can also be interpreted de re in attitude
reports. Thus, the sentence in (28) is felicitous in a context where John is watching a
surveillance video and said, ‘The thief stole that black thing’, while, unbeknownst to John,
the black thing was his wallet.
Let us further examine in detail whether the de se requirement consistently holds for
LD caki under attitude predicates based on the data we saw in the previous section. First,
we have seen that caki can take a subject in any superordinate clause as its antecedent in
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multiple embedded sentences. Regardless of whom caki refers to, the referent of LD caki
must be interpreted de se with respect to its referent. For example, in (10), repeated below
as (29), the sentence is felicitous only when the sentence contains a de se attitude report
of the antecedent of caki.

(29)

a.

Coreference between the matrix subject and caki
S1: Tom thinks, ‘Mary said that John likes me.’
S2: Tom thinks, ‘Mary said that John likes this guy in the photo.’ (Unbeknownst to Tom, the guy in the photo is Tom himself.)
Tomi -un [Maryj -ka [John-i
cakii -lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta-ko]
Tom-top [Mary-nom [John-nom self-acc like]-comp
said]-comp
sayngkakhanta.
think
‘Tomi thinks that Maryj said that John likes himi .’ [!S1, #S2]

b.

Coreference between the intermediate subject and caki
S1: Tom thinks, ‘Mary said: “John likes me.”’
S2: Tom thinks, ‘Mary said: “John likes that girl.”’ (Unbeknownst to Mary,
that girl is Mary herself.)
Tomi -un [Maryj -ka [John-i
cakij -lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta-ko]
Tom-top [Mary-nom [John-nom self-acc like]-comp
said]-comp
sayngkakhanta.
think
‘Tomi thinks that Maryj said that John likes herj .’ [!S1, #S2]

When LD caki refers to the intermediate subject under the multiple embeddings, the entire attitude report sentence is felicitous when caki is interpreted de se with respect to
the antecedent of caki (i.e. Mary), as described in (29b). More precisely, what is more
important is the fact that the intermediate subject must have a de se attitude in the matrix
subject’s belief. Suppose that Mary actually said, ‘John likes Mia’, instead of, ‘John likes
me.’ The matrix subject Tom, however, misheard it as the latter and formed a thought like
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Mary said: “John likes me”. Then, Tom’s belief can felicitously be reported by the sentence
in (29b). By comparison, the matter of how Mary’s direct speech is perceived by Tom is
not critical in (29a), where the embedded caki takes the matrix subject as its antecedent.
Rather, it is only important that Tom uses the first person pronoun in the direct discourse
to refer to the person who Mary said John likes. For instance, Mary may say to Tom John
likes you or John likes this guy in the photo. As long as Tom is aware that the guy in the
photo is Tom himself, he can have a thought using the first person pronoun, e.g., Mary
said that John likes me., and we can report this situation with the sentence in (29a).
Second, I have presented a special case where caki can find a matrix subject or a
non-subject NP as its antecedent under the embedding verb ‘hear’. In this case, caki still
must be interpreted de se with respect to its referent.

(30)

Coreference between the matrix subject and caki
S1: John says: “Mary told me that Tom likes me.”
S2: John says: “Mary told me that Tom likes this guy in the photo.” (Unbeknownst
to John, the guy in the photo is John himself.)
John-ii
Mary-lopwuthe [Tom-i cakii -lul cohahanta-ko] tulessta.
John-nom Mary-from
Tom-nom self-acc like-comp
heard
‘Johni heard from Mary that Tom likes himi .’ [!S1, #S2]

(31)

Coreference between the matrix non-subject and caki
S1: John says: "Mary told me, ‘Tom likes me.’"
S2: John says: "Mary told me, ‘Tom likes this girl in the photo.’" (Unbeknownst to
Mary, the girl in the photo is Mary herself.)
John-i
Maryj -lopwuthe [Tom-i cakij -lul cohahanta-ko] tulessta.
John-nom Mary-from
Tom-nom self-acc like-comp
heard
‘John heard from Maryj that Tom likes herj .’ [!S1, #S2]

Note that the antecedent of caki must be understood as the one who made a speech or
55

had a thought or belief about the content expressed by the embedded clause containing
caki. Moreover, the direct speech or thought of the antecedent of caki must contain the
first person pronoun in order for the reflexive to be used in attitude reports.
Third, given that multiple caki’s in the same clause must find the same referent,
they are obligatorily interpreted de se with respect to the same attitude holder. Recall
the example in (14), which contains multiple caki’s in the most embedded clause under
the multiple embeddings. In this case, we have seen that both of the reflexives refer to
the matrix subject or the intermediate subject as their referent. In order for the multiple
clausemate LD reflexives to be coreferent with the matrix subject, it must be the case that
John’s speech act contains the content of the clause in which the reflexives appear using
the first person pronoun, e.g. ‘my mother hates me’, as shown in ‘S1’ below.

(32)

Coreference between the matrix subject and multiple caki’s
S1: John said: "Bill thinks that my mother hates me (, which is absurd)."
S2: John said: "Bill thinks that my mother hates this guy in the photo." (Unbeknownst to John, the guy in the photo is John himself.)
S3: John said: "Bill thinks the mother of this guy in the photo hates me." (Unbeknownst to John, the guy in the photo is John himself.)
S4: John said: "Bill thinks the mother of this guy in the photo hates him." (Unbeknownst to John, the guy in the photo is John himself.)
Johni -i [Billj -i [cakii -uy emmeni-ka cakii -lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom self-gen mother-nom self-acc hate-comp
sayngkakhanta-ko] malhayssta.
think-comp
said
‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himi .’ [!S1, #S2, #S3, #S4]

Similarly, multiple caki’s can co-refer with the intermediate subject in the same sentence
in a situation where Bill has a belief that contains my mother hates me. Given that the
entire attitude report is about what John said, the embedded caki can co-refer with the
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intermediate subject only when John specifies in his reported speech act that Bill has a
first-personal thought, as in ‘S1’ in (33).

(33)

Coreference between the intermediate subject and multiple caki’s
S1: John said: "Bill thinks, ‘My mother hates me.’"
S2: John said: "Bill thinks, ‘My mother hates this guy in the photo.’" (Unbeknownst
to Bill, the guy in the photo is Bill himself.)
S3: John said: "Bill thinks, ‘The mother of this guy in the photo hates me.’" (Unbeknownst to Bill, the guy in the photo is Bill himself.)
S4: John said: "Bill thinks, ‘The mother of this guy in the photo hates him.’" (Unbeknownst to Bill, the guy in the photo is Bill himself.)
Johni -i
[Billj -i [cakij -uy emmeni-ka cakij -lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom self-gen mother-nom self-acc hate-comp
sayngkakhanta-ko] malhayssta.
think-comp
said
‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himj .’ [!S1, #S2, #S3, #S4]

As we already saw before, clausemate caki’s must find the same referent. This means that
the sentence with the multiple clausemate caki’s cannot be used to describe more than
one attitude holder’s de se attitudes.

(34)

Disjoint reading between multiple clausemate caki’s
S1: Bill thought, ‘John’s mother hates me.’ After John knew about Bill’s thought,
he said: "Bill thought that my mother hates him."
S2: Bill thought, ‘My mother hates him.’ After John knew about Bill’s thought, he
said: "Bill thought that his mother hates me."
*Johni -i [Billj -i [cakii/j -uy emmeni-ka cakij/i -lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom self-gen mother-nom self-acc hate-comp
sayngkakhanta-ko] malhayssta.
think-comp
said
Intended: ‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi/j mother hates himj/i .’
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Even though both ‘S1’ and ‘S2’ are the situations where John and Bill, respectively, have
some de se attitudes, we cannot report such situations with a multiple occurrence of the
LD reflexive in the same clause.
In the case where multiple caki’s in different clauses have a disjoint reading, as seen
in (18), repeated below as (35), the sentence must report two separate de se attitudes by
each of the attitude holders. Thus, the sentence in (35) cannot be used when either John
or Bill has a non-de se attitude, as shown in ‘S2’ and ‘S3’ below.

(35)

Disjoint reading between multiple caki’s
S1: Bill told John at a party: "Mary hates me." Next day, John thought, ‘Bill told
me last night that Mary hates him.’
S2: Bill told John at a party: "Mary hates this guy in the photo. John, but not Bill,
was aware that the guy in the photo was Bill. Next day, John thought, ‘Bill told
me last night that Mary hates him.’
S3: John is watching a video from the party the other night. In the video, Bill told
a guy in the red shirt: "Mary hates me." John saw that and thought, ‘Bill told that
guy that Mary hates him.’ Unbeknownst to John, the guy in the red shirt was
John himself.
Johni -i
[Billj -i cakii -eykey [Mary-ka cakij -lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom self-to
Mary-nom self-acc hate-comp
malhayssta-ko] sayngkakhanta.
said-comp
think
‘Johni thinks that Billj told himi that Mary hates himj .’ [!S1, #S2, #S3]
The last property of LD caki we discussed in the preceding section was that it only

allows a sloppy reading under ellipsis. More precisely, LD caki in ellipsis only allows a
sloppy de se reading.
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(36)

Sloppy and de se readings of LD caki under ellipsis
Context: Mary and Sue are talking about who John likes. While Mary thought,
‘John likes me.’,
(sloppy and de se)

S1: Sue thought, ‘John likes me.’

S2: Sue thought, ‘John likes this girl in the photo.’ Unbeknownst to Sue, the girl
(sloppy and de re)

in the photo is Sue herself.
S3: Sue thought, ‘John likes Mary.’

(strict)

Mary-nun John-i
caki-lul cohahanta-ko sayngkakhayssta. Sue-to
Mary-top John-nom self-acc like-comp
thought
Sue-also
kule-hay-ss-ta.
so-do-pst-decl
‘Mary thought that John likes her. Sue did so too.’ [!S1, #S2, #S3]

3.4.2

Obligatory de se in NP complements of attitude verbs

In contrast to the attitude verbs we saw so far, which take CP complements, factive verbs in
Korean, such as alta ‘know’, kkaytatta ‘realize’, kiekhata ‘remember’, etc., take an NP as its
complement instead of a finite CP. As shown in (37), the complement clause of alta ‘know’
is an NP headed by a dummy noun kes that takes a clausal complement. While finite CP
complements are followed by the complementizer −ko, NP complements of factive verbs
take the accusative case marker −(l)ul. When caki occurs in an NP complement of factive
attitude predicates, it still gets an obligatory de se interpretation. Thus, (37) is infelicitous
when John does not know that the guy Tom criticized is actually John himself, as in ‘S2’
in (37).12
The same restriction holds even when an NP complement is headed by a lexical noun, like somwun
‘rumor’, sosik ‘news’, etc.
12

(i)

S1: John thinks, "(Someone says that) Mary criticized me."
S2: John thinks, "(Someone says that) Mary criticized this guy in the photo." Unbeknownst to John,
the guy in the photo is John himself.
Johni -i [Mary-ka cakii -lul piphanhay-ss-ta-nun somwun]-ul anta.
John-nom Mary-nom self-acc criticize-pst-decl-nm rumor-acc know
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(37)

S1: John says: "Tom criticized me."
S2: John says: "Tom criticized that guy." (Unbeknownst to John, that guy is John
himself.)
Johni -i
[Tom-i cakii -lul piphanha-n] kes-ul anta.
John-nom Tom-nom self-acc criticized-adn kes-acc know
‘Johni knows that Tom criticized himi .’ [!S1, #S2]13

3.4.3

Obligatory de se under negative attitude verbs

Thus far, we have seen that LD caki embedded under attitude predicates requires an obligatory de se interpretation. It is worth noting that there has been some doubt regarding the
obligatory de se requirement for LD reflexives in the literature. Cole et al. (2001c) argue
that the generalization that the Chinese LD reflexive ziji must be read de se in attitude
environments does not hold for ziji occurring under certain verbs like wangji ‘forget’ and
bu xiao ‘not be aware’, because sentences with these verbs do not "report on the state of
the world as pictured in the mind of the matrix subject" (Cole et al. 2001c).
‘Johni knows the rumor that Mary criticized himi .’ [!S1, #S2]
Once the attitude holder has a first personal belief about the CP complement of the noun that contains caki,
e.g., ‘Mary criticized me.’, the sentence in (i) is felicitous even when John is not aware that what he knows
is in fact a rumor. While this is a novel observation, I will leave to future research the semantic analysis of
the obligatory de se interpretation of caki in CP complements of content nouns.
13
The dummy noun kes can also take a ‘long-form’ as its complement, a CP complement that contains a
mood marker like Declarative -ta. LD caki under factive attitude verbs must be interpreted de se regardless
of the form of the CP complement of the head noun kes, as shown in (i) below. The difference between a
CP complement with or without a mood marker under factive attitude verbs is beyond our scope here.
(i)

S1: John says: "Tom criticized me."
S2: John says: "Tom criticized that guy." (Unbeknownst to John, that guy is John himself.)
Johni -i [Tom-i cakii -lul piphanhayss-ta-nun] kes-ul anta.
John-nom Tom-nom self-acc criticized-decl-adn kes-acc know
‘Johni knows that Tom criticized himi .’ [!S1, #S2]
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(38)

a.

Zhangsani wangji-le Lisi hen taoyan zijii de gege.
Zhangsan forget-perf Lisi very hate self DE brother
‘Zhangsani forgot that Lisi hates hisi brother.’

b.

Zhangsani bu xiao de Lisi hen taoyan zijii .
Zhangsan neg aware DE Lisi very hate self
‘Zhangsani was not aware that Lisi hates himi .’

(Cole et al. 2001c)

Similarly, Kuno (1972b) also distinguishes verbs like deny, forget, be unaware of from
verbs like expect, claim, know, think, etc., given that the content of the complement clause
of the former type of verbs does not represent the direct discourse (or feelings) of the
matrix subject.

(39)

a. *John denied, "I am sick."
b. *John forgot, "I have an appointment at two."

(Kuno 1972b)

Under his system, this distinction predicts that LD reflexives cannot occur under the verbs
in (39), since the embedded clause of these verbs is not derived from a direct discourse of
the matrix subject. Contrary to the prediction, however, the LD reflexives both in Japanese
and Korean can occur under these verbs as well as in Chinese, as we saw in (38).
Following Anand (2006), I argue that these are not exceptions to the de se requirement of LD caki. In fact, there is no exception for the generalization with respect to the
obligatory de se interpretation of the LD reflexive caki when it is directly embedded under attitude predicates.14 The meanings of the sentences with the seemingly problematic
verbs like wangji ‘forget’ and bu xiao ‘not be aware’ in Chiense contain negation: for instance, (38a) roughly means ‘It is not the case that Zhangsan remembers that Lisi hates his
brother (in the first-person way)’, while the meaning of (38b) corresponds to: ‘It is not the
case that Zhangsan was aware that Lisi hates him (in the first-person way)’. Therefore, if
ziji in (38a) and (38b) in fact receive a de se interpretation, these sentences should be false
However, we will see in Chapter 5 that relative clauses are a special environment where caki need not
be interpreted de se even within the scope of an attitude verb.
14
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only when Zhangsan holds a de se attitude, such as Lisi hates my brother or Lisi hate me.
As Anand (2006) shows, these sentences are true when Zhangsan has a (non-de se) de re
attitude like Lisi hates that person’s brother or Lisi hates that person without knowing that
that person is Zhangsan himself.
The Korean reflexive caki behaves like the Chinese reflexive ziji in that caki embedded under a negative attitude verb can only be used when the attitude holder does not
have a de se attitude. That is, caki in attitude reports with negative attitude verbs is interpreted as the one in attitude reports that contain an overt negation. Although a negation
is used in an attitude report, the de se requirement for caki in the complement clause must
hold. Therefore, a sentence like (40) can be true when the attitude holder has a (non-de
se) de re belief about himself.

(40)

S1: John is watching a video from the party he attended the other night. He saw
Mary having a conversation with a guy in the red shirt and thought, ‘Oh, Mary
likes that guy.’ Unbeknownst to John, the guy in the red shirt is John himself.
S2: John is watching a video from the party he attended the other night. He saw
Mary having a conversation with him and thought, ‘Oh, Mary likes me.’
Johni -un Mary-ka cakii -lul cohaha-nun kes-ul alci-moshanta.
John-top Mary-nom self-acc like-adn
kes-acc know-neg
‘Johni does not know that Mary likes himi .’ [!S1, *S2]

The reflexive caki in complements of negative attitude verbs behaves in the same way. An
illustrative example with a verb moluta ‘not know’ is provided in (41).

(41)

Caki under a negative attitude verb
Under the same contexts (S1 and S2) as in (40):
Johni -un Mary-ka cakii -lul cohaha-nun kes-ul molunta.
John-top Mary-nom self-acc like-nm
kes-acc not.know
‘Johni does not know that Mary likes himi .’ [!S1, *S2 ]
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The sentence in (41) is true under a context like ‘S1’ because although John knows that
Mary likes a guy who happens to be him, John does not hold a first-personal belief, such
as Mary likes me. If LD caki in the complements of these negative attitude verbs receives
a pure de re interpretation instead of an obligatory de se interpretation, the sentence with
caki would not be expected to be true under a context like ‘S1’. Therefore, we can generalize that the Korean LD reflexive caki must receive a de se interpretation under any kinds
of attitude verbs.
In summary, we have seen that caki appearing in the complements of any attitude
verbs is obligatorily interpreted de se. In particular, the same de se requirement must be
satisfied even when caki occurs in an NP complement of an attitude verb or when it is
embedded under a negative attitude verb.

3.5

Deriving obligatory de se interpretations of caki

The preceding sections have presented a number of key properties of LD caki in attitude
environments, which are summarized below.

(42)

Key properties of LD caki under attitude verbs
a.

LD caki can find an antecedent from any superordinate clause.

b.

An antecedent of caki must be understood as an attitude holder.

c.

Multiple clausemate caki’s need to find the same long-distance antecedent.

d.

LD caki behaves like a bound anaphor, given that it only allows a sloppy
reading under ellipsis.

e.

LD caki under attitude verbs must be interpreted de se with respect to the
referent of caki.

In this section, I will develop a syntactic and semantic analysis of the Korean LD
reflexive caki in attitude environments that can successfully account for the observed
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properties presented in (42). As our analysis will be primarily based upon prior work
by Lewis (1979) and Chierchia (1989), Section 3.5.1 will describe the Lewis-Chierchia’s
approach to de se attitudes and de se expressions. Section 3.5.2 is devoted to a proposal of
licensing conditions for LD caki. Specifically, I will argue that LD caki must be bound by a
closest binder that bears a certain feature. Section 3.5.3 explores the consequences of our
proposal.

3.5.1

A dedicated de se LF: The Lewis-Chierchia’s property approach

Let me first describe an existing approach to the semantics of de se attitude reports and
de se expressions that stems from the work of Lewis (1979) and Chierchia (1989). In his
influential work on attitudes de se, Lewis (1979) argues that objects of attitudes are not
propositions (a set of possible worlds) but properties. More specifically, he, first, argues
that any proposition can correspond to a property of inhabiting a possible world in which
that proposition holds. For example, suppose I believe a proposition p such that John is
smart. Then, correspondingly, I have a belief about myself such that I inhabit some world
where the proposition ‘John is smart’ holds. In other words, ‘I believe John is smart’
means I self-ascribe the property of inhabiting in one of the worlds where John is smart.
Furthermore, Lewis claims that there are certain cases where property objects, instead of
propositional objects, are required. He provides John Perry’s famous ‘Rudolf Lingens’ example (Perry 1977, pp.21–22) as crucial evidence against the propositional objects. That
is, although Rudolf Lingens, an amnesiac who is lost in the Stanford library, gets to learn
a lot of facts by reading books, including the biographical information about him and the
detailed information about the library, he still does not know where he is and who he is.
Let us suppose that Lingens says Rudolf Lingens is great after reading his biography. According to Lewis, only the property view can capture the difference between an amnesiac
thought and a de se thought. In the former (amnesiac) case, Lingens self-ascribes the property of inhabiting one of the worlds where Rudolf Lingens is great, while he self-ascribes
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the property of being great in the latter (de se) case.
Based upon Lewis’s work, Chierchia (1989) develops a semantic account that can
derive a self-ascription of a property as a meaning of attitude reports with de se expressions. Although specific details may vary, there is a line of research since Chierchia (1989)
suggesting that a dedicated de se LF is necessary because de re truth conditions are not
sufficient to cover the meanings of de se attitude reports with certain elements that are
obligatorily interpreted de se, such as PRO, logophors, and LD reflexives (Chierchia 1989,
Schlenker 1999, Percus and Sauerland 2003, Anand 2006, Ninan 2010, Pearson 2013, a.o.).
Recall the contrast between the third person pronoun and PRO seen in (1), repeated
below as (43). While the attitude reports with the third person pronoun in (43a) is true
under the scenario in which the bearer of attitude has a (non-de se) de re or a de se belief,
the sentence with PRO is only felicitous in the latter case.

(43)

S1: John says: "I should be elected."
S2: John is so drunk that he has forgotten that he is a candidate in the election.
He watches someone on TV and finds that that person is a terrific candidate, who
should definitely be elected. Unbeknownst to John, the candidate he is watching
on TV is John himself.
a.

John hopes that he will be elected. [!S1, !S2]

b.

John hopes PRO to be elected. [!S1, #S2]

(Schlenker 2003)

Regardless of how the semantics of de re belief reports might be implemented, there
is a considerable consensus in the literature that an attitude report like (43a) is judged true
in both a de se and de re scenario—where the attitude holder has a de se or de re attitude—
under the general truth-conditions generated from a de re LF (e.g., Reinhart 1991, Percus
and Sauerland 2003, Schlenker 2003, Maier 2011, Anand 2006). Following Kaplan (1968),
let us assume that de re beliefs are not merely about an object of belief (res), but rather
about how a res is presented to a believer. As Kaplan argues, then, truth-conditions of
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de re belief reports contain some special relations between a believer, res, and description
α that the believer presents the res to herself. For instance, in the two scenarios in (43),
although the res is the same guy John, John holds two different relations with himself
that can be represented by two different descriptions, e.g. the description α ‘the terrific
candidate on TV’ and the description β ‘I’. Under these two different descriptions of him,
John believes that ‘α will be elected.’ To characterize a relation between an attitude holder,
res, and description of the res, Kaplan introduces a three-place relation ‘R (α, x, ATT)’,
which denotes ‘α represents x to the attitude holder’ if and only if (i) α denotes x, (ii) α is
a name of x for the attitude holder, and (iii) α is (sufficiently) vivid. John’s (non-de se) de
re or de se belief report in the contexts above, then, can be illustrated as below.

(44)

∃α. R(α, John, John) & Believe(John, α will be elected)

Under this Kaplanian truth-conditions, the sentence in (43a) is judged true in both ‘S1’
and ‘S2’. The de se and de re attitudes of the attitude holder can be distinguished given the
nature of the acquaintance relations (in particular, using the two different descriptions:
‘the terrific candidate on TV’ or ‘I’. Then, a de se attitude is merely a special case of de re,
where the attitude holder identifies the res argument as himself (i.e., the identity relation).
Although the Kaplanian de re truth-conditions may be sufficient to account for the
semantics of attitude reports with the third person pronoun, it seems to be too weak for
the sentences with the obligatory de se elements like PRO and LD reflexives. In order
to maintain the Kaplanian de re LF for de se attitude reports with the obligatory de se
expressions, we need an additional mechanism to restrict the acquaintance relations to
those of identity, e.g., SELF acquaintance relation.
Focusing on the obligatory de se interpretation of PRO in attitude reports in contrast to the third person pronoun, Chierchia (1989) proposes a dedicated de se LF: A de se
element like PRO, a logophor, or a long-distance reflexive is a variable that needs to be
bound by an operator that forms a property, which is self-ascribed by an attitude holder.
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Specifically, based on the proposal of Lewis (1979) that the object of de se attitudes is a
property rather than a proposition, Chierchia (1989) argues that attitude verbs can take
either a proposition or a property as its argument, and a de se interpretation can only be
derived when an attitude verb takes a property-type object that contains a pronominal element. An operator (that is, an individual abstractor), which appears in the left periphery
of the embedded clause, turns a proposition into a property. In such cases, attitude verbs
denote relations between agents and properties. Moreover, a de se element in the embedded clause must be bound by the operator. An illustrative example of the Chierchia’s
dedicated de se LF is as follows.15

(45)

a.

Maryi thinks that shei is in danger.

b.

The de se LF of (45a):
Maryi thinks [Opi that [shei is in danger]]

c.

think (M, λx[x is in danger])

(Chierchia 1989)

According to Chierchia, in order for the third person pronoun to be interpreted de se, it
must be bound by the de se operator, as in (45). With this particular de se LF, the sentence
indicates Mary’s self-ascription of a property of being in danger.
Chierchia argues that the fact that (46b) can get a strict or a sloppy reading provides
evidence that the verb believe can take either a propositional or property-type object.
Under his system, a sloppy reading (Pavarotti believes that he (Pavarotti) is a genius) is
derivable from the property-type de se LF, and thus the embedded pronoun is linked to
the de se interpretation.16
15
Regarding the de se operator, Chierchia favors a base-generation analysis over a movement analysis,
given that we can derive a de se interpretation from an embedded clause where a pronominal element occurs
in an island, such as an adverbial clause or a complex NP, as shown below.

(i)

a.
b.

Johni thinks [Opi that Mary is still wondering [whether to marry himi ]
Billi believes [Opi that the fact that people like himi is a miracle]

While a sloppy reading of the third person pronoun is expected under the de se LF because it is bound by
the local de se operator, a sloppy reading of the third person pronoun is also available when it is interpreted
16
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(46)

a.

Domingo believes that he is a genius.

b.

Pavarotti believes it too
the thing that Domingo believes
what Domingo believes

Chierchia further argues that, contrary to the finite embedded clauses with a pronominal element that can denote propositions or properties, certain complement clauses of
attitude verbs that contain obligatory control PRO or long-distance reflexives only denote properties that need to be indirectly predicated of the attitude holder. For example,
a property-abstractor is mandatory in obligatory control complements, and PRO—as an
inividual variable—must be bound by the local abstractor. Chierchia’s analysis can, then,
correctly capture the well-known facts that obligatory control PRO only receives a de se
interpretation in attitude reports and it only allows a sloppy reading under VP ellipsis.

(47)

a.

Mary expects to win, and Bill does too.

b.

The de se LF:
Mary expects [Opi PROi to win] & Bill expects [Opi PROi to win]

c.

expect (M, λx[x wins]) & expect (B, λx[x wins])

de re (Reinhart 1991, Higginbotham 1992, Fiengo and May 1994).
(i)

Context: Lucie, a broadcast manager, is looking for the perfect female voice for an ad, and requests
to hear some samples of women in natural conversation. Unbeknown to her, the technician records
her too, and adds it to the samples as number 17. Lucie does not recognize her recorded voice, and
rules out 17 as too aggressive.
a.
b.

Lucie1 thought that she1 sounded too aggressive
and Lili thought the same thing (/believed it too).

(Reinhart 1991)

The sentence in (ib) can mean that Lili thought that she (Lili) sounded too aggressive, which is a sloppy
reading, when Lili also does not recognize her own voice and thinks she sounds aggressive, as Lucie does
in the context of (i). This shows that bound-variable readings of the embedded pronoun does not require a
de se LF, contrary to Chierchia’s assumption. Therefore, a sloppy reading of an embedded pronoun under
ellipsis does not guarantee the dedicated de se construal.
By contrast, a non-de se sloppy reading for LD caki is not allowed under ellipsis, as we saw in (36) in
Section 3.4.1. In other words, caki would only require a de se construl unlike the third person pronoun.
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Since PRO must be bound by the operator in the left periphery of the embedded clause,
each sentence denotes a self-ascription of the property of winning by each attitude holder.
Therefore, PRO can only get a sloppy reading in (47), as expected.17
So far, I have stated that under the dedicated de se LF proposed by Chierchia (1989)
attitude reports denote a self-ascription of a property by the bearer of an attitude. However, it must be clarified what self-ascription exactly means and how an element bound by
the individual abtractor receives a de se interpretation. In fact, we need a more elaborate
semantics of attitude verbs to account for the de se interpretation of the pronominal or unambiguous de se elements under the de se LF we have discussed. The crucial idea regarding
this issue centers on the semantics of attitude verbs and doxastic alternatives that (i) complements of attitude verbs are sets of centered worlds as opposed to just possible worlds,
and (ii) doxastic alternatives of an attitude holder’s are also centered possible worlds (i.e.,
individual-world pairs) (Quine 1969, Lewis 1979, Cresswell and von Stechow 1982, Cresswell 1985, Chierchia et al. 1989, Percus and Sauerland 2003, Schlenker 2003, von Stechow
2003, Anand and Nevins 2006, Stephenson 2007, Pearson 2013, among many others).18
The definition of doxastic alternatives as centered worlds is given in (48), and a sample
lexical meaning of an attitude verb is illustrated in (49).

17

(i)

Chierchia also points out the following contrast with respect to VP-anaphora, due to T. Reinhart.
a.
b.
c.

John wants to become a doctor,
but his mother doesn’t want to.
but his mother doesn’t want that.

The sentence in (ib) only allows a sloppy reading, as in the VP-ellipsis cases, while the sentence in (ic)
allows either a sloppy or a strict reading. Given this contrast, Chierchia argues that the verb want may take
a property (ib) or a propositional-type object (ic) so that a strict reading is possible in (ic). However, as he
admits, it is unclear what the exact mechanism would be that allows the strict reading.
18
Centered worlds can vary from individual-world paris to more complicated n-tuples including time and
location. Throughout the rest of the dissertation, I set aside the time and location coordinates. That is, I
will consider centered worlds as pairs of a possible world w and an individual x.
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(48)

Doxastic alternatives:
Doxx,w = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what x thinks in w that w’ is a world x
might be living in and y is the one who x identifies in w as herself in w’}

(49)

JthinkKg = λP<e,st> . [λx. ∀<y,w’> ∈ Doxx,w : P(y)(w’) =T]

Given the semantics of attitude verbs and doxastic alternatives defined above, x thinks
P is true iff in all of the agent x’s doxastic alternatives <y, w’>, x’s de se counterpart y
has the property P in w’. Recall that de se elements in complements of attitude verbs are
abstracted over by being bound by the individual abstractor. Since the derived property is
predicated of the agent’s de se counterpart when it combines with the attitude verb, owing
to the semantics of attitude verbs, the de se interpretation is correctly derived under the
property approach.
Based on the Lewis-Chierchia’s property approach to de se attitude reports, Percus
and Sauerland (2003) further argue for a dedicated LF of de se attitude reports that is
distinct from de re. Given that pronouns in English can be read either de se or de re, it is
widely assumed in the literature that a special de se LF is not necessary for attitude reports
that contain pronouns. The question is whether the third person pronoun in English
would admit a dedicated de se LF (Schlenker 1999). Percus and Sauerland (2003) provide
an argument in favor of the dedicated de se LF for the third person pronoun in English.
Consider the following example under a scenario from Percus and Sauerland (2003).

(50)

Scenario: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches
on television do not recognize themselves in the broadcast. John, the only confident one, thinks "I’ll win," but does not recognize himself in the broadcast. Bill
and Sam, both depressive, think "I’ll lose" but are impressed by the speeches that
happen to be their own and are sure "that candidate" will win. Peter, also depressive, happens to be impressed not by his own speech but by John’s.
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Only John thinks that he will win the election.

(Percus and Sauerland 2003)

The example in (50) is true in the scenario shown above. Percus and Sauerland (2003)
show that this sentence would not turn out to be true under this particular context if a de
re LF were the only possible representation. Suppose that the VP thinks that he will win
the election has the following denotation.

(51)

[[thinks that hei will win the election]]g =
= λx.λw. there is some acquaintance relation R that x bears uniquely to g(i) in w,
such that, for all <y, w’> in DOXx,w , the individual that y bears R to in w’ wins
the election in w’

First, when the embedded pronoun gets a bound-variable reading, the example in (50)
cannot be true under this de re LF. In order for it to be true, John should be the only
candidate who bears an acquaintance relation R to himself. However, in the scenario
above, Bill and Sam also bear some acquaintance relation to themselves, and think that
the individual they bear R to (namely, Bill and Sam, respectively) will win the election.
Moreover, Percus and Sauerland show that the de re LF will also predict the example in (50)
to be false even though we only consider the case where the assignments map the index
of the pronoun i to John. In this case, although Bill and Sam do not bear any acquaintance
relation to John, Peter, in addition to John himself, bears some R to John. Therefore, John
cannot be the only individual who thinks he will win the election given the de re LF shown
in (51). Based upon this argument, Percus and Sauerland (2003) argue that a dedicated de se
LF may sometimes be required even for the third person pronoun in English. The truthconditions in (52c) are derived from the de se LF in (52a) and the semantics of attitude
verbs in (52b). Given that the doxastic alternatives are centered worlds and a property
that an attitude verb takes as its first argument is predicated of a doxastic counterpart of
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the attitude holder, we can guarantee a de se interpretation.

(52)

a.

John thinks [λ1 λw’ he1 will win the election].

b.

JthinkKw,g = λP<e,st> . [λx. ∀<y,w’> ∈ Doxx,w : P(y)(w’) =T],
where Dox(x,w) = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what x thinks in w that w’ is
a world x might be living in and y is the one who x identifies in w as himself
in w’.}

c.

JJohn thinks that he will win the electionKg = λw. ∀<y,w’>∈DoxJohn,w : y wins
the election in w’

Assuming that there is a dedicated de se LF and a de re LF for de se attitude reports,
then we have at least two different mechanisms for de se ascriptions. If we assume two
de se mechanisms (dedicated de se and de re) and two types of de se elements (ambiguous
and unambiguous), now some impotant questions arise: First, can an unambiguous de se
element be construed de re? In other words, would it ever be possible that attitude reports
with the obligatory de se expressions have a de re LF in some cases (for instance, when
the dedicated de se LF is not availalbe for some reason)? Second, when is the dedicated
de se construal necessary or available for the third person pronoun? Would it always be
possible when the third person pronoun is interpreted de se, or can it only be used when it
is forced to be used? We will discuss these issues focusing on the behavior of the Korean
LD reflexive caki and the third person pronoun.

3.5.2
3.5.2.1

A proposal
Basic assumptions

I will begin by laying out some semantic assumptions, based upon the Lewis-Chierchia’s
property approach and the extensional framework of modal quantification (Percus 2000).
First, I assume that attitude verbs denote relations between properties and individuals
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and quantify over world-individual pairs (i.e., centered worlds) (Quine 1969, Lewis 1979,
Cresswell and von Stechow 1982, Cresswell 1985, Chierchia et al. 1989, Percus and Sauerland 2003, Schlenker 2003, von Stechow 2003, Anand and Nevins 2006, Stephenson 2007,
Pearson 2013, a.o.). The lexical meaning of the attitude verb think seen in (49) is repeated
below.

(49)

Lexical entry for think
JthinkKg = λP<e,st> . [λx. ∀<y,w’> ∈ Doxx,w : P(y)(w’) =T],
where Doxx,w = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what x thinks in w that w’ is a
world x might be living in and y is the one who x identifies in w as herself in w’}

Second, obligatory de se elements are variables that need to be bound by an individual
abtractor introduced by an attitude verb (Chierchia et al. 1989, Percus and Sauerland 2003,
von Stechow 2003, Pearson 2013, a.o.). Third, based on Percus (2000) and many other
authors (e.g., Keshet 2008, Schwarz 2012), I assume that attitude verbs introduce a world
and an individual abstractor in the syntax, while matrix clauses and modals introduce
a world binder. Following the extensional system, then, we slightly revise the lexical
meaning of the attitude verb in (49) by adding a world binder, as in (53).

(53)

Lexical entry for think (revised)
JthinkKg = λP<e,st> . [λx. λw. ∀<y,w’> ∈ Doxx,w : P(y)(w’) =T],
where Doxx,w = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what x thinks in w that w’ is a
world x might be living in and y is the one who x identifies in w as herself in w’}

Given these assumptions, an LF of a sentence with the obligatory de se expression PRO is
provided in (54). The lexical entry for the verb expect is given in (55).

(54)

a.

John expects to win the election.

b.

LF: λw w John expects [λx1 λw2 w2 PRO1 to win the election]
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(55)

Lexical entry for expect
JexpectKg = λP<e,st> . [λx. λw. ∀<y,w’> ∈ Expectx,w : P(y)(w’) =T],
where Expectx,w = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what x expects in w that w’ is a
world x might be living in and y is the one who x identifies in w as herself in w’}

Given the semantics of attitude verbs and the LF above, we can provide the truth conditions for the LF in (54b) as follows.

(56)

J(54b)Kg = λw. ∀<y,w’> ∈ ExpectJohn,w : y wins the election in w’

As discussed before, the obligatory de se interpretation is derived from the semantics of
the attitude verb and the assumption that PRO is bound by the local individual abstractor.
These truth-conditions correctly capture that the attitude report in (54) denotes John’s
self-ascription of the property of winning the election.
Now let me put forth our basic assumptions of the Korean LD reflexive caki. First,
given that caki cannot have the first or second person pronoun as its antecedent unlike ziji
in Chinese, I assume that caki in Korean is inherently third-person. That is, caki carries the
presupposition as the 3rd person pronoun: it cannot refer to the author or the hearer of the
context c (Schlenker 2003, Heim 2008). Moreover, caki cannot have a doxastic counterpart
(that is, every y in the set of doxastic alternatives of <y, w’>) of the author or the hearer
of the context c as its value.19 Given this, I provide a denotation of the LD reflexive caki
as in (57).

(57)

c,g

[[cakin ]]

=





g(n),



if g(n) is not auth(c), addr(c),
or a doxastic counterpart of auth(c) or addr(c)





undefined, otherwise
19

This was pointed out to me by Seth Cable (p.c.).
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Second, as discussed in Chapter 2, I distinguish LD caki from Local caki, while I treat
both of them as a bound variable. Specifically, I differentiate them given some special syntactic feature, e.g. [log] (Maling 1984, Sells 1987, Kratzer 1998, von Stechow 2003, Anand
2006, Pearson 2013, a.o.). That is, only LD caki bears this feature given its logophoric
property, while Local caki does not. Based on the notion of logophoricity proposed by
Sells (1987), I assume that LD caki with the feature [log] must be coreferent with a logophoric center (Huang and Liu 2001). In attitude environments, then, LD caki must find
a referent as its antecedent whose speech or attitude is represented in stating the clause
that contains caki.

(58)

Primitive notions of logophoricity
source: one who is the intentional agent of the communication
self: one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes
pivot: one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated

3.5.2.2

(Sells 1987, p.457)

Two licensing conditions for caki

Based on the assumptions laid out above, let us now turn our attention to the details of
how LD caki must be construed de se in attitude environments. We have seen in Section
3.3 that the Korean LD reflexive caki must receive a de se interpretation when embedded
under attitude verbs. The data on caki are more complicated than those on PRO, since (i)
LD caki is not subject to locality restrictions, (ii) its position is not limited to the subject
position, and (iii) a multiple occurrence of LD caki is possible unlike PRO. Therefore, while
our proposal of LD caki as a de se expression is based on the Lewis-Chierchia’s property
approach, certain amendments of the property analysis are required to account for the
full properties of LD caki in attitude environments. I will first put forth specific licensing
conditions for LD caki and then show how the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki
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can be derived.
Following Chierchia (1989), I have assumed that LD caki is a variable that needs to be
bound by an individual abstractor that is introduced by an attitude predicate. Moreover, I
have also assumed that LD caki bears the special feature [log]. Given these assumptions,
I propose two licensing conditions for LD caki in Korean: the feature match and locality
condition.
First, I assume that individual abstractors introduced by attitude verbs can optionally bear the [log] feature, and LD caki must be bound by a binder that bears the same
feature [log]. Under the multiple embeddings, then, there are four possible LFs, given the
existence/absence of the [log] feature on the binders.

(59)

a.

λw w John thinks [λx1 [log] λw2 w2 Tom said [λx3 λw4 w4 Mary likes caki1/∗3 [log] ]]

b.

λw w John thinks [λx1 λw2 w2 Tom said [λx3 [log] λw4 w4 Mary likes caki∗1/3 [log] ]]

c.

λw w John thinks [λx1 [log] λw2 w2 Tom said [λx3 [log] λw4 w4 Mary likes
caki?? [log] ]]

d. *λw w John thinks [λx1 λw2 w2 Tom said [λx3 λw4 w4 Mary likes caki1/3 [log] ]]

In (59a), given that only the higher binder bears the [log] feature, caki is bound by the
lambda under the verb ‘think’. On the other hand, since the [log] feature is present on the
lower binder in (59b), caki must be bound by λx3 under this particular LF. The LF in (59d)
is not available because there is no proper binder (that is, one with [log]) for LD caki. How
about the LF in (59c), then? Which antecedent should caki be associated with under this
LF? I will show in a moment that caki finds the intermediate subject as its antecedent in
this case.
In addition to the feature match condition, I argue that there is a locality condition
for LD caki binding. Based upon the locality condition for variable binding proposed in
the previous work (e.g., Fox 2000, Anand 2006), I also assume that a variable with [log]
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must be bound by a closest binder that also bears the same feature [log]. Note that PRO
must always be bound by the closest binder whatsoever. By contrast, under our system,
LD caki can be bound by a non-closest binder when the closer binder does not bear the
[log] feature. Therefore, our system correctly predicts that LD caki can find an antecedent
from any superordinate clauses when there is no binder in lower clauses that bears the
[log] feature. Owing to the combination of the feature match and the locality condition,
LD caki in the most embedded clause in the LF we saw in (59c), repeated below, must be
associated with the intermediate subject by being bound by the lower binder. The locality
condition is violated when caki is bound by the higher binder in the configuration in (60).

(60)

λw w John thinks [λx1 [log] λw2 w2 Tom said [λx3 [log] λw4 w4 Mary likes caki3/∗1 [log] ]]
The two binding conditions for LD caki proposed here determines which abstractor

caki needs to be bound by and how caki should be interpreted. Based on the semantics of
attitude verbs as in (61), a sample LF and truth-conditions of a sentence with LD caki are
provided in (62).

(61)

Lexical entry for say
JsayKg = λP<e,st> . [λx. λw. ∀<y,w’> ∈ Sayx,w : P(y)(w’) =T],
where Sayx,w = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what x says in w that w’ is a world
x might be living in and y is the one who x identifies in w as herself in w’}

(62)

a.

LF: λw w John say [λx1 [log] λw2 w2 Mary likes caki1 [log] ]

b.

J(62a)Kg = λw. ∀<y,w’> ∈ SayJohn,w : Mary likes y in w’

In the LF in (62a), caki satisfies its two binding conditions by being bound by the closest
binder that bears the [log] feature, i.e., λx1 [log] , and receives a de se interpretation because
caki is interpreted as John’s doxastic counterpart given the semantics of the attitude verb
and the definition of say-alternatives.
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3.5.3

Consequences

Let us now discuss the consequences of our proposal, focusing on the properties of LD
caki under attitude verbs that we have seen in 3.3. Firstly, our proposed account makes
a correct prediction regarding the ‘no locality restriction’ property of caki. LD caki can
find any LD antecedent as its antecedent with legitimate LF representations. Consider the
following simplified LFs.

No locality restriction

(63)

a.

John thinks [λ1 [log] Mary likes caki1 [log] ]

b.

John thinks [λ1 [log] Tom said [λ2 Mary likes caki1 [log] ]]

c.

John thinks [λ1 [log] Tom said [λ2 Bill thinks [λx3 Mary likes caki1 [log] ]]]

In all the cases in (63), caki is legitimately associated with the matrix subject John because
the binder introduced by the highest verb, λx1 [log] , is the closest binder with the [log] feature due to the lack of the [log] feature on the lower binders. The feature match condition
will be violated if caki is bound by any binder with no [log] feature in (63).20
Secondly, the obligatory coreference of multiple clausemate LD caki’s can also correctly be captured by our proposal of the binding conditions for LD caki. That is, since
LD caki must be bound by the closest operator that carries the [log] feature, more than
one caki in the same clause must be bound by the same abstractor. Otherwise, the locality
and/or feature-match condition is violated.

As soon as any lower binder bears the [log] feature, LD caki cannot take the matrix subject as its
antecedent anymore due to the violation of our locality condition.
20

(i)

a.
b.
c.

John thinks [λ1 [log] Tom said [λ2 [log] Mary likes caki∗1/2 [log] ]]
John thinks [λ1 [log] Tom said [λ2 [log] Bill thinks [λ3 Mary likes caki∗1/2/∗3 [log] ]]]
John thinks [λ1 [log] Tom said [λ2 [log] Bill thinks [λ3 [log] Mary likes caki∗1/∗2/3 [log] ]]]
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(64)

Obligatory coreference of multiple clausemate caki’s
a.

John said [λ1 [log] Bill said [λ2 [log] caki2 [log] ’s mother hates caki2 [log] ]]

b.

John said [λ1 [log] Bill said [λ2 caki1 [log] ’s mother hates caki1 [log] ]]

As we saw for the single caki in a multiple embedded sentence, both caki’s in the most
embedded clause can take the matrix subject as its antecedent only when the [log] feature
is absent on the lower binders so that the one in the highest clause can be the closest
legitimate binder for LD caki’s, as shown in (64b). On the other hand, the LFs in (65)
cannot be derived, because the locality condition of LD caki is violated in these cases: one
of the caki’s, caki1 log , is not bound by the closest binder with [log].

(65)

Violation of the locality condition
a. *John said [λ1 [log] Bill said [λ2 [log] caki1 [log] ’s mother hates caki2 [log] ]]
b. *John said [λ1 [log] Bill said [λ2 [log] caki2 [log] ’s mother hates caki1 [log] ]]
c. *John said [λ1 Bill said [λ2 [log] caki2 [log] ’s mother hates caki1 [log] ]]

Some impossible LFs due to the violation of the feature-match condition are illustrated in
(66). Since a binder with [log] is required to properly bind LD caki, a configuration like
(66b) is ruled out.

(66)

Violation of the feature-match condition
a. *John said [λ1 [log] Bill said [λ2 caki2 [log] ’s mother hates caki1 [log] ]]
b. *John said [λ1 Bill said [λ2 caki1 ’s mother hates caki1 [log] ]]
As we saw earlier, multiple caki’s in different clauses may take different antecedents.

The coreference and disjoint readings of multiple caki’s in different clauses can easily
be derived as well based on the existence/absence of the [log] feature on the individual
abstractors.
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(67)

Multiple caki’s in different clauses
a.

John thinks [λ1 [log] Bill told caki1 [log] [λ2 [log] Mary hates caki2 [log] ]]

b.

John thinks [λ1 [log] Bill told caki1 [log] [λ2 Mary hates caki1 [log] ]]

c. *John thinks [λ1 [log] Bill told caki1 [log] [λ2 [log] Mary hates caki1 [log] ]]
While caki embedded directly under the matrix verb think has only one possible binder,
the one in the most embedded clause has two binding possibilities. When the lower binder
bears [log], as in (67a), the lower caki must be bound by that and be interpreted de se with
respect to Bill. Owing to the feature [log] on the higher binder in (67a), λ1 [log] , the higher
caki is bound by λ1 [log] and receives a de se interpretation with respect to the matrix subject
John. Therefore, the sentence with the LF in (67a) can be true only when both John and
Bill have a de se attitude: e.g., John thinks, ‘Bill told me, ‘Mary hates me’.’
Thirdly, we have seen that LD caki can co-refer with a non-subject NP when the
non-subject NP can be understood as the one whose speech is reported in the embedded
clause that contains caki. The illustrative example we saw in (12b), repeated below as (68),
includes the matrix verb ‘hear’.

(68)

S1 (John = caki): John said: "Mary told me that Tom hates me."
S2 (Mary = caki): John said: "Mary told me, ‘Tom hates me,’"
Johni -i
Maryj -lopwute [Tom-i
cakii/j -lul silhehanta-ko] tulessta.
John-nom Mary-from
Tom-nom self-acc dislike-comp heard
‘Johni heard from Maryj that Tom dislikes himi /herj .’

We can report the situations S1 and S2 using the same sentence in (68). Note first that
the non-subject NP is the source of the content of the embedded clause, regardless of the
antecedent of caki. Moreover, the first person pronoun must be used in Mary’s direct
speech when Mary is interpreted as the referent of caki. Given this, I propose that there
is a covert speech verb say in a sentence like (68). The LFs of (68), then, are parallel to
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those of the doubly embedded cases, as shown in (69) and (70).

(69)

Coreference between the matrix subject and caki with the verb ‘hear’
a.

LF: λw w John heard [λ1 [log] λw2 w2 Mary say [λ3 λw4 w4 Tom hates caki1 [log] ]]

b.

[[(69a)]]g = λw. ∀<y,w’> ∈ HearJohn,w : ∀<z,w”> ∈ SayM ary,w0 : Tom hates y
in w”, where
HearJohn,w = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what John hears in w that w’ is
a world John might be living in and y is the one who John identifies in w as
himself in w’}

(70)

Coreference between the matrix non-subject and caki with the verb ‘hear’
a.

LF: λw w John heard [λ1 λw2 w2 Mary say [λ3 [log] λw4 w4 Tom hates caki3 [log] ]]

b.

[[(70a)]]g = λw. ∀<y,w’> ∈ HearJohn,w : ∀<z,w”> ∈ SayM ary,w0 : Tom hates z
in w”, where
SayM ary,w0 = {<z, w”>: it is compatible with what Mary says in w’ that w” is
a world Mary might be living in and z is the one who Mary identifies in w’
as herself in w”}

Since caki is bound by an individual abstractor that is introduced by the matrix verb ‘hear’
or the covert intermediate predicate say, it receives a de se interpretation with respect to
either the matrix subject John or the intermediate subject Mary.21
21

The source of the covert verb say may be problematic. Seth Cable (p.c.) suggests that this covert
attitude verb say may be contribtued from the postpositional phrase ‘from Mary.’ It is a very plausible idea,
given that LD caki can only be associated with the matrix subject under the verb ‘hear’ when the ‘source’
postpositional phrase is absent in the sentence.
(i)

S1: John said: "Someone said that Tom hates me."
S2: John said: "Someone said, ‘Tom hates me,’"
Johni -i [Tom-i
cakii/∗j -lul silhehanta-ko] tulessta.
John-nom Tom-nom self-acc
dislike-comp heard
‘Johni heard that Tom dislikes himi /*someonej .’ [!S1, %S2]
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Lastly, our account also derives the property of LD caki that it only allows a sloppy
reading under ellipsis. The elided part in the second conjunct of (71) contains caki and an
individual abstractor under the verb ’think’. The LF of the first and second conjuncts of
(71) are given in (72).

(71)

John-un caki-ka chencayla-ko sayngkakha-ko, Bill-to kule-hata.
John-top self-nom genius-comp think-and
Bill-also so-does
Lit. ‘Johni thinks that selfi is a genius and Bill does, too.’
a.

Bill thinks that Bill is a genius, too.

b. *Bill thinks that John is a genius, too.
(72)

a.

LF: λw w John think [λx1 [log] λw2 w2 caki1 [log] is a genius]

b.

LF: λw w Bill think [λx1 [log] λw2 w2 caki1 [log] is a genius]

(sloppy reading)
(*strict reading)

Given our assmptions on LD caki and the semantics of attitude verbs, LD caki must be
bound by the abstractor under the verb ’think’ in (72), and thus, it only receives a de se
intereration with respect to the subject of each conjunct: John in the first conjunct and
Bill in the second conjunct. Therefore, the obligatory sloppy and de se readings of LD caki
are derived in an ellipsis construction.

3.5.4

Summary

To summarize, I proposed in this section the two binding conditions of LD caki: the
feature-match and locality conditions. Based upon the Lewis-Chierchia’s property approach to de se attitudes and ascriptions, I have assumed that LD caki is a variable that
needs to be bound by an individual abstractor introduced by an attitude verb. Given our
proposed account of LD caki, the LD reflexive caki, which bears the special feature [log],
cannot be bound by any abstractor but must be bound by a closest binder with the feature [log]. While the binding mechanism of LD caki in attitude reports is based upon the
dedicated de se LF, our system specifically regulates the suitable binder for LD caki.

82

I have shown that under our account the properties of LD caki within the scope of
attitude verbs can all be derived, such as no-locality restriction, obligatory coreference of
multiple clausemate caki’s, obligatory sloppy readings under ellipsis, and the obligatory
de se interpretation, etc.

3.6

Comparison with previous accounts

We have pursued an extension of the property approach to de se to account for the obligatory de se interpretation of caki as well as its other properties. Besides the property
approach that has been developed based upon prior work by Lewis (1979) and Chierchia
(1989), other analyses of the semantics of de se ascriptions have also been proposed in the
literature. In this section, I will examine two existing semantic accounts of de se expressions and demonstrate the advantages of our account for the LD reflexive caki.

3.6.1

The indexical approach

One of the alternative semantic approaches to de se expressions, such as PRO, logophors,
and LD reflexives, involves assigning indexical-like semantic values to these elements
(Schlenker 1999, Anand and Nevins 2004, Stephenson 2007, a.o.).
Under the Kaplanian semantics (Kaplan 1989), an interpretation function is relative
to a context c, an index (point of evaluation) i, and an assignment function g, [[ . ]]c,i,g .
Moreover, it is assumed that both contexts and indices are represented as tuples of coordinates, such as <author, hearer, time, location, world> (Kaplan 1989, Schlenker 1999, a.o.).22
Under this system, the extensions of indexicals are dependent on the context parameter,
as illustrated in (73).

22

The tuples of coordinates of the context and index parameter vary between authors.
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(73)

Lexical entries for indexicals
a.

J I Kc,i,g = auth(c)

b.

J you Kc,i,g = addr(c)

c.

J here Kc,i,g = loc(c)

In light of this, Anand and Nevins (2004) propose that certain de se elements like
logophors as well as obligatory control PRO can be identified as an indexical that refers
to either the auth or addressee coordinate of the index (point of evaluation) parameter,
as shown below.

(74)

Indexical meanings of PRO
a.

[[PROsubj ]]c,i = auth(i)

subject-controlled PRO

b.

[[PROobj ]]c,i = addr(i)

object-controlled PRO

Since the auth coordinate of the context or index parameter is the one who the speaker
identifies as himself, Anand and Nevins argue that this account can explain one of the
important properties of logophors and obligatory controlled PRO that they must be interpreted de se. In other words, given that the first person pronoun is used by the speaker
of the utterance context to refer to herself, a logophor or PRO refers to an individual that
the speaker of the reported context identifies as her counterpart.23
Under the semantics of PRO seen in (74) and the assumption that attitude predicates
quantify over indices, which include speaker, hearer, time, location, world, etc. coordinates, the truth-conditions of a sentence with PRO in (76a) would be as in (76b).24
23

Although their system is distinguished from Anand and Nevins (2004), Schlenker (1999, 2003) also treat
PRO and logophors as indexicals.
24
If one takes an intentional approach, a semantic rule like Intensional Function Application would be
required for the semantic composition of attitude predicates and propositions (Anand 2006, Stephenson
2007).
(i)

Intensional Function Application (adopted from Heim and Kratzer (1998))
If α is a branching node and {β, γ} the set of its daughters, then, for any context c, index i, and
assignment g: if JβKc,i,g is a function whose domain contains λi’. JγKc,i’,g , then JαKc,i,g = JβKc,i,g (λi’.
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(75)

Lexical entry for hope
JhopeKc,i,g = λp<κt> . [λx. ∀i0 compatible with what x hopes in i, p(i0 ) =T]25

(76)

a.

John hopes PRO to win.

b.

[[(76a)]]c,i,g = ∀i’ compatible with what John hopes in i, auth(i’) wins in i’

Since auth(i’) denotes the speaker of the reported context (i.e. the person ‘I’ refers to in
John’s reported speech act refers to), the obligatory de se interpretation of PRO can be
derived in (76).
Anand and Nevins also propose that logophoric pronouns in languages like Bafut
also have the same lexical entries as those of PRO, and thus receive an obligatory de se
interpretation.

(77)

Indexical meanings of logophors
a.

Jlog-authKc,i,g = auth(i)

b.

Jlog-addrKc,i,g = addr(i)

(Anand and Nevins 2004)

However, the semantics in (77) predicts that logophors can also occur outside the scope
of attitude predicates, contrary to the property of logophors in many languages that they
have to appear under the scope of attitude predicates. Therefore, they propose the following additional restriction.

(78)

Context blocking:
Do not use a logophor when an indexical could be used.
(Anand and Nevins 2004)

In the matrix clause, what a logophor denotes, auth(i), would be identical with what the
JγKc,i’,g ).
25

κ is the semantic type of the set of quintuples <a, h, t, l, w>.

85

1st person indexical indicates, auth(c). Given the restriction in (78), then, the indexical
should be used instead of the logophor in an unembedded sentence.
Importantly, the semantics of shifted indexicals is also uniformly explained under
the indexical approach. In languages like English, where there is no operator that can
manipulate the context parameter, semantic values of indexicals are soley determined by
the context parameter. Therefore, for example, the first person pronoun always refers to
the speaker of the context of utterance under any intensional operators in these languages.
By contrast, indexicals in complements of attitude verbs can be interpreted with respect
to the reported context instead of the actual speech context in certain languages, such as
Amharic (Schlenker 1999), Navajo (Speas 2000), Zazaki (Anand and Nevins 2004), Uyghur
(Sudo 2012, Shklovsky and Sudo 2014), Nez Perce (Deal 2014), etc., a phenomenon known
as ‘indexical shift’.

(79)

No indexical shift in English
John said that I am smart.

(80)

(I=the speaker of the sentence/*John)

Indexical shift in Zazaki
HEsenij
(m1k -ra) va kE Ezj/k dEwletia
Hessen.obl (I.obl-to) said that I
rich.be-pres
‘Hensen said that {I am, Hesen is} rich.’

(Anand and Nevins 2004)

Anand and Nevins (2004) argue that indexical shift is the result of a context-shift
operator that overwrites the context parameter on the interpretation function with the
index, as illustrated in (81). If there is any indexical under the scope of the context-shift
operator, then those indexicals refer to certain coordinates of the index parameter. For
instance, the first person pronoun in (80) will be interpreted as the author of the reported
speech context when a context-shift operator appears in the embedded clause.
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(81)

Context-shift operator
JOP∀ α Kc,i,g = J α Ki,i,g

(82)

a.

(Anand and Nevins 2004)

No indexical shift
JHensen said I am richKc,i,g = T iff
∀i’ compatible with what Hensen says in i, auth(c) is in i’.

b.

Indexical shift
JHensen said [OP∀ I am rich]Kc,i,g = T iff
∀i’ compatible with what Hensen says in i, auth(i’) is in i’.

Note that the semantics of the shifted first person pronoun is identical to those of PRO
and logophors seen above, that is, auth(i’).
While the indexical approach may uniformly capture the obligatory de se interpretation of the elements like PRO, logophors, and shifted indexicals, there are some potential
problems with this approach for certain de se elements. First, as Landau (2015) points
out for PRO, under this proposal we must assume multiple lexical entries for PRO and logophors. In particular, given that LD caki can also appear in non-attitude environments,
the indexical approach can only be adopted for caki under attitude predicates. Landau
(2015) rejects this proposal for PRO also because of the core differences between PRO and
shifted indexicals. Contrary to indexical shifting that is found only in a limited number of
languages and that usually occurs optionally, obligatory controlled PRO is rather general
and consistent.
More importantly, Park (2015) raises some crucial problems with this approach to
account for the obligatory de se interpretation of the Korean LD reflexive caki. The first
problem has to do with the interpretation of caki under multiple embeddings. As we
already saw, under more than one attitude predicate, LD caki can find its antecedent from
either the matrix clause or the intermediate clause, as illustrated below. No matter which
attitude holder LD caki takes as its antecedent, caki must be interpreted de se in either
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case.

(83)

John-i
[Mary-ka [caki-ka ttokttokhata-ko] sayngkakhanta-ko]
John-nom Mary-nom self-nom smart-comp
think-comp
malhayssta.
said
Lit. ‘Johni said that Maryj thinks selfi/j is smart.’
Assuming that LD caki in attitude environments indicates an author of an index, as

shown in (84), then it is hard to explain how the meaning of the LD caki can depend on
either point of evaluation under the two intensional operators (i.e., attitude verbs). It is
only expected to be determined by the closest intensional operator. The presence of the
context-shift operator would also be ineffective, because it only overwrites the context
parameter, not the index parameter.

(84)

Lexical entry for LD caki under the indexical approach
JcakiKc,i,g = auth(i)
Another problem arises in a sentence where two elements with the same semantics

(e.g., a shifted indexical and a logophor) co-occur. In the previous sections, we have seen
that multiple LD caki’s in the same clause must have the same antecedent. Park (2015)
also shows that indexical shifting in Korean is subject to the so-called ‘Shift Together’
constraint so that more than one (same type of) indexical in the same clause must find
their reference from the same context. Assuming shift indexicals and LD reflexives are
the same type of de se elements, the indexical approach predicts that a shifted indexical
and a LD reflexive in the same embedded clause should not be able to find references from
different contexts.
This is, however, a false prediction. First, caki and the shifted first person pronoun
can never be co-referential, unlike clausemate shifted indexicals or LD cakis.26 Rather,
26

Park (2014) shows that this is due to the person feature of caki.
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they must be disjoint, as illustrated below.

(85)

[John-i
[Bill-i
[caki-uy emeni-ka
na-lul silhehanta-ko]
John-nom Bill-nom self-gen mother-nom I-acc hate-comp
malhayssta-ko] malhayssta.]
said-comp
said
Lit. ‘Johni said that Billj said that selfj (=Bill)’s mother hates mei (=John)’27

There are two logically possible referents of caki and na ‘I’ in (85), namely, the matrix
subject John and the intermediate subject Bill. In (85), each element can independently
find its reference so that caki refers to the intermediate subject Bill, while na ‘I’ refers to
the matrix subject John. Such interpretations are not predicted if we assume caki is an
instance of indexical-type elements.
Additionally, the relationship between PRO and LD caki also challenges the unified
indexical approach by Anand and Nevins (2004) for shifted indexicals, logophors, and PRO.
Again, under this approach, we would expect for the clausemate PRO and LD reflexive
to be coreferent. Contrary to the prediction, however, the clausemate PRO and caki in
(86) can have different referents. That is, the subject-controlled PRO must refer to John,
whereas caki can refer to the matrix subject Mary. Again, we would not predict such a
disjoint interpretation if the semantics of PRO and caki were identical.28 The data on caki
and PRO are problematic under the indexical approach even though one may assume that
Interestingly, the other reading where caki refers to the matrix subject and na ‘I’ the intermediate
subject is impossible. Park (2015) shows that binding of caki is impossible once indexical shifting occurs
in the lower clause. That is, the context-shift operators cannot intervene between caki and its antecedent,
if they are separated by more than one clause boundary. On the basis of this observation, the interaction
between the shifted indexicals and caki can be described and be schematized, as in (i).
27

(i)

IS-Blocking Effect (Park 2015)
If caki and its antecedent are separated by more than one clause, a context-shift operator cannot
intervene between them.
X
[log]
∗[CP 1 A1 ...[CP 2 λj

B2 ...[CP 3 OPPER/ADV ...cakij ...ind2 ...]]]

28
The interpretation where PRO and caki are coreferential is also available. In this case, however, caki
can be understood to be bound by the local binder, PRO. The properties of obligatory control PRO and the
LD reflexive caki in Korean will receive focused discussion in Chapter 5.
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these indexical-like elements can refer to an author of any index, because the obligatory
coreference of multiple caki’s is then not predicted.

(86)

Disjoint reference of PRO and caki
Maryi -ka [Johnj -i [PROj cakii/j -uy emeni-lul pangmwunha-keyss-ta-ko]
Mary-nom John-nom PRO self-gen mother-acc visit-vol-decl-comp
yaksokhay-ss-ta-ko]
sayngkakhayssta.
promise-pst-decl-comp -thought
‘Maryi thought that Johnj promised to visit heri /hisj mother.’

Therefore, the unified indexical account of shifted indexicals, logophos/LD reflexives, and
PRO is faced with an empirical challenge from the Korean data seen above. However, it
should be noted that there is a possibility that the semantic value of caki may be determined by another parameter other than author or addressee of the context or index parameter: for instance, judge (Stephenson 2007) or perspective-holder (Bylinina et al. 2014),
etc. However, it is also not entirely clear how an element that denotes a perspective-center
or judge would obligatorily get a de se interpretation in attitude reports.

3.6.2

The de se-as-a-special-de re analysis

Another alternative approach that we will examine is to derive the obligatory de se interpretation of de se expressions from a de re construal instead of a dedicated de se LF. I will
first present a compositional semantic theory of de re ascriptions proposed by Percus and
Sauerland (2003). Then, I will provide an examination of one version of the so-called ‘de
se-as-a-special-de re’ analysis of Landau (2015).
Regardless of how the semantics of de re belief reports might be implemented, there
is a considerable consensus in the literature that attitude reports with a de re LF yield
truth-conditions that can be true whether the attitude in question is a de re attitude or a
de se attitude (e.g. Reinhart 1991, Percus and Sauerland 2003, Schlenker 2003, Maier 2011,
Anand 2006). To discuss how a de re construal is compatible with a de se attitude report,
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let us begin with the famous ‘double-vision’ problem that was first discussed by Quine
(1956). The belief statements in (87) can easily be judged contradictory when Ralph holds
both beliefs at the same time. Interestingly, however, they can be understood as rational
beliefs of Ralph towards Ortcutt in the following situation: Ralph encounters Ortcutt in
two difference guises, namely, the man in the brown hat and the man seen at the beach,
and he holds a belief of Ortcutt in the first guise that he is a spy, whereas he also thinks of
Ortcutt in the second guise not as a spy, without knowing that those two men are actually
the same person, Ortcutt.

(87)

a.

Ralph believes that Ortcutt is a spy.

b.

Ralph believes that Ortcutt is not a spy.

How can we, then, represent that the two sentences in (87) are not contradictory
and Ralph holds consistent de re beliefs about Ortcutt? As we briefly discussed in Section
3.5.1, Kaplan (1968) provides a solution to this problem: de re beliefs are not merely about
an object of belief (res), but rather about how a res is presented to a believer. In other
words, Kaplan argues that truth-conditions of de re belief reports contain some special
relations between a believer, res, and description α that a believer presents a res to herself.
For instance, in the ‘double-vision’ scenario, although the res is the same guy Ortcutt,
Ralph holds two different relations with Ortcutt that can be represented by two different
descriptions: the description α ‘the man in the brown hat’ and the description β ‘the man
seen at the beach’. Under these two different descriptions of Ortcutt, Ralphs believes that
‘α is a spy’ and ‘β is not a spy’, which are indeed not inconsistent beliefs. To characterize
a relation between an attitude holder, res, and description of the res, Kaplan introduces a
three-place relation ‘R (α, x, ATT)’, which denotes ‘α represents x to the attitude holder’
if and only if (i) α denotes x, (ii) α is a name of x for the attitude holder, and (iii) α is
(sufficiently) vivid. Ralph’s two de re belief reports about Ortcutt in the context above,
then, can be illustrated as below.
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(88)

a.

∃α. R(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) & Believe(Ralph, α is a spy)

b.

∃α. R(α, Ortcutt, Ralph) & Believe(Ralph, α is not a spy)

Given the Kaplanian approach to the semantics of de re, we can naturally derive
the fact that an embedded pronoun that is coreferential with the attitude holder can be
interpreted (non-de se) de re or de se without assuming any special mechanism for de se.
Although the res may be the same, namely the attitude holder, the descriptions of the res
argument for the attitude holder may vary. Consider the following sentence with two
different contexts from Reinhart (1991).

(89)

S1: Lucy hears herself and says: "I sound too aggressive."
S2: Lucie, a broadcast manager, is looking for the perfect female voice for an
ad, and requests to hear some samples of women in natural conversation. Unbeknown to her, the technician records her too, and adds it to the samples as
number 17. Lucie does not recognize her recorded voice, and rules out 17 as too
aggressive.
a.

Lucie1 believes that she1 sounds too aggressive. [!S1, !S2]

b.

∃α. R(α, Lucy, Lucy) & Believe(Lucy, α sounds too aggressive)

The sentence in (89a) can be used in either scenario, S1 or S2, corresponding to a de se
and a (non-de se) de re attitude, respectively. The sentence is predicted to be true in either
scenario given the Kaplanian de re truth-conditions, shown in (89b). Note that we have
two different descriptions of the res argument (Lucy) for the attitude holder (Lucy): either
"I" or "the person labeled as number 17". Therefore, the de se or de re attitude can be
reported using the same sentence with the same LF given the relevant descriptions, and
the de se reading is merely a special case of de re, where the attitude holder identifies the
res argument as herself.
Although we would agree that a pronoun can be interpreted de se in an attitude
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report with a de re LF when there is an acquaintance relation of identity (that is, SELF
acquaintance relation), it is more controversial whether we can employ the same de re
construal for attitude reports containing the obligatory de se expressions like PRO and
the LD reflexive caki. In order to force an element to be unambiguosuly interpreted de se
with a de re LF, acquaintance relations in LFs need to be fixed as the special acquaintance
relation of identity. The crucial problem is how we can enforce such a special acquaintance
relation when the obligatory de se elements are used.

3.6.2.1

The concept-generator analysis: Percus and Sauerland (2003)

As we just saw, it has been widely believed since Kaplan (1968) and Lewis (1979) that a
de re reading of an NP in a propositional attitude sentence is associated with a special
acquaintance relation (R) between an attitude holder and an object entity (a res). In other
words, for a de re reading, an attitude holder must be acquainted with a res in the actual
world under a certain relation R, and the relation R provides the mode of presentation of
the res, that is, how the attitude holder represents the res to herself. For instance, imagine
a situation where John is looking at a girl with a big smile in the picture (unbeknownst
to John, this girl is actually Mary), and thinks, ‘This girl in the picture is happy.’ In this
situation, the acquaintance relation R is the relation that the attitude holder bears to ‘the
girl in the picture’, namely, Mary. Given that there is a unique relation that John bears
to Mary in this situation and that he ascribes the property of ‘being happy’ to her in the
actual world, the truth-conditions of the sentence in (90a) can be provided as in (90b).

(90)

a.

John thinks that Mary is happy.

b.

[[(90a)]] = T iff there is a relation R such that John uniquely bears to Mary
in w,
and for all John’s doxastic alternatives <y, w’>,
the entity that y uniquely bears R to in w’ is happy in w’.
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Assuming that the truth-conditions of de re reports are like those in (90b), there is
a problem of how to derive these de re truth-conditions compositionally. Lewis (1979)
assumes that an entity can exist at exactly one possible world. However, an entity in
w can be related to a different entity at a different possible world as counterparts. An
entity can be mapped to its counterpart in different possible worlds via a function from
entities to individual concepts (that is, functions from possible worlds to entities). Along
this line of idea, Percus and Sauerland (2003) assume that de re truth-conditions involve
existential quantification over functions from entities to acquaintance-based concepts of
those entities, which are different from the de re truth-conditions seen in (90b), in which
existential quantification over acquaintance relations is involved. Under this de re theory
of Percus and Sauerland (2003), then, the de re truth-conditions of (90a) are as following.

(91)

[[(90a)]] = T in w iff there is some way G of assigning individuals to acquaintancebased concepts of those individuals for John in w, such that
for all John’s doxastic alternatives <y, w’>, G(Mary)(w’) is happy in w’

Note that the de re truth-conditions in (91) involve quantification over ways of assigning individuals to acquaintance-based concepts, which Percus and Sauerland (2003) dub
‘acquaintance-based concept-generator’. The ‘concept-generator’ and ‘acquaintance-based
concept-generator’ are defined as below.

(92)

The definition of the ‘concept-generator’ (Percus and Sauerland 2003)
G is a concept-generator for individual x in w iff
i.

G is a function from individuals to individual concepts

ii.

Dom(G) = {z: x is acquainted with z in w}
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(93)

The definition of the ‘acquaintance-based concept-generator’ (Percus and
Sauerland 2003)
G is an acquaintance-based concept-generator for individual x in w iff
i.

G is a concept-generator for x in w

ii.

the concepts G yields are "acquaintance-based" in the sense that
For all z in Dom(G), there is some acquaintance relation R such that
x bears R uniquely to z in w, and
for all <y,w’> in Doxx,w , y bears relation R uniquely to G(z)(w’) in w’

Percus and Sauerland (2003) propose that concept-generators appear in LFs as variables
inside a resP that also contains a res argument and a world variable, and there are also
abstractors over concept generator variables in the syntax. Then, the complements of attitude verbs denote functions from concept-generators to propositions, and attitude verbs
denote relations between individuals and functions from concept-generators to propositions. Given the definitions shown in (92) and (93), as wells as their syntactic assumptions,
the LF and truth-conditions of (90a) are as follows.

(94)

[[think]] = λΠ<<e,se>, <s,t>> . λx.λw. there is some acquaintance-based conceptgenerator G for x in w such that,
for all <y,w’> in DOXx,w , p(G)(w’) = 1.

(95)

a.

[John thinks [λG1 λw’ [w’ [resP G1 Mary w’] is happy ]]

b.

[[(90a)]] = T in w iff there is some acquaintance-based concept-generator G
for John in w,
such that ∀<y,w’>∈ DoxJohn,w , G(Mary)(w’) is happy in w’

The merit of the concept-generator analysis, besides eliminating the ‘res’-movement, is
thoroughly discussed in Charlow and Sharvit (2014).29
29

They show that de re readings of bound pronouns, e.g. her in (i), can be derived from the concept-
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The embedded pronoun in (96a) can be interpreted de se under the concept-generator
approach in cases where John, as a res argument, in the actual world is associated with a
concept that is based on a ‘self’ acquaintance relation. Assuming John bears a relation of
self-representation to himself in the actual world, the truth-conditions in (96b) will only
be defined when ∀<y,w’>∈ Dox<John,w> , y bears R, the relation of self-representation, to
G(John)(w’) in w’. Therefore, under this special kind of acquaintance relations with a de
re LF, the pronoun is interpreted de se.

(96)

a.

[Johni thinks [λG1 λw’ [w’ [resP G1 hei w’] is happy ]]

b.

[[(96a)]] = T in w iff there is some acquaintance-based concept-generator G
for John in w,
such that ∀<y,w’>∈ Dox<John,w> , G(John)(w’) is happy in w’

Given the nature of acquaintance relations that are contextually provided, an embedded
pronoun in attitude reports can be interpreted (non-de se) de re or de se. However, the
focus of this section is whether these de re LFs can be employed for the obligatory de se
expressions.
While Percus and Sauerland (2003) develop the concept-generator analysis for de
re ascriptions, they argue for a dedicated de se LF within the Lewis-Chierchia’s property
approach for cases in which an element is unambiguously interpreted de se. In particular, they present a case where even the third person pronoun must be associated with a
dedicated de se LF. Recall the example in (50), repeated below as (97), from Percus and
Sauerland (2003).30

generator analysis, but not from the ‘res’-movement analysis.
(i)

John believes that every female studenti likes heri mother.

30
They adopt the scenario and sentence from Schlenker (1999), where he credits them to Ede Zimmermann.
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(97)

Context: A group of drunken election candidates watching campaign speeches on
television do not recognize themselves in the broadcast. John is the first speaker,
Bill is the second, Sam is the third, and Perter is the last speaker. John, the only
confident one, thinks "I’ll win," but does not recognize himself in the broadcast.
Bill and Sam, both depressive, think "I’ll lose" but are impressed by the speeches
that happen to be their own and are sure "that candidate" will win. Peter, also
depressive, happens to be impressed not by his own speech but by John’s.

Only John thinks that he will win the election.

The sentence in (97) can be judged true under this particular context. Percus and Sauerland argue that the sentence can be true only under a dedicated de se construal like in
(98a), but not under a de re construal in (98b).

(98)

a.

[Only John]1 λ1 t1 thinks [λx2 . λw’. he2 will win the election]

b.

[Only John]1 λ1 t1 thinks [λG2 . λw’. [G2 he1 /he3 ]-w’ will win the election]

The sentence in (97) is true under the LF in (98a) because it is only John among the candidates who self-ascribes the property of winning, confirmed by his utterance I will win. On
the other hand, the sentence is predicted to be false under the de re LF in (98b) no matter
the third person pronoun is used as a bound variable or a free variable that is mapped
to John. First, when the pronoun he gets a bound-variable reading, the property (VP denotation) shown in (99) should only be true of John in order for the sentence to be true.
However, because it is not only John but also Bill and Sam who bear an acquaintance
relation R to themselves (e.g. ‘the second speaker’ and ‘the third speaker’), respectively,
and they think the individual they bear R to will win the election, the sentence turns out
to be false under (98b).
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(99)

[[think that he will win the election]] = λx.λw. there is some acquaintance-based
concept-generator G for x in w such that,
for all <y,w’> in DOXx,w , G(x)(w’) wins the election in w’.

Second, the sentence is false with the de re LF even under the reading where he specifically
refers to John. Given the VP denotation shown in (100), the sentence can be true when
only John, and no one else, bears an acquaintance relation R to John in w. This is not the
case because there is another individual in the context in addition to John who bears an
acquaintance relation R to John, namely, Peter, and thinks the person he bears R to will
win the election.

(100)

[[think that he will win the election]] = λx.λw. there is some acquaintance-based
concept-generator G for x in w such that,
for all <y,w’> in DOXx,w , G(John)(w’) wins the election in w’.

Given these arguments, Percus and Sauerland (2003) argue for a dedicated de se LF that
is distinct from a de re LF. However, as Anand (2006) points out, the context and sentence above may merely indicate that there are cases in which acquaintance relations in
a de re LF are restricted to a special kind, i.e. acquaintance relations of identity. If we
can restrict the type of acquaintance relations to the identity relation or posit a special
concept-generator that ultimately yields a special entity, e.g. a de se counterpart of the
attitude holder, we will be able to derive an obligatory de se interpretation from a de re LF.
The problem is how we can do that.

3.6.2.2

Landau (2015): De se-as-a-special-de re

Based upon the concept-gerator analysis for de re by Percus and Sauerland (2003), Landau
(2015) attempts to derive the obligatory de se interpretation of PRO from a de re LF. Under
his analysis, the source of the special SELF concept comes from the syntactic structure of
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certain control constructions, i.e. the OC complementizer. In this section, we will examine
a version of the ‘de se-as-a-special-de re’ analysis proposed by Landau (2015) and discuss
whether this account can be employed for the LD reflexive caki.31
Focusing on the facts that obligatory control constructions can be distinguished into
two types by the existence/absence of attitude complements - predicative control and logophoric control - and that de se readings of PRO are only relevant in logophoric control
(Mary began to paint the wall. vs. John intends to visit Athens.), Landau (2015) proposes a
two-tiered theory of control. That is, on top of the predicative control complements (FinP),
there is a second-tier in the structure that forms logophoric control with attitude complements. Under his analysis, then, attitude complements are syntactically more complex
than non-attitude complements, e.g. an additional CP layer headed by the OC complementizer.
In the two-tiered theory of control put forth in Landau (2015), the OC complementizer that exists only in attitude complements play a crucial role in deriving the obligatory de se interpretation of PRO in attitude complements. Within the theory of conceptgenerators by Percus and Sauerland (2003), Landau introduces a special concept-generator
for de se, GSELF , which is a constant function that maps an individual to an author function. Consider the definition of the ‘self concept-generator’ below.

(101)

Self concept-generator: GSELF =def G: ∀y ∈ Dom(G), G(y)= author.
For any individual z: [[GSELF ]]g,i (z) = λi’. author(i’)

(Landau 2015)

Self concept-generators are functions from entities to individual concepts, which are functions from indices (author, addr, world, time, etc.) to entities, and the domains of the
self concept-generator GSELF are singletons, author. In other words, GSELF takes an individual (an author) as its argument, and returns a special individual concept – a function
See Maier (2009, 2011) for another version of the ‘de se-as-a-special-de re’ analysis within a dynamic
framework.
31
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mapping a possible index i to an individual who is the author of the index i. Therefore,
when an entity is associated with this self concept-generator, it gets an unambiguous de
se reading.32
The next step, then, is to identify how OC PRO is only associated with GSELF (or
GTHOU ) instead of regular acquaintance-based concept-generators. Landau assumes that
PRO is a minimal pronoun (Kratzer 2009), and it turns a predicative control complement
into a property type by undergoing movement from Spec of TP to Spec of FinP and creating a lambda abstraction. These property-type predicative complements are selected by
non-attitude verbs, and the property that is created by the movement of PRO is directly
predicated of the matrix controller. Note that a de se interpretation of PRO must be derived only when there is an additional tier, CP, above FinP for logophoric complements
that are selected by attitude verbs under the two-tiered theory of control. Given that,
Landau attributes the primary role in deriving de se interpretations of PRO to the head of
CP in logophoric complements, the OC complementizer (COC ).
The special roles of COC are that (i) it projects an individual variable that corresponds
to either author or addressee coordinate as a specifier, and (ii) it introduces a presupposition that the concept-generator that is attached to this variable should be GSELF (or
GTHOU ). Landau’s core idea is that the obligatory de se interpretation of PRO is the result
of a de re LF with a specially enforced self-identification relation (SELF concept) between
the attitude holder and himself.
A question that immediately arises is whether we can extend this line of analysis
to other de se elements, especially the LD reflexive caki, which can freely appear in noncontrol constructions contrary to PRO. There are at least two different ways to consider
to examine Landau’s approach based on our Korean data: First, one may assume that LD
32

(i)

Landau also introduces another special concept-generator for de te readings of PRO.
GTHOU =def G: ∀y ∈ Dom(G), G(y)= addressee.
For any individual z: [[GTHOU ]]g,i (z) = λi’. addresseer(i’)
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(Landau 2015)

caki is a different kind of de se element that is not subject to the ‘de se-as-a-special-de re’
route. Second, one may argue that the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki is also
derivable from a de re LF with a specifically determined acquaintance relation. In order to
pursue the latter view, Landau’s version of the ‘de se-as-a-special-de re’ analysis must be
adequately modified to account for other de se elements, because the current version only
targets PRO, which appears in subject position of OC complements, and takes the special
structure of OC complements (Coc ) as the ultimate source of the de se interpretation of
PRO. As we saw, the Korean LD reflexive caki occurs in both subject and object position
in any complements of attitude verbs, and a multiple occurrence of caki is availalbe in
the same clause. Therefore, a significant change in Landau’s analysis is unavoidable to
expand this account to other de se elements. Under the former view, we may maintain
our property approach for caki, while PRO is subject to a different de se mechanism. This
option, however, is not only uneconomical but also not straightforward to explain the
interaction between PRO and caki, as well as the fact that caki and pronouns can also be
used as an overt OC subject in Korean. We will discuss this matter in detail in Chapter 4
and propose a unified account for both PRO and caki, based on our proposed account.

3.7

An extension: Caki in other attitude environments

In this final section of this chapter, I would like to briefly address the cases in which caki
appears in attitude environments without explicit attitude verbs. In the previous subsection, we have examined the properties of LD caki occuring in the complements of attitude
verbs. We have observed the close relationship between the attitude predicates and obligatory de se interpretation of caki. The presence of an attitude verb in a sentence forces LD
caki to be interpreted de se, no matter in which environment it occurs. In other words, caki
can be used under attitude predicates only when its antecedent, the one whose speech or
thought is represented in a sentence (source or self under Sells (1987)’s notions), can
identify herself in a first-person way in her speech or thought (using the first person pro101

noun). In this section, we will discuss other environments that involve attitudes other
than with overt attitude verbs and show that LD caki must be interpreted de se in those
attitude environments as well.

3.7.1

Attitudes without attitude verbs

An attitude can be reported not only with attitude verbs but with adjunct forms such as
‘according to A’ or ‘in A’s thought.’, etc. Interestingly, caki still must be interpreted de se
when attitudes are not explicitly expressed by a predicate (as zibun in Japanese; Bylinina
et al. 2014). In (102), the main clause describes the attitude of John towards Mary that is
introduced not by a predicate but by an adjunct clause. Similar to the case where caki is
embedded in the complement clause of an attitude verb, caki occurring in the main clause
that refers to the attitude holder in the adjunct clause has to be interpreted de se.

(102)

S1: John thinks, ‘Mary hates me.’
S2: John thinks, ‘Mary hates this guy in the photo.’ Unbeknonwnst to John, the
guy in the photo is John himself.
Johni -uy sayngkakey, Mary-ka cakii -lul silhehanta.
John-gen thought
Mary-nom self-acc hate
Lit. ‘In Johni ’s thought, Mary hates selfi .’ [!S1, #S2]
In the example in (103), the adjunct -ey ttalumyen ‘according to’ and the Korean

reportative evidential -tay indicate that the sentence is reporting John’s speech act. In
this case as well, John’s speech must contain the content of the main clause using the first
person pronoun in order to use LD caki, as in S1.
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(103)

S1: John said: "Mary is funnier than me."
S2: John said: "Mary is funnier than that guy in the video." Unbeknownst to John,
the guy in the video is John himself.
Johni -ey.ttalumyen, Mary-ka cakii -pota wuski-tay.
John-according.to, Mary-nom self-than funny-rpt
Lit. ‘Accroding to Johni , Mary is funnier than himi (I heard).’ [!S1, #S2]
LD caki can be further embedded in the attitude construction like above, and it can

take any attitude holder as its long-distance antecedent as in the multiple embedding
cases we saw before. Moreover, LD caki is subject to the de se restriction regardless of its
antecedent in this construction. Thus, in (104), it must be the case that either John said,
‘Tom thinks that Mary is funnier than me.’ or Tom thinks, ‘Mary is funnier than me.’

(104)

Johni -ey.ttalumyen, Tomj -i [Mary-ka cakii/j -pota wuskita-ko]
John-according.to, Tom-nom Mary-nom self-than funny-comp
sayngkakhan-tay.
think-rpt
Lit. ‘Accroding to Johni , Tomj thinks that Mary is funnier than himi/j (I heard).’

The examples in (102)–(104) show that LD caki requires a de se interpretation under attitude environments, although it is not explicitly expressed by an attitude verb. I assume
that these adjunct clauses introduce covert attitude operators whose semantics are identical to those of attitude verbs like ‘think’ and ‘say’.

3.7.2

Backward binding

In this subsection, I will introduce another environment in which caki gets an obligatory de se interpretation. In a number of languages, such as in Icelandic, Italian, Tamil,
Japanese, Chinese, etc., anaphors in the subject phrase can co-refer with an object NP,
a phenomenon called "backward binding", (Kuno 1972b, Sells 1987, Maling 1990, Huang
and Liu 2001, Giorgi 2006, Sundaresan 2012, among many others). It has been noted that
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backward binding is possible mostly with psych-verbs or causatives in these languages.
Sells (1987) argues that backward binding with psych verbs is the case where a logophor (e.g., zibun in Japanese) finds an individual "whose mental state or attitude the
content of the proposition describes" (i.e. self) as its antecedent (Sells 1987, p.457). Under his analysis, a psych verb specifies its experiencer object NP as a self, and an NP that
bears the self role must be aware of the propositional content that contains the logophor,
since "the self represents the one whose "mind" is being reported" (Sells 1987, p.455).

(105)

[Yosiko-ga zibuni -o nikundeiru koto]-ga Mitikoi -o zetuboo
e oiyatta.
Yosiko-nom zibun-acc be-hating C-nom Mitiko-acc desperation to drove
‘That Yosiko hated heri drove Mitikoi to desperation.’
(Sells 1987, p.453)
Backward Binding is also available for caki with psych-verbs or causatives.33 While

backward binding of caki in the subject NP by the object (i.e., Mary) is possible in (106),
caki in the object position cannot be bound by an element in the subject NP, as shown in
(107).34 When caki occurs in a subject clause and co-refers with an experiencer object, it
must be interpreted de se (Lee 2001). For instance, Mary in (106) must be able to identify
the propositional content of the news that disappointed her by using the first person
pronoun, e.g., "My daughter didn’t get the award."

33

In some languages, local backward binding is possible with psych-verbs, as shown in (i). By contrast,
caki in the subject position cannot be coreferential with a local experiencer in the object (ii).
(i)

a.
b.

(ii)

La propria moglie preoccupa molto Gianni.
Self’s wife worries Gianni a lot.
*La propria moglie ha ucciso Gianni.
Self’s wife murdered Gianni.

(Giorgi 2006)

*Cakii -uy atul-i
Maryi -lul kekcengsikhyessta
self-gen son-nom Mary-acc worried
Intended: ‘Selfi ’s son worried Maryi .’

34
Han and Storoshenko (2012) argue that caki in Korean is a bound variable. Accorindg to them, caki
cannot be bound by an element in a subject clause because the subject clause is an island that blocks QR.
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(106)

[Cakii -uy ai-ka
sang-ul
patci mosha-ss-ta-nun sosik]-i
Maryi -lul
Caki-gen child-nom award-acc get not-pst-decl-nm news-nom Mary-acc
silmangsikhyessta.
disappointed
Lit. ‘The news that selfi ’s child didn’t get the award disappointed Maryi .’

(107)

*[Maryi -uy ai-ka
sang-ul
patci mosha-ss-ta-nun sosik]-i
cakii -lul
Mary-gen child-nom award-acc get not-pst-decl-nm news-nom self-acc
sangsimkhey-hayssta.
disappointed.’
Intended: ‘The news that Maryi ’s child didn’t get the award disappointed selfi .’
There are certain restrictions in order for LD caki in subject position to take an

object NP as its antecedent. Firstly, backward binding seems to be sensitive to the types
of predicates. As shown below, LD caki in the subject clause cannot refer to the agent NP
in the passive construction, even though the surface positions of LD caki and a possible
antecedent NP look similar to those in (106).

(108)

*[Inho-ka cakii -lul moyokhaess-ta-nun sasil]-i Yumii -eyuyhay
Inho-nom self-acc insulted-decl-nm fact-nom Yumi-by
phoklotoeessta.
disclosed
Intended: ‘The fact that Inho insulted heri was disclosed by Yumii .’ (Lee 2001)

Secondly, even though local backward binding is usually unavailable in Korean, as
shown in fn.33, caki can occur in a subject NP without a clausal complement and co-refer
with an object NP in some cases.

(109)

(110)

Cakii -uy-kwake-ka Maryi -lul koylophyessta.
Caki-gen-past-nom Mary-acc bothered
Lit. ‘Self’s past bothered Mary.’
Cakii -ey kwanhan somwun-i Maryi -lul koylophyessta.
Caki
about
rumor-nom Mary-acc bother
Lit. ‘The rumor about self bothered Mary.’
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(Lee 2001)

Thirdly, not every backward binding case of caki requires a de se interpretation.
For instance, while some non-psych predicates also allow backward binding, caki is not
always subject to the de se restriction because backward binding sentences do not necessarily contain attitudes. Therefore, the sentences in (111) with non-psych matrix verbs
are still felicitous when Mary is not aware that the sound that awoke her is from her own
child’s piano sound.

(111)

[Caki1 -uy ai-ka
phiano chi-nun soli]-ka
Mary1 -lul kkaywessta.
Caki-gen child-nom piano play-nm sound-nom Mary-acc awoke
Lit. ‘The sound of self1 ’s child playing piano awoke Mary1 .’
Lastly, the type of subject phrases determines whether caki must receive a de se

interpertation. To illustrate this, consider the contrast between (112) and (113). While
the matrix predicate is identical and caki can take the object NP as its antecedent in both
sentences, only the one in (113) is subject to the de se requirement.

(112)

S1: Mary heard some nice sound and said: "What is this sound? This sound
makes me feel good."
S2: Mary’s son, Bill, played piano for her, and Mary said: "Bill’s piano sound
makes me feel good."
[Caki1 -uy ai-ka
phiano chi-nun soli]-ka
Mary1 -lul kipwun
Caki-gen child-nom piano play-nm sound-nom Mary-acc mood
cohkey
hayssta.
good-caus
Lit. ‘The sound of self1 ’s child playing piano made Mary1 feel good.’ [!S1, !S2]

(113)

S1: Mary said: "I feel so good today because I heard that my child got the award."
S2: Mary, who was a judge of a writng contest, said: "I feel so good today because
I heard that the one I gave a high score got the award." Unbeknownst to Mary,
the one who she gave a high score and got the award was her own child.
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[Caki1 -uy ai-ka
sang-ul
patass-ta-nun
sosik]-i
Mary1 -lul
Caki-gen child-nom award-acc received-decl-nm news-nom Mary-acc
kipwun cohkey
hayssta.
mood good-caus
Lit. ‘The news that self1 ’s child got the award made Mary1 feel good.’ [!S1, #
S2]

Note that the subject phrase in (112) describes the sound and the sentence expresses
Mary’s perception of sound. In other words, the subject phrase in (112) does not contain any propositional content. On the other hand, in (113), the subject phrase contains
the propositional content, ‘Mary’s child got the award.’ The entire sentence also expresses
Mary’s emotive attitude toward the content of the news. Therefore, with the existence of
attitudes in the sentence, caki in the subject clause must be interpreted de se.
Given the data seen above, only the subset of backward binding cases requires a de se
interpretation for LD caki. Specifically, we have seen that caki receives an unambiguous
de se reading when the subject phrase in which caki appears contains a propositional
content and the entire sentence (either explicitly or implicitly) expresses an attitude of
the antecedent of caki.

3.7.3

Summary

In summary, we have observed that LD caki must be interpreted de se within attitude environments, although attitudes may be expressed by an adjunct instead of verbs. Moreover,
caki in backward binding cases receives an obligatory de se interpretation when a sentence
expresses an attitude of the antecedent of caki. For these constructions, I tentatively assume that there is a covert attitude operator whose semantics resembles that of attitude
verbs, but I leave for future work the thorough investigation of these constructions.
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3.8

Conclusion

In this chapter, we have developed a binding theory of the LD reflexive caki in Korean
that can account for the following properties of caki:

(114)

Key properties of LD caki under attitude verbs
a.

LD caki can find an antecedent from any embedding clause.

b.

A long-distance antecedent of caki must be understood as an attitude holder.

c.

Multiple clausemate caki’s need to find the same long-distance antecedent.

d.

LD caki behaves like a bound anaphor, given that it only allows a sloppy
reading under ellipsis.

e.

LD caki under attitude verbs must be interpreted de se with respect to the
referent of caki.

Our analysis is largely based on the Lewis-Chierchia’s property approach to de se ascriptions. That is, caki in the complement of an attitude verb is a variable that must be bound
by an individual abstractor, which turns the complement clause into a property type. On
the basis of our semantics of attitude verbs and the definition of doxastic alternatives as
individual-world pairs, caki, then, is interpreted as a doxastic counterpart of an attitude
holder, who she thinks as herself in every possible world. This is how we can derive the
properties shown in (114b), (114d), and (114e).
While the pure property approach can explain some of the core properties of LD
caki, it is still not sufficient to account for the remaining properties like (114a) and (114c).
In order to capture these facts, we have added additional constraints to caki binding. That
is, caki cannot be freely bound by any individual abstractor, but must be bound by a particular abstractor that satisfies two conditions: the feature-match and locality condition.
In other words, caki, a variable that bears the feature [log], needs to be bound by a closest
binder that bears the [log] feature. The existence/absence of the feature on a binder as
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well as the distance of a binder determine one suitable binder for caki in cases where there
is more than one possible binder under multiple embeddings.
Although our proposed account for LD caki accommodates all the properties of LD
caki presented in (114), it should be noted that our focus has been confined to LD caki in
attitude environments only. In fact, in Chapter 6, we will see that caki can appear in nonattitude environments and find a long-distance antecedent. Accordingly, I will propose
a new logophoric binding system for LD caki in both attitude and non-attitude environments in Chapter 6, while still maintaining the property approach for the dedicated de se
construal.
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CHAPTER 4
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN DE SE ELEMENTS IN
CONTROL CONSTRUCTIONS

4.1

Introduction

The preceding chapter has provided an in-depth discussion of the obligatory de se interpretation of the LD reflexive caki in complements of attitude verbs, from both empirical
and theoretical perspectives. In this chapter, I will expand our discussion of the semantics of de se attitude reports by focusing on another type of obligatory de se expression in
Korean, namely, obligatory control (OC) subjects.
Despite significant advances in the literature on the obligatory de se expressions in
attitude reports, far less attention has been paid to the interactions between more than
one de se element in a language. Given that different semantic mechanisms have been
proposed for the de se expressions like PRO, logophors, and LD reflexives, respectively,
there are two possibilities when one language has multiple de se elements: first, more than
one mechanism may be employed for different kinds of de se elements, or, alternatively,
there could be one and the same route to de se ascriptions with these seemingly different
de se elements. I will argue for the latter view for the two types of de se elements in Korean,
controlled subjects and the LD reflexive caki, based on novel empirical evidence.
While the null subject in Korean OC constructions receives an obligatory de se in-
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terpretation as in English, overt OC subjects are also unambiguously interpreted de se in
Korean. While maintaining the dedicated de se construal for LD caki that we developed
in the previous chapter, I will extend the same construal to controlled subjects (e.g. PRO,
controlled pronouns and controlled anaphors), and will show that we do not need separate
mechanisms for OC subjects and LD caki. In addition, I will argue propose that additional
structural conditions of OC constructions and lexical properties of caki can derive a complete set of properties of OC subjects, LD caki, and their interactions.
Section 4.2 will introduce basic properties of OC constructions in Korean, focusing
on attitudinal OC constructions (logophoric control). Section 4.3 presents the properties of
overt OC subjects (pronouns and the reflexive caki) in comparison with the null subject
PRO and their non-controlled uses. Section 4.4 then provides novel data on how OC
subjects (PRO and controlled pronouns on the one hand, and the controlled caki on the
other) interact with non-controlled LD caki within the same clause. Section 4.5 proposes a
unified analysis of the two types of de se elements (controlled subjects and LD caki) under
the property approach.

4.2

Basic properties of obligatory control constructions in Korean

In this section, I begin by introducing some basic properties of control constructions in
Korean. Then, in Section 4.2.2, we limit our attention to a specific type of obligatory
control complements that are embedded under attitude verbs.

4.2.1

Obligatory control

It has been proposed that control environments in Korean can be formed by a combination of certain embedding predicates and mood markers in the embedded clause or some
special complementizers (Yang 1985, Borer 1989, Madigan 2008, Lee 2009, etc.). Let us
first consider how mood or modal markers play a role in control constructions in Korean,
as illustrated in (1).
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(1)

a.

Subject Control with a volitional modal marker -keyss
Tomi -i
Billj -eykey [PROi/∗j Mary-lul manna-keyss-ta-ko]
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO
Mary-acc meet-vol-decl-comp
yaksokha-ess-ta.
promised
‘Tomi promised Billj PROi/∗j to meet Mary.’

b.

Object Control with an imperative mood marker -la
Tomi -i
Billj -eykey [PRO∗i/j Mary-lul manna-la-ko]
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO
Mary-acc meet-imp-comp
myenglyenghay-ss-ta.
order
‘Tomi ordered Billj PRO∗i/j to meet Mary.’

c.

Split Control with a hortative mood marker -ca
Tomi -i
Billj -eykey [PRO∗i/∗j/i+j Mary-lul manna-ca-ko]
Mary-acc meet-hor-comp
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO
ceyanhay-ss-ta.
propose
‘Tomi proposed Billj PRO∗i/∗j/i+j to meet Mary.’

In (1a), an obligatory subject control construction is created by the combination of the
embedding predicate yaksokhata ‘promise’ and a volitional modal -keyss.1 Thus, PRO in
(1a) can only refer to the matrix subject. On the other hand, the sentence in (1b) with
the embedding verb myenglyenghata ‘order’ and an imperative mood marker -la is an
instance of an obligatory object control construction in which PRO is controlled by the
matrix object. Moreover, a hortative mood marker -ca and the matrix verb ceanhata ‘propose’ in (1c) form a split control environment, where PRO must be jointly controlled by
both arguments in the matrix clause, Tom and Bill. The data presented above show that
the mood/modal markers play a crucial role in determining the interpretation of PRO in
Korean. It should also be noted that these control complements are headed by a complementizer -ko and embedded under control verbs that are also attitude predicates.
1

-keyss can also denote a speaker’s inference in evidential sentences (Chung 2005, 2007).
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Before we explore our main question of interest—the semantics of de se attitude
reports with control constructions—we need to make sure that the constructions shown
above are indeed obligatory control constructions in Korean. There is a widespread consensus in the literature that obligatory control (henceforth, OC) exhibit certain properties
shown in (2) (e.g., Hornstein 1999, Landau 1999). We can confirm that the constructions in
(1) are indeed obligatory control constructions in Korean using these properties (Madigan
2008, Lee 2009).

(2)

The properties of Obligatory Control (OC)
a.

Arbitrary control is impossible.

b.

Long-distance control is impossible.

c.

Strict reading of PRO is impossible.

d.

(Non-de se) de re reading of PRO is impossible (only de se).

Firstly, arbitrary control is impossible in the examples in (1). That is, the null subject
in the embedded clause must refer to the matrix subject in (1a), the matrix object in (1b),
and both of the matrix arguments in (1c). Any other coreference readings are not available.
Secondly, when the sentences in (1) are embedded under another attitude verb, the null
subject in the control clause must be controlled by a local controller, an argument in the
immediately embedding clause, as illustrated below.

(3)

No long-distance control
a.

Johni -un [Tomj -i Billk -eykey [PRO∗i/j/∗k Mary-lul manna-keyss-ta-ko]
John-top Tom-nom Bill-dat
PRO
Mary-acc meet-vol-decl-comp
yaksokha-ess-ta-ko]
mitnunta.
promise-pst-decl-comp believe
‘Johni believes that Tomj promised Billk [PRO∗i/j/∗k to meet Mary].’
(Yang 1985, p.390-91)
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b.

Johni -un [Tomj -i Billk -eykey [PRO∗i/∗j/k Mary-lul manna-la-ko]
John-top Tom-nom Bill-dat
PRO
Mary-acc meet-imp-comp
myenglyenghay-ss-ta-ko] mitnunta.
order-pst-decl-comp
believe
‘Johni believes that Tomj ordered Billk [PRO∗i/∗j/k to meet Mary].’

c.

Johni -un [Tomj -i Billk -eykey [PRO∗i/∗j/∗k/i+j Mary-lul manna-ca-ko]
John-top Tom-nom Bill-dat
PRO
Mary-acc meet-hor-comp
ceyanhay-ss-ta-ko]
mitnunta.
propose-pst-decl-comp believe
‘Johni believes that Tomj proposed Billk [PRO∗i/∗j/∗k/j+k to meet Mary].’

The matrix subjects of the sentences in (3) cannot be a legitimate controller of PRO in the
most embedded clause, due to the locality restriction on obligatory control.
Thirdly, the null subjects in these constructions only allow a sloppy reading under
VP ellipsis, as shown in (4).

(4)

Only sloppy reading under ellipsis
Tomi -i
Billj -eykey [PROi/∗j Mary-lul manna-keyss-ta-ko] yaksokha-ess-ta.
Mary-acc meet-vol-decl-comp promised
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO
John-to kuli-hay-ss-ta.
John-also so-do-pst-decl
‘Tom promised Bill to meet Mary. John did too.’
a.

%Strict reading: Johnj promised Bill that Tom would meet Mary.

b.

!Sloppy reading: Johnj promised Bill that hej would meet Mary.

Lastly, the null subjects in (1) only get a de se (/de te/de se+de te) reading. For instance,
the sentence in (1a) is felicitous only when Tom promised Bill: "I will meet Mary." Similarly,
in the object control construction in (1b), Tom must identify Bill as his addressee and say
something like, ‘You should meet Mary.’ In the split control case as in (1c), the matrix
subject Tom must identify himself and his addressee as the ones who would meet Mary,
and say: "Let us (you and me) meet Mary."
In summary, we have focused on the control constructions in Korean in which con-
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trol complements are headed by the complementizer -ko and contain a volitional modal,
an imperative mood marker, or an exhortative mood marker. We have seen that the null
subject in these constructions exhibits the well-known properties of obligatory control.
We also saw that the type of mood/modal marker determines the interpretation of PRO:
subject control with the volitional modal -keyss, object control with the imperative mood
-la, and split control with the exhortative mood -ca. The null subject PRO in an obligatory control complement and LD caki have both similarities and differences: both of them
must be interpreted de se and only allow a sloppy reading under ellipsis, while only PRO
requires a local and obligatory control.

4.2.2

Logophoric control

Landau (2015) distinguishes obligatory control into two subtypes: Predicative control and
Logophoric control. According to him, the crucial difference between the two types of
obligatory control is the existence/absence of attitude complements. That is, predicative
control environments are constructed with verbs that take non-attitude complements,
such as implicative (e.g., avoid, fail, force, manage, etc.), aspectual (e.g., begin, continue,
finish, start, etc.), modal (e.g., have, may, must, etc.), and evaluative (e.g., crazy, kind, rude,
etc.) predicates. On the other hand, logophoric control applies in attitude complements
that are selected by attitude predicates.

(5)

Predicative Control
a.

Mary began to paint the wall.

b.

Mary is able to paint the wall.

c.

Mary saw fit to paint the wall.

d.

It was smart of Mary to paint the wall.
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(Landau 2015, p.24)

Logophoric Control

(6)

a.

Mary claimed to have found the solution.

b.

Mary was shocked to find the solution.

c.

Mary intended to find the solution.

d.

Mary asked how to find the solution.

(Landau 2015, p.30)

Landau’s distinction between predicative and logophoric control in terms of the type
of complements (non-attitude vs. attitude) is closely related to the fact that obligatory
de se interpretations of PRO only arise in logophoric control. In other words, the de se
interpretation of PRO is irrelevant in predicative control, where there is no attitude environment.
Landau also presents empirical contrasts between the two types of obligatory control. He examines phenomena of implicit control, control shift, partial control, and split
control, and argues that these phenomena are available only in logophoric control.2 Consider the following examples of partial and split control from Landau (2015).

Partial Control

(7)

a.

Jamesi agreed PROi+ to meet thanks to our pressures.

b. *Jamesi condescended PROi+ to meet thanks to our pressures.

logophoric
predicative

Split Control

(8)

a.

Johni proposed to Maryj [PROi+j to meet each other at 6].

b.

Johni asked Maryj [whether PROi+j to get themselves a new car].

logophoric

logophoric
c. *Billi forced/compelled Georgej [PROi+j to deal with themselves first].
predicative
By contrast, he shows that inflected complements and [-human] PRO are only possible in predicate
control.
2
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Given this distinction, the obligatory control constructions in Korean that we saw
in the previous section can be distinguished as logophoric control. We already saw that
the control complements with a mood or modal marker are selected by attitude predicates in Korean. In other words, non-attitude verbs (e.g. implicative, aspectual, modal,
evaluative) cannot take a complement headed by the complementizer -ko that contains a
particular mood or modal marker. Moreover, it has been observed that these structures
allow partial and split control in Korean (e.g., Madigan 2008, Lee 2009). As shown below,
control complements that contain the volitional modal -keyss or imperative mood marker
-la allow partial control, while split control can be created in control complements with
the exhortative mood marker -ca.

(9)

Partial Control in Korean
a.

Billj -eykey [PROi+ tosekwan-eyse moi-keyss-ta]-ko
Tom-ii
gather-vol-decl-comp
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO library-loc
yaksokhay-ss-ta.
promise-pst-decl
‘Tom promised Bill to gather in the library.’

b.

Billj -eykey [PROj+ tosekwan-eyse moi-la]-ko
Tom-ii
library-loc
gather-imp-comp
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO
myenglyenghay-ss-ta.
promise-pst-decl
‘Tom ordered Bill to gather in the library.’

The collective verb moita ‘gather’ in Korean requires a plural subject, as in English. Given
this, PRO in the subject control construction in (9a) must be understood as plural that
includes the matrix subject, whereas object-controlled PRO in (9b) must refer to a group
that contains the matrix object.
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(10)

Split Control in Korean
Tom-ii
Billj -eykey [PROi+j tosekwan-eyse manna-ca]-ko
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO
library-loc
meet-exh-comp
ceyanhay-ss-ta.
propose-pst-decl
‘Tom proposed Bill to meet in the library.’

As we saw before, the control complements with the exhortative mood -ca are only associated with split control. Thus, PRO in (10) must be controlled by both the matrix subject
and object arguments.
Based upon Landau’s (2015) distinction between predicative and logophoric control
among obligatory control, we have shown that the relevant Korean OC constructions we
saw in the previous section—complements that contain certain modal/mood markers and
are headed by the complementizer -ko—are logophoric control cases where there are attitude environments. Therefore, PRO in these constructions always need to be interpreted
de se (de te/de se+de te) in Korean. Throughout the remainder of this chapter, we will focus
our attention on logophoric control that contains attitude complements.

4.3

Overt controlled subjects in Korean

4.3.1

Pronouns and caki as controlled subjects

It has been argued that Korean is a language where lexical subjects, such as pronouns or
anaphors, can appear in OC constructions (Yang 1985, Madigan 2008, Lee 2009, Park 2011,
a.o.).34 For instance, in the subject control sentence we saw in (1a), repeated below as (11),
3

Madigan (2008) argues that the third person pronoun cannot be controlled, while the first/second pronoun and the reflexive caki can be. However, it has been widely reported in the literature that even the
third person pronoun can replace PRO in Korean (Yang 1985, Lee 2009, Park 2011, etc.). Judgments from
my consultants and myself as a native speaker support the latter view that overt third person pronouns can
be controlled in Korean, while they may sound less natural than anaphors.
4
A number of other languages also allow overt subjects in OC constructions: see, among many others,
Szabolcsi (2009a,b) for Hungarian; Raposo (1987) for Portuguese; etc.
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the third person pronoun or the LD reflexive caki can replace PRO.56

(11)

Overt subject in subject control
S1: Tom promised Bill: "I will meet Mary."
S2: Tom promised Bill: "I’ll make sure that that guy in this picture meets Mary."
(Unbeknownst to Tom, the guy in the photo is Tom himself.)
Tomj -i Billk -eykey [PRO∗i/j/∗k /ku∗i/j/∗k -ka/caki∗i/j/∗k -ka Mary-lul
Tom-nom Bill-dat
PRO/he-nom/self-nom
Mary-acc
manna-keyss-ta-ko] yaksokha-ess-ta.
meet-vol-decl-comp promise-pst-decl
Lit. ‘Tomj promised Billk [PROj /hej /selfj to meet Mary].’ [!S1, # S2]

In (11), the third person pronoun ku and the reflexive caki behave as OC PRO in that they
must be controlled by the subject of the immediately embedding clause (Tom), and they
only allow a de se reading.
Overt subjects are also possible in object and split control sentences, as illustrated
in (12) and (13).

In addition to the LD reflexive caki, another LD reflexive casin and the local anaphor cakicasin can also
appear in the controlled subject position.
5

(i)

Casin and cakicasin as an OC subject
S1: Tom promised Bill: "I will meet Mary."
S2: Tom promised Bill: "I’ll make sure that that guy in this picture meets Mary." (Unbeknownst to
Tom, the guy he is referring to is Tom himself.)
Tomj -i Billk -eykey [casin∗i/j/∗k /cakicasin∗i/j/∗k -i Mary-lul manna-keyss-ta-ko]
Tom-nom Bill-dat
self-nom
Mary-acc meet-vol-decl-comp
yaksokha-ess-ta.
promise-pst-decl
‘Lit. Tomj promised Billk [selfj to meet Mary].’ [!S1, # S2]

As shown above, both the LD reflexive casin and the local anaphor cakicasin occurring in the controlled
subject position also exhibit the OC properties.
6
It has been noted that overt controllees usually get a focused reading in Korean as in other languages
like Spanish and Hungarian, etc. (Madigan 2008, Lee 2009, Szabolcsi 2009a).
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(12)

Overt subject in object control
S1: Tom told Bill: "You meet Mary!"
S2: Tom told Bill: "That guy in this picture should meet Mary!" (Unbeknownst to
Tom, the guy he is referring to is Bill.)
Tomi -i
Billj -eykey [PRO∗i/j /ku∗i/j -ka Mary-lul manna-la-ko]
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO/he-nom
Mary-acc meet-imp-comp
myenglyenghayssta.
ordered
‘Lit. Tomi ordered Billj PROj /hej to meet Mary.’ [!S1, # S2]

The third person pronoun ku can replace PRO in the object control construction, as in
(12). Although it may sound a bit awkward to some speakers with no context, it gets
easily accepted when a context is provided where the embedded subject is focused, e.g.
Tom told Bill, ‘You, not someone else, should meet Mary’. Both the null subject and the
overt pronoun are felicitous in the object control construction only when the attitude
holder expresses an attitude toward his addressee, as in S1. It should be noted that unlike
in the subject control case, object controlled PRO cannot alternate with the reflexive caki.
We will address this issue shortly in 4.3.3.

(13)

Overt subject in split control
S1: Tom told Bill: "Let us (you and me) meet Mary."
S2: Tom told Bill: "Let these two guys in this picture meet Mary." (Unbeknownst
to Tom, the guys he is referring to are Tom himself and his addressee Bill.)
Tomi -i
Billj -eykey [PRO∗i/∗j/i+j /kutul∗i/∗j/i+j -i/caki-tul∗i/∗j/i+j -i Mary-lul
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO/they-nom/caki-pl-nom
Mary-acc
manna-ca-ko] ceyanhayssta.
meet-hor-comp proposed
‘Lit. Tomi proposed Billj PROi+j /theyi+j /selfsi+j to meet Mary.’ [!S1, # S2]

In the split control construction, both the third person pronoun and caki can appear in the
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subject position. We can see that overt controlled subjects must take a plural form, either
the plural third person pronoun kutul ‘they’ or the plural LD reflexive caki-tul, indicating
that the subject of the split control construction must be plural. Moreover, the subject of
the split control construction must be interpreted both de se and de te, as shown in S1.
In contrast to the pronouns and anaphors, lexical referential NPs cannot be used in
subject position of the control construction (Lee 2009). It is compatible with the traditional
view on PRO that it is non-referential.

(14)

No referential NPs as an OC subject
*Tomj -i Billk -eykey [Sue-ka Mary-lul manna-keyss-ta-ko]
Tom-nom Bill-dat
Sue-nom Mary-acc meet-vol-decl-comp
yaksokha-ess-ta.
promise-pst-decl
‘Lit. Tomj promised Billk [Sue to meet Mary].’

So far, we have seen that overt subjects in obligatory control constructions behave like
the null subject PRO with respect to the basic properties of obligatory control. In the
next subsection, I will provide a comparison between controlled and non-controlled pronouns/caki.

4.3.2

Controlled vs. non-controlled pronouns/reflexives

We have seen that pronouns and the LD reflexive caki in the controlled subject position
must be controlled by a matrix argument in the immediately embedding clause and must
be obligatorily interpreted de se with respect to their controllers. These properties of
controlled pronouns or caki are distinguished from the typical properties of these elements
in a number of ways. First, the third person pronoun can usually be used as a free variable.
Second, the LD reflexive caki can have any long-distance antecedent that c-commands it.
Moreover, the third person pronoun can usually get either a (non-de se) de re or de se
reading. Consider a non-control construction with the third person pronoun ku and caki
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below.

(15)

Pronoun and caki in a non-control construction
a.

Johni -un [Tomj -i Billk -eykey [kui/j/k/l -ka Mary-lul
John-top Tom-nom Bill-dat
he-nom
Mary-acc
manna-ss-ta-ko]
malhay-ss-ta-ko] mitnunta.
meet-pst-decl-comp say-pst-decl-comp believe
‘Johni believes that Tomj said to Billk that hei/j/k/l met Mary.’

b.

Johni -un [Tomj -i Billk -eykey [cakii/j/∗k -ka Mary-lul
John-top Tom-nom Bill-dat
self-nom
Mary-acc
manna-ss-ta-ko]
malhay-ss-ta-ko] mitnunta.
meet-pst-decl-comp say-pst-decl-comp believe
‘Johni believes that Tomj said to Billk that hei/j/∗k met Mary.’

The complement clauses with the declarative marker -ta only form a non-control construction in Korean. In (15a), the third person pronoun ku in the most embedded clause
can refer to any male individual in the sentence, as long as it does not violate Condition
B, or in the context. Moreover, a (non-de se) de re reading of the third person pronoun
is easily acceptable under a mistaken scenario. The non-controlled LD reflexive caki in
(15b) can be coreferential with any long-distance subject, John or Tom.
Pronouns and LD caki differ significantly in non-control constructions than in OC
constructions. The contrasts between controlled and non-controlled pronouns or caki
presented in this subsection show that the interpretations of the pronoun and LD caki are
restricted in a similar way only when they occur in the OC subject position, indicating
that the OC properties seem to be attributed to structural properties of OC constructions
instead of inherent properties of the elements that can be used as an OC subject.

4.3.3

Controlled caki vs. OC PRO

Given that the LD reflexive caki behaves like PRO in the OC subject position, one may
argue that the controlled LD reflexive is merely an overt form of PRO in OC constructions
(e.g. Madigan 2008). However, as Lee (2009) points out, caki and OC PRO are not always
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interchangeable.
One of the basic properties of caki we have seen is that caki cannot have a first or
second person pronoun as its antecedent. This person restriction holds even when caki
is used as a controlled subject. Thus, caki cannot replace PRO when a controller is either
the first or second person pronoun (Lee 2009).

(16)

No 1st /2nd person controller for controlled caki
a.

Nai -nun Billj -eykey [PROi/∗j /caki∗i/∗j /nayi/∗j -ka Mary-lul
I-top Bill-dat PRO/self/I-nom
Mary-acc
manna-keyss-ta-ko] yaksokha-ess-ta.
meet-vol-decl-comp promised
Lit. ‘Ii promised Billj PROi/∗j /self∗i/∗j /Ii/∗j to meet Mary.’

b.

Tomi -i
nej -eykey [PRO∗i/j /caki∗i/∗j /ney∗i/j -ka Mary-lul
Tom-nom you-dat PRO/self/you-nom
Mary-acc
manna-la-ko] myenglyenghay-ss-ta.
meet-imp-comp ordered
Lit. ‘Tomi ordered youj PRO∗i/j /self∗i/∗j to meet Mary.’

In (16), contrary to the first or second person pronoun, caki cannot overtly appear in the
controlled subject position when the controller is the first or second person pronoun. If
it were the case that caki were merely an overt form of PRO in the OC construction, we
would not expect this person restriction on the controlled caki.
Moreover, it has been reported in the literature that caki cannot replace PRO in
the object control construction (Yang 1985, Lee 2009).7 In the object control construction
below with the imperative mood marker -la, caki is not interchangeable with PRO while
the third person pronoun is.
Madigan (2008) reports that his consultants allow object control with caki in the subject position of the
control clause. However, I agree with the judgment reported in Lee (2009) (see fn.80, p.177) that caki in the
object control construction can only be understood as a discourse pronoun ‘you’ rather than an anaphor.
7

(i)

Inhoi -ka Jwuhij -eykey caki∗i/j -ka cip-ey
ka-la-ko
mal-ha-yess-ta.
I-nom Jwuhi-dat
caki-nom home-Lpc go-imp-comp tell-do-pst-decl
Lit. ‘Inhoi told Jwuhij SELF∗i/j to go home.’
(Madigan 2008, p.84)
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(17)

No object control for controlled caki
Tomi -i
Billj -eykey [PRO∗i/j /ku∗i/j -ka/caki∗i/∗j -ka Mary-lul manna-la]-ko
Tom-nom Bill-dat PRO/he-nom/self-nom
Mary-acc meet-imp-comp
myenglyenghay-ss-ta..
order-pst-decl
Lit. ‘Tomi ordered Billj [PRO∗i/j /he∗i/j /self∗i/∗j to meet Mary].’

Given this fact, Yang (1985) argues that the controlled caki is still subject to its general
binding conditions.8 That is, we have seen that caki is mostly subject-oriented unless a
non-subject element can be understood as a person whose speech or thought is represented, i.e. source or self. The unavailability of caki in the object control construction,
then, can be attributed to the fact that the object controller is not a legitimate antecedent
of caki in general—it is neither a subject nor a source or self NP.

4.3.4

Summary

In this section, I have presented the properties of controlled lexical subjects like pronouns
and the reflexive caki in obligatory control constructions in Korean in comparison with
the null subject PRO and non-controlled pronouns and caki. In the obligatory controlled
subject position, even pronouns get an obligatory de se interpretation and LD caki can
only be controlled by a local controller like the null subject PRO. It is hard to see, then,
that these OC properties of the controlled pronouns or caki are inherent lexical properties
of these elements. Rather, it would be more plausible to assume that these OC properties
are imposed by certain structural properties of OC constructions. We have also seen that
8

(i)

Yang (1985) provides an object control example with the complementizer -tolok.
Johni -un [Tomj -i Billk -eykey [PRO∗i/∗j/k /ku∗i/∗j/k -ka/caki∗i/∗j/∗k -ka Mary-lul
John-top Tom-nom Bill-dat
PRO/he-nom/self-nom
Mary-acc
manna-tolok] seltukhay-ss-ta-ko]
mitnunta.
meet-comp persuade-pst-decl-comp believe
‘Lit. Johni believes that Tomj persuaded Billk [PRO∗i/∗j/k /he∗i/∗j/k /self∗i/∗j/∗k to meet Mary].’
(Yang 1985, p.392)
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the controlled caki preserves its basic properties that it cannot be anteceded by the first or
second person pronoun and it requires a subject antecedent or an antecedent that satisfies
certain discourse roles (e.g., source or self). Therefore, caki cannot be used as a controlled
subject when a controller is the first or second person pronoun or when a controller is
not in a subject position (e.g., object control constructions).
Table 4.1: Interim summary: PRO, (non-)controlled pronoun, and (non-)controlled LD caki
PRO
Obligatory de se
Obligatory local control
Object control
3rd person restriction

4.4

!
!
!
%

Controlled
pronoun
!
!
!
%

Non-controlled
pronoun
%
%
n/a
%

Controlled
caki
!
!
%
!

Non-controlled
LD caki
!
%
n/a
!

OC PRO vs. LD caki

In the previous section, we saw that although LD caki can replace PRO in OC constructions, they are not always interchangeable due to the inherent properties of caki, such as
the third person restriction and subject-orientation. In this section, I will present more
novel data on the difference between OC subjects—PRO and controlled pronouns on the
one hand and controlled LD caki on the other—with respect to their interactions with
another de se element, a non-controlled LD caki, in the same clause.

4.4.1

Clausemate OC PRO and LD caki

As we saw already, both OC PRO and LD caki must be interpreted de se within the scope
of attitude verbs in Korean. Although the obligatory de se interpretations of PRO and
long-distance reflexives in many languages have received considerable attention, the interaction of these two different de se elements (when they co-occur in the same clause)
has not been fully discussed. Interestingly, OC subjects do not interact with a clausemate
LD caki in the same way. This subsection provides novel data regarding how OC subjects
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and LD caki interact with each other.
First, if the OC subject is PRO or an overt pronoun, a clausemate caki does not have
to be coreferent with the OC subject under multiple embeddings. For example, the most
embedded clause in (18) contains both the null subject PRO and caki. Not surprisingly,
PRO in this subject control complement must be controlled by the local controller—the
subject of the immediately embedding clause, Bill. The LD caki, on the other hand, can
refer to either the matrix subject John or the intermediate subject Bill.

(18)

Disjoint reference possible between PRO/controlled pronouns and LD caki
Johni -un [Billj -i Maryk -eykey [PRO∗i/j/∗k /ku∗i/j/∗k cakii/j/∗k -uy cip-ulo
John-top Bill-nom Mary-dat
PRO/he
caki-gen
house-to
ka-keyss-ta]-ko
yaksokhayssta]-ko sayngkakhayssta.
go-vol-decl-comp promised-comp
thought
Lit. ‘Johni thought that Billj promised Maryk PROj /hej to go to hisi/j house.’

When PRO (as well as the controlled pronoun) and caki are not coreferential, each of the
element must be interpreted de se with respect to each attitude holder. In other words, the
disjoint reading of PRO and caki in (18) can be obtained only when Bill says to Mary, ‘I
will go to John’s house’, while John thinks, ‘Bill said to Mary that he will go to my house.’
There are two interesting points about the clausemate PRO and caki shown in (18).
First, the disjoint reading of PRO and caki in (18) may be unexpected if we assume that
the two elements are the same type of de se element, given that multiple clausemate LD
cakis need to be coreferential, as we saw before, repeated below as (19).

(19)

Obligatory coreference of multiple clausemate LD caki’s
John-i
[Bill-i [caki-uy emmeni-ka caki-lul silhehanta]-ko
John-nom Bill-nom caki-gen mother-nom caki-acc hate-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta.
think-comp
said
a.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himi .’
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b.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himj .’

c. *‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himj .’
d. *‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himi .’
As shown in (19), the two cakis in the same clause need to find the same LD antecedent,
contrary to the clausemate PRO and caki. Given this, our first key question to ask regarding PRO and caki is whether the obligatory de se construals of PRO and caki arise via the
same or different mechanisms.
The second point that is worth noting in (18) is the coreference reading of PRO and
caki. In the case where PRO and caki refer to the intermediate subject, Bill, both of the
elements still obligatorily receive a de se reading. Thus, it is infelicitous to use the sentence
in (18) when Bill says to Mary, ‘I will go to this house’, without knowing that that house
he is referring to is actually his own house. There are two possible ways to derive the
coreference reading between PRO and caki: caki being locally bound by the local subject
PRO or (directly or indirectly) bound by the LD antecedent Bill. The fact that caki that is
covalued with PRO only gets a de se interpretation can be compared with a similar case
in English.
The interpretation of reflexives in control complements has received some attention since Heim (1994), especially due to the fact that a reflexive that is covalued with a
local c-commanding PRO can be interpreted de re. Given that the reflexives in English
are subject to Condition A, herself in (20) can only be understood to be covalued with the
local c-commanding NP, PRO. What has been considered as a puzzle regarding this construction in the literature is that the reflexive herself can get a (non-de se) de re reading,
although it is covalued with an obligatory de se element PRO, a puzzle so-called ‘unexpected binding theory (BT) effects’ (Sharvit 2011). Consider the following sentence under
the particular de re scenario adopted from Sharvit (2011).
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(20)

‘Unexpected Binding Theory Effects’ (Sharvit 2011)
Context: Sarah Palin, who is running for president, wakes up from a coma and
suffers from severe memory loss: she does not remember that she is running for
president and perhaps does not even know who she is. McCain visits her in the
hospital, and she says to him: ‘I don’t know who to vote for’. While the two of
them look at a picture of her in the newspaper, he says to her: ‘You must vote for
this woman’. Palin, who does not recognize herself in the picture, says: ‘You are
right; I will vote for this woman. She seems reliable’.
a.

McCain convinced Palin [PRO1 to vote for herself1 ].

b. *McCain convinced Palin2 [PRO1 to vote for her2 ].
One might assume that herself may get a de re interpretation if it is directly bound by Palin
instead of PRO. Note, however, that Palin is outside of the local binding domain of herself,
and the use of the pronoun her instead of herself makes the sentence ungrammatical, as
shown in (20b). Given Condition A, then, herself needs to be understood to be bound
by the local c-commanding NP, PRO, and then a de re reading of herself is unexpected.9
Therefore, the possible de re reading in (20a) has been considered a puzzle. Now another
puzzle emerges given our Korean data: Why does an anaphor that is covalued with PRO
only get a de se reading in languages like Korean, while an anaphor covalued with PRO
can be interpreted de re in languages like English? Although we will not examine how
this puzzle has been dealt with in the prior studies in this subsection, it should be noted
that whichever mechanism that allows the ‘unexpected BT effects’ in English cannot be
employed in Korean.10
Suppose that the de se interpretation of PRO is derived from our dedicated de se construal following the
property approach. PRO, then, is co-indexed and bound by the local individual abstractor, which means that
the reflexive herself will also be bound by the same binder. Hence, only a de se interpretation is expected
for herself under this approach.
10
See, for instance, Sharvit (2011) and Pearson (2013, 2015) for existing accounts of this issue.
9
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4.4.2

Clausemate controlled and non-controlled LD caki

Having shown that PRO and LD caki do not need to be coreferent when they appear in
the same clause, contrary to multiple clausemate LD caki’s, let us now turn to another
example that also leads us to important puzzles regarding de se elements. We have seen
that PRO can be replaced with the LD reflexive caki in Korean OC constructions. Then,
how would a controlled caki interact with another non-controlled LD caki in the same
clause? Interestingly, if the LD reflexive caki is used as an OC subject, it must co-refer
with a non-controlled LD caki appearing in the same clause, which is in contrast to the
PRO/controlled pronouns but identical to the multiple non-controlled LD cakis. Consider
the following sentence in which PRO in (18) is replaced with a lexical subject, LD caki.

(21)

Obligatory coreference between a controlled and non-controlled caki
Johni -un [Billj -i Maryk -eykey [caki∗i/j/∗k -ka caki∗i/j/∗k -uy cip-ulo
John-top Bill-nom Mary-dat
caki-nom
caki-gen
house-to
ka-keyss-ta]-ko
yaksokhayssta]-ko sayngkakhayssta.
go-vol-decl-comp promised-comp
thought
Lit. ‘Johni thought that Billj promised Maryk selfj to go to hisj house.’

In (21), the controlled caki in the subject position and another caki in the object position
co-occur in the most embedded clause. As we saw before, in this subject control construction with the volitional modal -keyss, the subject caki of the most embedded clause in (21)
must be controlled by the subject in the immediately embedding clause. Interestingly, the
non-controlled caki can also only refer to the intermediate subject, Bill, in (21). That is,
the controlled and non-controlled caki must be coreferent. We already saw that PRO and
a clausemate LD caki do not need to be coreferential, whereas multiple LD caki’s in the
same clause must be. As expected, the controlled and non-controlled caki in (21) are unambiguously read de se as well. The controlled caki, then, behaves like the non-controlled
caki with respect to the interaction with another clausemate LD caki. On the other hand,
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the controlled caki also exhibits the PRO-like property in terms of the obligatory local
control. This dual property of the controlled caki is puzzling and requires explanation.

4.4.3

Summary

To summarize, the data presented in this section suggest that (i) not every de se element
(OC subjects vs. LD caki) behaves identically in Korean, and (ii) not every OC subject
exhibits the same property, especially with respect to their interactions with another de
se element, LD caki, in the same clause, although they share some properties in common
(e.g., local control and obligatory de se interpretations). The complete properties of PRO,
(non-)controlled pronouns, and (non-)controlled LD caki presented so far are summarized
in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2: Summary: PRO, (non-)controlled pronoun, and (non-)controlled LD caki

!
!
!
%

Controlled
pronoun
!
!
!
%

Non-controlled
pronoun
%
%
n/a
%

Controlled
caki
!
!
%
!

Non-controlled
LD caki
!
%
n/a
!

%

%

%

!

!

PRO
Obligatory de se
Obligatory local control
Object control
3rd person restriction
Coreference with a
clausemate LD caki

4.5

De se construal in obligatory control constructions

Having presented the properties of PRO, let us now discuss how to account for these
properties of OC subjects and their relationships with another de se element in Korean. A
number of questions we need to explain are listed in (22).

(22)

a.

How do the OC subjects, either null or overt, consistently exhibit OC properties?

b.

How does the LD reflexive caki in the OC subject position display both the
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OC PRO-like and non-controlled LD caki-like properties?
c.

How can we account for the difference between the two de se elements: OC
PRO on the one hand and LD caki on the other?

d.

Why do controlled and non-controlled LD cakis have to be coreferential,
while PRO (or controlled pronouns) and non-controlled LD caki need not?

e.

What blocks the ‘unexpected BT effects’ in Korean?

Given that PRO is obligatorily interpreted de se, some prior studies on PRO attributed its unambiguous de se interpretation to the lexical meaning of PRO, as we discussed in the previous chapter (e.g., Schlenker 2003, Anand and Nevins 2004, Stephenson
2007). For instance, PRO is treated as the first or second person indexical, which denotes
the author or addressee of the context (or index). However, our data about the overt
controlled subjects in Korean provide evidence against this indexical approach. If the
obligatory de se interpretation of PRO is derived from its inherent indexical-like meaning, we may also need to assume that the third person pronoun or LD caki has the same
lexical meaning only when it is controlled, given that they must also receive a de se interpretation in the controlled subject position. It does not seem to be reasonable, however,
to directly posit the first or second person-like meaning to the third person pronoun or
LD caki. Rather, since any element that can appear in the OC subject position must be
construed de se in Korean, it would be more plausible to argue that the obligatory de se
interpretation of the elements in the controlled subject position is derived due to certain
structural properties of the obligatory control construction, instead of some special lexical
meaning of these elements.
In this section, based upon our analysis for the LD caki proposed in Chapter 3, we
will discuss how to analyze the data on the null and overt controlled subjects and their
interactions with non-controlled LDcaki in Korean. In particular, following and extending
the Lewis-Chierchia’s property approach to de se (Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1989, Percus and
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Sauerland 2003), I will provide a unified account of obligatory de se interpretations of any
kinds of controlled subjects (e.g., PRO, controlled pronouns, and controlled anaphors) and
the LD reflexive caki, arguing that additional structural conditions of OC constructions
and lexical properties of caki can derive a complete set of properties of the OC subjects,
LD caki, and their interactions.

4.5.1

Structural conditions of OC constructions

Based on the Chierchia’s (1989) semantic approach to OC, I assume that OC complements
are derived predicates, whose subject must be a bound variable that needs to be bound by
a local individual abstractor. Madigan (2008) provides the definition of Control as in (23),
motivated by Chierchia (1984, 1989).

(23)

Definition of Control proposed by Madigan (2008)
Let X be an NP in a sentence S, Y a subject NP in a sentence S’ that is embedded
under S, and R the predicate that selects Y. X and Y are in the control relation (or
X controls Y) iff the property that corresponds to R is unambiguously attributed
to the referent of X and the referent is aware of the attribution.
(Madigan 2008, p.49)

Given the definition of control shown in (23), control constructions are properties that are
attributed to an argument in the immediately embedding clause. The definition in (23) attempts to capture the obligatory de se interpretation of OC subjects by adding a condition
that the referent of controller must be aware of the attribution. However, this condition
has no clear link to the semantic mechanism of the obligatory de se interpretation of the
controlled subjects.
From a semantic point of view, the obligatory de se construal of PRO can be derived
from the Lewis-Chierchia’s property approach with the assumption that PRO is a variable
that is bound by an individual abstractor, which appears in the left periphery of comple-
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ments of attitude predicates. In contrast with other de se elements like LD caki, controlled
subjects are special in that they only allow local control. Based on the property analysis
of de se (Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1989, Percus and Sauerland 2003, Pearson 2013, a.o.), the
definition of control in (23) can be revised as in (24).11

(24)

Definition of Control (revised version)
Let X be an NP in a sentence S, Y a subject NP in a sentence S’ that is directly
embedded under S. Y is abstracted over, yielding a structure that denotes a property P. X and Y are in the control relation (or X controls Y) iff the property P is
self-ascribed by the referent of X.

Our revised version of the definition of control states that (i) control complements denote
properties, (ii) the subject of control complements is a variable that is abstracted over, and
(iii) the properties denoted by control complements must be attributed to an argument of
the immediately embedding clause (by being bound by the local abstractor). A sample LF
and the semantics of a control construction is provided in (26), based on the semantics of
attitude verbs, as illustrated in (25).

(25)

[[expect]]g = λP<e,st> . [λx. ∀<y,w’> ∈ Expectx,w : P(y)(w’) =T],
where Expectx,w = {<y, w’>: w’ is a world compatible with what x expects in w
that w’ is a world x might be living in and y is the one who x identifies in w as
herself in w’.}

(26)

a.

John expects PRO to win the election.

b.

LF: λw0 w0 John expects [λx1 λw2 w2 PRO1 to win the election].

c.

[[(26a)]]g = λw. ∀<y,w’>∈ExpectJohn,w : y wins the election in w’

Given our definition of control seen in (24), the sentence in (26a) is a legitimate control
11

More precisely, this is a definition of Logophoric Control (Landau 2015), where control complements
appear in attitude environments.
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construction where the matrix subject John controls the null subject PRO, since the control complement denotes a property of type <e,st> whose subject (PRO) is abstracted
over, and the controller John self-ascribes the property of winning the election. The latter
condition can be satisfied by our semantics of attitude verbs and the fact that PRO is bound
by the local individual abstractor. Given the definition of ‘expect-alternatives’ as centered
worlds, PRO is interpreted as John’s expect-alternative y in w’, who John identifies in w
as himself in w’, and thus receives an obligatory de se interpretation.
Our discussion of control constructions predicts that if a language allows an overt
subject in the OC complement for an independent reason, the overt element must be able
to be used as a bound variable, such as anaphors or pronouns.12 Thus, the unavailability of
referential OC subjects that we saw in (14) is also predicted. Moreover, any bound variable
that can appear in the OC subject position must also be locally controlled and receive an
unambiguous de se interpretation under our system.

4.5.2

Overt OC subjects under the property approach

In the previous sections, we have examined the properties of pronouns and LD caki when
they appear in the OC subject position: they only allow local control and a de se interpretation like PRO. In contrast to PRO, however, LD caki preserves its basic properties with
respect to the third person feature and its binding conditions. Thus, caki cannot replace
PRO in the OC construction when a controller is the first or second person pronoun or a
non-subject element. Given the definition of Control, I have argued that an overt element
can be controlled in Korean only when it can be used as a bound variable. In addition, I
will show that overt elements need to satisfy their own inherent lexical or binding conditions (if there are any) even when they occur in the OC subject position. Therefore, overt
subjects in control construction in Korean are not merely an overt form of the null subject
12

In fact, it is controversial whether pronouns can be used as a bound variable in Korean (and Japanese).
Although they may be more restricted than in other languages, I assume that pronouns in Korean can
actually be used as bound variables.
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PRO.
Now let us see how the basic property of controlled caki can be derived. First, LD
caki must be subject to the structural conditions of OC complement. Thus, the control
complement containing LD caki in its subject position must denote a property, and the
property must be self-ascribed by an argument of the clause that immediately embeds
the control complement. Due to this structural condition of OC, controlled caki does not
allow long-distance control unlike non-controlled LD caki. Second, the lexical entry for
controlled caki is identical to the one for non-controlled caki, as we proposed in (27) in
Chapter 3, repeated as (27) below. The inherent third person feature of caki is responsible
for the person restriction in the controlled case as well. That is, when LD caki is controlled
by the first or second person pronoun, or a doxastic counterpart of the first or second
person pronoun, it suffers from presupposition failure.

(27)

[[cakin ]]c,g =





g(n),



if g(n) is not auth(c), addr(c),
or a doxastic counterpart of auth(c) or addr(c)





undefined, otherwise
When a controlled caki satisfies its own conditions, the semantics of a control sentence
containing LD caki as an overt subject of the control complement is identical to the one
with the null subject PRO. The semantics of a pseudo-Korean OC sentence with a controlled caki is given in (28)–(29).

(28)

a.

Pseudo-Korean: John promised [caki to meet Mary].

b.

LF: λw w John promise [λ1 λw’ w’ caki1 to meet Mary].
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(29)

JJohn promised caki to meet MaryKc,g = λw. ∀<y,w’>∈SayJohn,w : y will meet Mary
in w’ ,
where SayJohn,w = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what John says in w that w’ is a
world John might be living in and y is the one who John identifies in w as himself
in w’.}

4.5.3

Interactions between PRO and LD caki

Recall that, in Chapter 3, we suggested the two binding conditions for the LD reflexive
caki: the locality and feature match condition. That is, LD caki, which is a variable that
bears the feature [log], must be bound by a closest individual binder that bears the same
feature, [log] (e.g., Anand 2006). We also assumed that a de se binder introduced by an
attitude verb can optionally take the [log] feature.
Note that only LD caki bears the [log] feature and is subject to the particular binding
conditions. While LD caki must be bound by the closest binder with the feature [log],
PRO and controlled pronouns must be bound by the local individual abstractor in order
to satisfy the structural conditions of OC. Given that, we can now derive the interactions
between PRO/controlled pronouns and a clausemate LD caki, especially with respect to
their disjoint reading. Let us recall the example (18), repeated below as (30), in which the
PRO/controlled pronouns and LD caki co-occur under the multiple embeddings.

(30)

Disjoint reference between PRO and caki
Johni -un [Billj -i Maryk -eykey [PRO∗i/j/∗k cakii/j/∗k -uy cip-ulo
John-top Bill-nom Mary-dat
PRO
caki-gen
house-to
ka-keyss-ta]-ko
yaksokhayssta]-ko sayngkakhayssta.
go-vol-decl-comp promised-comp
thought
Lit. ‘Johni thought that Billj promised Maryk PROj to go to hisi/j house.’

When the closest abstractor does not bear the [log] feature as in (31a), PRO or the controlled pronoun and the clausemate LD caki are bound by the different abstractors, and
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thus they can have a disjoint reading. This disjoint reading is only felicitous when John
thinks, ‘Bill promised (it a first person way) that he would go to my house.’ On the other
hand, the configuration in (31b) is not legitimate because the locality condition of LD caki
is violated: caki is not bound by the closest binder with the feature [log].

(31)

Deriving the disjoint reading of PRO and LD caki
a.

John thought [λ1 [log] Bill promised Mary [λ2 PRO/he2 to go to caki1 [log] ’s
house]]

b. *John thought [λ1 [log] Bill promised Mary [λ2 [log] PRO/he2 to go to caki1 [log] ’s
house]]

Although PRO/controlled pronouns and LD caki are distinguished by the specific structural or binding conditions, one and the same semantic mechanism is responsible for their
de se interpretations under the property approach. We can derive the de se interpretation
of both PRO and LD caki with respect to their referents based on the LF in (32a) and our
semantics of attitude verbs.

(32)

a.

LF of (30) with the disjoint reading:
λw w John thinks [λx1 [+log] λw2 w2 Bill promised [λx3 λw4 w4 PRO3 to go
to caki1 [log] ’s house]

b.

[[(30)]]g = λw. ∀<y,w’>∈DoxJohn,w : ∀<z,w”>∈SayBill,w0 : z goes to y’s
house in w”

4.5.4

The dual property of controlled LD caki

Lastly, we can also derive the dual property of LD caki in the OC subject position. We have
seen that a controlled LD caki displays both the OC PRO-like and non-controlled LD cakilike properties. Due to the structural conditions of OC, LD caki only allows local control
in the OC subject position. Since LD caki must also satisfy its own binding conditions
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when it appears in the OC subject position, the local binder in the control complement
must bear the [log] feature to properly bind LD caki. Given this, we can now explain the
obligatory coreference between controlled and non-controlled LD cakis as well. Consider
the following configurations.

(33)

Deriving the obligatory coreferential reading of the controlled and noncontrolled LD cakis
a.

John thought [λx1 [log] Bill promised [λx2 [log] caki2 [log] to go to caki2 [log] ’s
house]]

b. *John thought [λx1 [log] Bill promised [λx2 [log] caki2 [log] to go to caki1 [log] ’s
house]]
c. *John thought [λx1 [log] Bill promised [λx2 caki1 [log] to go to caki1 [log] ’s house]]
Since the local binder must bear the feature [log] to properly bind LD caki and satisfy
the structural conditions of OC complements, any other clausemate LD caki must also be
bound by the same local binder to meet its ‘locality’ binding condition. Therefore, the
disjoint reading of the controlled and non-controlled LD cakis are ruled out.
In summary, I have shown that the complete set of the properties of OC subjects,
both null and overt, and LD caki in Korean can be uniformly explained under the property
approach (Lewis 1979, Chierchia 1989, Percus and Sauerland 2003, among many others)
with the additional binding conditions for LD caki and structural conditions of OC. Our
system correctly predicts that any bound variable type elements may appear in the controlled subject position in Korean, unless it is blocked by an independent reason. As predicted, local anaphors such as caki-casin or pronoun-casin in Korean can also be controlled
and display OC properties.
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4.5.5

Potential problems

There were two main puzzles concerning the properties of controlled subjects and LD
caki: Why does controlled caki not allow long-distance control like PRO and controlled
pronouns?; And why does controlled caki have to co-refer with a clausemate LD caki unlike PRO and controlled pronouns? While maintaining a unified account for the different
elements that are obligatorily construed de se under the property approach, we have attempted to provide solutions to these puzzles based upon our assumptions about the [log]
feature on the binders and controlled elements. Specifically, the first puzzle was treated
by assuming that when LD caki occurs in the OC subject position the individual abstractor in control complements must bear the [log] feature to obey the structural condition of
OC. The second puzzle has been handled on the assumption that the LD caki differs from
both PRO and controlled pronouns in terms of the [log] feature: only LD caki bears the
[log] feature and requires a binder with the same feature.
Although the analysis presented above under the property analysis seems to be able
to explain the key properties of the controlled subjects and LD caki, it also faces considerable challenges. Firstly, what does it mean for an element to take a [log] feature? Given
that PRO gets an obligatory de se interpretation under attitude verbs, von Stechow (2003)
argues that PRO is a logophoric pronoun that bears a feature [log(ophoric].13 Similarly,
Anand (2006) also posits the same feature [log] on one type of de se elements to indicate
that such elements need to be bound by a logophoric operator. Under our system, we
assume that only one type of de se elements, i.e., LD caki, bears the [log] feature, although
we assume that all of these elements are variables that need to be bound by an individual
abstractor that is introduced by an attitude verb and thus obligatorily recieve a de se interpretation. We therefore should seek fundamental differences between PRO and controlled
pronouns on the one hand and the LD caki on the other. In Chapter 6, I will demonstrate
13

von Stechow (2003) argues that PRO also bears an additional feature [loc(al)] to capture that it must be
bound by the most local binder.
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that LD caki is strictly subject to the notion of logophoricity.
Secondly, we cannot avoid the stipulative nature of the optional [log] feature on the
binders in control complements. A clearer explanation of the property of the [log] feature,
which is not just on the logophoric elements but also on the binders, should be provided
on the basis of a better understanding of logophoricity.
Lastly, we did not discuss the fact that overt subjects can also appear in OC complements without attitude environments in Korean (Landau 2015). In these cases, de se
interpretations of controlled subjects are not relevant because there is no attitude environment. One might wonder how our proposal can be extended to overt subjects in OC
complements under non-attitude environments. I leave this issue for future research.

4.6

Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter was to fill the gap in the literature on multiple de se expressions by exploring the interactions between different kinds of de se elements appearing
in the same clause. In particular, we have examined the properties of OC subjects and
their relationship with the LD reflexive caki. I have shown that the obligatory de se interpretations of the controlled subjects and the LD reflexive caki in Korean can uniformly
be derived under the property analysis of de se. That is, these elements are variables that
must be bound by an individual abstractor, which appears in the complement of attitude
verbs, so that they are interpreted as a de se counterpart of an attitude holder.
Given that overt lexical subjects (pronouns and anaphors) can appear in the OC
complements in Korean, I have also shown that not every OC subject exhibits identical properties, while they display the similarities in terms of the obligatory local control
and de se interpretation. Specifically, we saw that LD caki behaves both like PRO and
non-controlled caki when it appears in the OC subject position. Under our system, the
consistent OC properties of any kinds of OC subject can be explained by the structural
conditions of OC constructions, repeated below.
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(34)

Definition of Control
Let X be an NP in a sentence S, Y a subject NP in a sentence S’ that is directly
embedded under S. Y is abstracted over, yielding a structure that denotes a property P. X and Y are in the control relation (or X controls Y) iff the property P is
self-ascribed by the referent of X.

In order to be a proper OC construction, given the definition of control shown in (34),
an OC subject must be bound by a local abstractor that posits in the left periphery of
the OC complement (i.e., only local control). Moreover, the differences between the OC
subjects can also be captured by the inherent lexical or binding conditions of the OC
subjects. In particular, when the reflexive caki is used as an OC subject, it still must satisfy
its binding conditions we proposed in the previous chapter (i.e., the locality and feature
match conditions).
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CHAPTER 5
DE SE AND DE DICTO

5.1

Introduction

In Chapters 3 and 4, I demonstrated that the Korean LD reflexive caki embedded under attitude verbs is unambiguously interpreted de se and developed a dedicated de se mechanism
based upon the property approach. In this chapter, I will present a novel environment in
which LD caki need not receive a de se interpretation even when it is embedded within
the scope of an attitude verb. That is, when LD caki occurs in a relative clause that is
embedded under an attitude verb, it is exempt from the de se requirement.
Our main discovery of this chapter will be a new relationship between the (non)de se interpretation of caki and the de dicto reading of the predicate in the same clause.
Owing to the special intensional property of relative clauses, LD caki receives a non-de
se interpretation only in a relative clause, especially when the predicate of the relative
clause is not interpreted de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.
In the later part of this chapter, I will also address two important theoretical questions regarding elements that can be interpreted de se or pure de re (e.g., pronouns) in
attitude reports: First, would a de se interpretation of elements like pronouns be freely
derived from a de re construal, as is widely assumed in the literature? Second, can a pronoun always be interpreted de se in attitude reports? On the basis of empirical evidence,
I will argue that pronouns can not always receive a de se interpretation and a de re con142

strual is not always sufficient to derive a de se reading of the pronouns. Specifically, I will
propose two pragmatic competitions between the dedicated and non-dedicated de se LF’s
and between the obligatory and non-obligatory de se elements.
The structure of this chapter is as follows. In Section 5.2, I will present new observations on LD caki in (gapless) relative clauses that a de se interpretation is no longer
mandatory of caki even in attitude environments when it is directly embedded in a relative clause. Interestingly, it will be shown that LD caki would still not allow a pure de re
reading. In order to capture the seemingly peculiar property of LD caki in this new environment, in Section 5.3 we will discuss the special intensional status of relative clauses
in comparison to finite complement clauses. Then, in Section 5.5, I will draw two generalizations of the relationship between de se and de dicto: ‘Obligatory de se under de dicto’
and ‘Obligatory non-de se under non-de dicto’. Lastly, in Section 5.6, I will show that the
new data presented in this chapter also shed important lights on the uses of the ‘de se as
a special de re’ route and (non-)obligatory de se expressions.

5.2

LD caki in relative clauses

In this section, I will present a striking fact about LD caki in attitude environments that it
can receive a non-de se reading when it occurs in a (gapless) relative clause. Interestingly,
LD caki does not allow a (non-de se) de re reading even when embedded in a (gapless)
relative clause.

5.2.1

Non-obligatory de se interpretations under attitude verbs

Like other LD reflexives in many languages such as Chinese, Japanese, etc., the LD reflexive caki in Korean can occur in a relative clause and take a matrix subject as its longdistance antecedent, e.g. Lit. Maryi likes the person who praised selfi . While LD caki in
relative clauses is similar to the one in complements of attitude verbs with respect to
the long-distance dependency between caki and its antecedent, the latter can be distin143

guished from the former in terms of the obligatory de se interpretation. In contrast to
the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki in attitude environments that we saw in the
previous chapter, a de se interpretation of caki is not relevant anymore in sentences that
do not report any attitudes. To capture the intuition that LD reflexives in attitude and
non-attitude environments differ in how they are interpreted, it has been pointed out in
the literature that the ‘awareness condition’ does not need to hold for LD reflexives in
Chinese and Japanese when they appear in relative clauses (Kuroda 1973, Sells 1987, Pollard and Xue 2001, Anand 2006). The ‘awareness condition’ states that the attitude holder
must be aware of the content of clauses in which LD reflexives appear and this condition
must hold for LD reflexives in attitude environments—which is another way of stating
the obligatory de se interpretation of these elements. However, LD reflexives in relative
clauses are not subject to this condition. To illustrate, consider the example in (1).

(1)

No awareness condition for LD caki in a relative clause
S1: John met a person who he identifies as “That person criticized me!"
S2: John met Tom. Unbeknownst to John, Tom is the person who criticized John.
Johni -i
[cakii -lul piphanha-n] salam-ul mannassta.
John-nom self-acc criticized-adn person-acc met
‘Johni met the person who criticized himi .’ (!S1, !S2)

As shown in (1), caki in the relative clause can be coreferent with the matrix subject in
a context like ‘S2’, where its antecedent is not aware of the content of the relative clause
containing caki. However, since the sentence in (1) is not an attitude report, we cannot
discuss whether LD caki in (1) receives a de se interpretation or not. Although some prior
studies have attempted to distinguish LD reflexives in relative clauses from those in the
complements of attitude verbs (e.g., ‘extensional’ vs. ‘intensional’ in Anand 2006), it has
not been examined carefully whether LD reflexives occurring in relative clauses would
exhibit distinctive properties even in attitude environments.
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Our focus in this section is on the interpretation of LD caki in the relative clause
within the scope of attitude verbs. We will present novel data showing that LD caki in a
relative clause does not have to receive an obligatory de se interpretation even in attitude
environments. Throughout Chapter 3, we have seen that the LD reflexive caki in Korean
must be unambiguously interpreted de se under attitude verbs, as illustrated in (2).

(2)

S1: John thinks, "I am kind."
S2: John thinks, "That guy on TV is kind." Unbeknownst to John, the guy on TV is
John himself.
Johni -un [cakii -ka chakhata]-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top self-nom kind-comp think
‘Johni thinks that hei is kind.’ (!S1, # S2)

Given our assumptions on LD caki that it is a variable that needs to be bound by an
individual abstractor as well as the semantics of attitude verbs presented in Chapters 3,
the truth-conditions of (2) are derived as in (3).

(3)

a.

LF: λw0 John thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 caki1 is nice w2 ]

b.

[[(3a)]]g (w) = T iff for every possible world w’ and individual y that are compatible with what John thinks in w, y is nice in w’ (where w’ is a world John
might be living in and y is the one who John identifies in w as himself in w’).

Strikingly, however, there is at least one environment in which LD caki does not
necessarily receive an obligatory de se interpretation under attitude verbs, which, to my
knowledge, has not been discussed in the literature: namely, relative clauses. Consider
the example in (4), which only differs from (3) in that caki is embedded in a relative clause
of the embedded subject DP under the matrix verb ‘think’.1
As Chisato Kitagawa (p.c.) and Kiyomi Kusumoto (p.c.) point out to me, the LD reflexive zibun also
behaves like caki when it appears in a relative clause.
1
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(4)

No de se requirement for LD caki in a relative clause
(de se)

S1: John thinks, "That woman who hit me is actually kind."

S2: John thinks that a girl he has newly met in class is very kind and nice. Unbeknownst to John, however, they met at a party the other night and she hit him
(non-de se)

while he was so drunk.

Johni -un [[cakii -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top self-acc hit-adn woman-nom kind-comp think
‘Johni thinks that the woman who hit himi is kind.’ (!S1, !S2)
We have seen that the example in (3), where caki appears in the embedded subject position,
is felicitous only under a scenario in which the attitude holder holds a de se belief, such
as ‘S1’. Similarly, LD caki in the relative clause can also receive a de se interpretation. In
such a case, as in ‘S1’ in (4), the attitude holder must identify the woman as ‘the one who
hit me’, regardless of whether she is actually the one who hit him in the actual world.
On the other hand, caki in the relative clause in (4) can co-refer with the matrix subject
John, even when John only holds a de re belief about the woman without expressing any
de se attitude, as in ‘S2’ above. That is, the subject DP ‘the woman who hit self’ is the
description from the speaker’s point of view given the actual world. John would only be
able to describe the woman he has attitude toward as ‘the woman who I met in class’
instead of ‘the woman who hit me at the party’ under the scenario in S2. This shows that
LD caki appearing in the relative clause does not have to be interpreted de se even when
the relative clause is embedded under an attitude verb.
Given that LD caki can be exempt from the de se requirement in relative clauses, one
might wonder if caki in (4) can also receive a (non-de se) de re interpretation. Surprisingly,
the answer is no. Consider the following additional context.
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(5)

S3: John finds Mary very kind. One day, John watches a video and sees Mary
hitting a guy. John recognizes that it is Mary and thinks, “That woman who is
hitting that guy is actually kind." Unbeknownst to John, the guy on the video was
John himself and Mary was actually giving him a massage.

((non-de se) de re)

Johni -un [[cakii -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top self-acc hit-adn woman-nom kind-comp think
‘John thinks that the woman who hit him is kind.’ (#S3)

Note that LD caki can receive a non-de se interpretation when the content of the relative
clause is not in John’s belief, as in ‘S2’ in (4). Given the context, we know that the content
of the relative clause is true in the actual world. By contrast, in the context ‘S3’ shown in
(5), there is a woman who hit a guy (which happens to be John) in John’s belief worlds,
while John does not know that the guy is John himself. The fact that LD caki cannot
be used under a context like this indicates that LD caki in the relative clause cannot be
interpreted (non-de se) de re.
In contrast to LD caki in the relative clause, there is no such restriction when the
third person pronoun is used in the relative clause. As we saw before, the third person
pronoun ku ‘he’ in Korean can be construed either de se or (non-de se) de re, as in English.
Unlike the example with caki, the following sentence with ku ‘he’ can be used in all of the
three contexts we examined above.

(6)

Third person pronoun in a relative clause
S1: John thinks, "That woman who hit me is actually kind."

(de se)

S2: John thinks that a girl he has newly met in class is very kind and nice. Unbeknownst to John, however, they met at a party the other night and she hit him
(non-de se)

while he was so drunk.
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S3: John finds Mary very kind. One day, John watches a video and sees Mary
hitting a guy. John recognizes that it is Mary and thinks, “That woman who is
hitting that guy is actually kind." Unbeknownst to John, the guy on the video was
John himself and Mary was actually giving him a massage.

((non-de se) de re)

Johni -un [[kui -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top he-acc hit-adn woman-nom kind-comp think
‘John thinks that the woman who hit him is kind.’ (!S1, !S2, !S3)
So far, we have seen that LD caki in the relative clause can receive a non-de se interpretation under a particular scenario even in the attitude environment, while it can never be
used when the attitude holder has a (non-de se) de re belief about himself.

5.2.2

A similar environment: Gapless relative clauses

Based on our observations on LD caki occurring in relative clauses, let us now turn our attention to another similar environment where LD caki can find a long-distance antecedent
without being obligatorily interpreted de se in attitude environments. In Korean, certain
nouns can take a modifying clause which looks almost identical to relative clauses, except that they do not contain any gap in them (Cha 1998, 1999, Kim 1998, among others).
Due to this reason, this noun-modifying construction is dubbed ‘gapless relative clauses’
(e.g., Cha 1998, 1999, Zhang 2008). As shown in (7), while the surface forms of the DPs
with the two types of noun-modifying clauses look very similar (i.e., ‘Noun modifying
clause+Adnominal marker nun+Head noun’), only the relative clause in (7a) contains a
gap in it. By contrast, there is no gap position in the gapless relative clause in (7b).2
2

There is another type of noun-modifying clause in Korean that looks very much similar to, but is different from, the so-called ‘gapless relative clauses’. Certain nouns in Korean can take a clausal complement
with a mood marker, which indicates that the complement is a full-fledged clause. The surface structure
of DPs with this type of clause is same as those with (gapless) relative clauses: the head noun is preceded
by a modifying clause and the adnominal marker -nun. As shown in (i), this noun-complement clause is
distinguished from gapless relative clauses in the existence of the mood marker -ta. The existence of the
mood marker is mandatory in the complement clause of certain nouns like somwun ‘rumor’, sosik ‘news’,
cwucang ‘claim’.

148

(7)

Relative vs. Gapless relative clause
a.

[ei sayngsen-ul pha-nun] salami
fish-acc
sell-adn person
‘The person who sells fish’

b.

[sayngsen-i tha-nun] naymsay
fish-nom burn-adn smell
‘The smell of fish burning’ (‘Lit. the smell that fish burns’)

Perception verbs like pota ‘see’ and tutta ‘hear’ can take DP complements that contain a gapless relative clause. As illustrated in (8), when LD caki appears in a gapless
relative clause, it can take the matrix subject as its long-distance antecedent, and the
‘awareness condition’ is not required, as in relative clauses.

(8)

Gapless relative clause under a perception verb
John1 -un [[thipi-eyse Mary-ka caki1 -lul piphanha]-nun kes/cangmyen]-ul
John-top TV-in
Mary-nom self-acc criticize-adn thing/scene-acc
poassta.
saw
‘John1 saw (the scene of) Mary criticizing him1 on TV.’

Moulton (2009) shows that perception verbs taking a bare infinitival complement in English express direct perception and do not implicate any beliefs of the subject (Barwise
1981, Higginbotham 1983). Since these direct perception reports are epistemically neutral,
the sentence in (9b) is not a contradiction.

(i)

[Mina-ka posek-ul
hwumchi-ess-ta-nun] somwun/sosik/cwucang
Mina-nom jewelry-acc steal-pst-decl-adn rumor/news/claim
‘the rumor/news/claim that Mina stole the jewelry’

(Kim 2011)

As discussed in Chapter 3, LD caki in the noun-complement clause with a mood marker must be interpreted
de se as in the complement clause of attitude verbs. In this subsection, we focus on the noun-modifying
clauses without a mood marker and show that they behave more like relative clauses when they contain
the reflexive caki: that is, LD caki contained in these clauses can receive a non-de se reading as in regular
relative clauses.
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(9)

a.

John saw Fred leave early.

b.

Edina saw Fred leave the house early, but she thought he was just looking out
the door.

(Moulton 2009)

Similarly, pota ‘see’ taking a DP complement with a gapless relative clause also expresses
a direct perception report and is epistemically neutral. Therefore, it is not a contradiction
when the sentence in (8) is followed by a sentence like (10). This shows that (8) is felicitous
in a situation in which John does not identify what he saw as the scene of Mary criticizing
him—i.e., no awareness condition.

(10)

Haciman ku-nun [Mary-ka solinayse chayk-ul ilk-ko.iss-ta]-ko
But
he-top Mary-nom out.loud book-acc read-prog-decl-comp
sayngkakhayssta.
thought
‘But he thought that Mary was reading a book out loud.’

More importantly, LD caki in gapless relative clauses displays the same properties
as caki in regular relative clauses in attitude environments. That is, LD caki in gapless
relative clauses can also be exempt from an obligatory de se interpretation within the
scope of an attitude verb.

(11)

Context: Bill, John’s son, was fixing a piano. John heard it while he was taking a
nap, and thought:
S1: ‘Oh my son is playing piano again. His piano sound is so loud.’
S2: ‘What is this sound? It’s so loud.’

(de se)
(non-de se)

Johni -un [[cakii -uy atul-i
phiano-lul chi-nun] soli-ka
sikkulepta]-ko
John-top self-gen son-nom piano-acc play-adm sound-nom loud-comp
sayngkakhayssta.
thought
‘Johni thought that the sound of hisi son playing piano was loud.’ (!S1, !S2)
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The fact that the sentence in (11) can be used under the context in ‘S2’ indicates that LD
caki in the gapless relative clause can be interpreted non-de se. Although John cannot
identify the sound he heard as ‘my son’s piano sound’, the description with the nounmodifying clause containing caki can be chosen by the speaker in the attitude report given
the actual world.
Moreover, the non-de se interpretation of LD caki in the gapless relative clause is
only available when the content of the clause is interpreted relative to the actual world
instead of the attitude holder’s belief worlds. Therefore, LD caki cannot get a non-de se
interpretation when the content of the gapless relative clause—for instance, someone’s son
is playing piano—is contained in John’s belief worlds, as shown in ‘S3’ below.

(12)

S3: John saw a video in which a boy was fixing a piano and a guy was standing by
the boy, and he thought the boy is the son of the guy next to him and was playing
piano. John thought, "Oh gosh, that guy’s son plays piano so badly. The sound is
too loud." Unbeknownst to John, the boy on the video was his own son and the
((non-de se) de re)

guy was John himself.

Johni -un [[cakii -uy atul-i
phiano-lul chi-nun] soli-ka
sikkulepta]-ko
John-top self-gen son-nom piano-acc play-adn sound-nom loud-comp
sayngkakhayssta.
thought
‘Johni thought that the sound of hisi son playing piano was loud.’ (# S3)
The unavailable context in (12) shows that LD caki in the gapless relative clause cannot
receive a (non-de se) de re interpretation. Due to the unavailability of the (non-de se) de re
reading of the LD caki in this construction, the sentence in (13) cannot be followed by a
sentence like (14).

(13)

Haciman John-un phiano kochi-nun sonyen-i caki-uy atul-incwul mollassta.
But
John-top piano fix-adn boy-nom self-gen son-be
not.know
‘But John didn’t know that the boy who’s fixing the piano was his own son.’
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Again, the sentence can be used under the context in ‘S3’ as well as ‘S1’ and ‘S2’ in (12)
when LD caki is replaced by the third person pronoun.

5.2.3

Summary

The novel data presented in this section indicate that (i) LD caki can be exempt from an
obligatory de se interpretation in attitude environments when it is contained in a (gapless)
relative clause, (ii) LD caki in the relative clause can receive a non-de se interpretation
only when the description with the relative clause is used by the speaker as opposed to
the bearer of attitude, and (iii) LD caki cannot receive a (non-de se) de re interpretation
when the content of the relative clause containing caki holds in every belief world of the
attitude holder.
Two important questions need to be addressed with regard to our new findings.
First, what are the structural properties of relative clauses that enable LD caki to be exempt
from the obligatory de se interpretation in attitude environments? Second, how can we
formally generalize the behavior of LD caki in relative clauses with respect to its (non)obligatory de se interpretation? The following sections will discuss these issues in detail.

5.3

Intensional status of relative clauses

As we have discussed in Chapter 3, we assume that intensional variables (e.g., variables
over possible worlds/situations) and abstractors over these variables are contained in the
syntax of the object language (Cresswell 1990, Percus 2000, Keshet 2008, Schwarz 2012,
a.o.). Like other pronouns, these unpronounced world pronouns are indexed and bound
by a co-indexed binder. Although the exact syntactic positions of these silent world pronouns may be controversial, it is less controversial that these pronouns appear in verb
and determiner phrases.
Under this extensional system, the so-called ‘de re/de dicto ambiguity’ of noun phrases
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can be analyzed with different indexings of the world pronouns occurring in noun phrases.
For instance, the embedded subject my brother in (14) can be interpreted in two different
ways. First, the sentence in (14) can be used when Mary thinks John is Canadian, while
John is in fact my brother (although Mary may not be aware of that). Second, (14) is also
felicitous when Mary mistakenly thinks Tom is my brother and he is Canadian, although
Tom may not be my brother in the actual world. The first case is the so-called de re or
transparent reading, while the second case is the de dicto or opaque reading. Under the intensional variable approach, the following two structures in (15) yield these two readings,
which differ only with respect to the index of the world pronoun in the embedded DP: w0
in (15a) and w2 in (15b).

(14)

Mary thinks that my brother is Canadian.

(15)

De re vs.de dicto

(Percus 2000)

a.

λw0 Mary thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [my brother w0 ] is Canadian w2 ]

(de re)

b.

λw0 Mary thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [my brother w2 ] is Canadian w2 ]

(de dicto)

In addition to the two structures in (15), there are two more possible structures to
consider, as shown in (16): namely, the structures in which the world pronoun that appears
in the embedded VP is bound by the higher binder, λw0 . Importantly, Percus (2000) shows
that the intended readings that the structures in (16) would yield are not available. For
instance, in (16b), the embedded DP my brother is interpreted relative to Mary’s belief
worlds, while the interpretation of the embedded VP is Canadian is relative to the actual
world. With this particular structure, the sentence in (14) should be judged true under the
scenario where there is a guy who is my brother (and may not be Canadian) in Mary’s
belief worlds, while that guy is actually Canadian, e.g., Mary thinks, ‘John, Yangsook’s
brother, is Korean’ (Unbeknownst to Mary, John is Canadian and not my brother). In fact,
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the sentence in (14) is judged false under this scenario.

(16)

a.

λw0 Mary thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [my brother w0 ] is Canadian w0 ]

b.

λw0 Mary thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [my brother w2 ] is Canadian w0 ]

Based on this observation that the binding of world pronouns are not entirely free,
Percus (2000) proposes a binding principle for world pronouns in the object language so
that we can block the impossible structures as in (16).3

(17)

Generalization X:
The situation[/world] pronoun that a verb selects for must be coindexed with the
nearest λ above it.

(Percus 2000, p.201; bracketed texts mine)

Given this principle, a world pronoun that is associated with a verb in the complement
of attitude verbs must be bound by the closest world binder that is introduced by the
immediately embedding attitude verb, and thus, verb phrases in complements of attitude
verbs always receive a de dicto or opaque reading.4
Note, however, that a world pronoun that is associated with a verb inside the relative
clause, which occurs in a complement of an attitude verb, does not have to be co-indexed
with a binder that is introduced by the embedding attitude verb. To illustrate, consider
the example in (18), where a relative clause is embedded under the attitude verb think.

(18)

Maryi thinks [the woman [who criticized heri paper]] is Canadian.

As in (14), the definite description ‘the woman’ may be interpreted de re or de dicto, while
the embedded predicate be Canadian can only be read de dicto. The problem is how the
verb inside the relative clause would be interpreted. Unlike the subordinate verb directly
3

This approach may lead to overgeneralization, as pointed out by a number of authors: see, for instance,
Keshet (2008) and Romoli and Sudo (2009).
4
Contrary to Percus’s Generalization X, embedded verbs may allow transparent readings in some cases
(Cable 2011).
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under the attitude verb think, the verb criticize in the relative clause seems to allow the
de re/de dicto ambiguity. Suppose that Mary met a woman at a conference and mistakenly thinks her paper was criticized by this woman and she is Canadian: Mary thinks,
‘The woman who criticized my paper is Canadian.’ Although the woman Mary met did
not criticize Mary’s paper, we can report Mary’s thought using the sentence in (18). In
this case, the verb embedded in the relative clause gets an opaque (de dicto) reading. On
the other hand, now suppose that Mary met a woman and thinks she is Canadian. Unbeknownst to Mary, however, the woman is the one who criticized Mary’s paper. In this
latter case, the verb criticize in the relative clause is interpreted transparently (de re).

(19)

De re vs. de dicto readings of the verb in the relative clause
a.

λw0 Mary1 thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [the woman w0 [who criticized her1 w0 ]] is
(de re/transparent)

Canadian w2 ]
b.

λw0 Mary1 thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [the woman w2 [who criticized her1 w2 ]] is
Canadian w2 ]

(de dicto/opaque)

In addition to the world pronoun, other intensional entities like time pronouns are
also known to behave differently in relative clauses than in finite complement clauses. A
well-known instance is the interpretation of the past tense in relative clauses (e.g., Cresswell 1990, Kusumoto 1999, 2005). That is, a past tense in a relative clause can be interpreted
relative to the utterance time instead of the matrix event time so that the eventuality of
the relative clause can be understood to take place later than the eventuality of the matrix
clause, an interpretation dubbed ‘later-than-matrix’ by Kusumoto (1999, 2005).

(20)

a.

John believed that Mary was sick.

(%later-than-matrix)

b.

Hillary married a man who became the president of the U.S.
(!later-than-matrix)
(Kusumoto 2005)
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Given the special properties of relative clauses with respect to their temporal or intensional status (Kusumoto 2005, Schwarz 2012, a.o.), we will assume that world pronouns
in relative clauses do not have to be bound by the closest binder, contrary to the restriction
on main predicates. We will see that this special intensional property of relative clauses
is the main source of the non-de se interpretation of LD caki.

5.4
5.4.1

The relationship between de se and de dicto attitude reports
Generalizations

Having shown the interesting and novel restriction on the interpretation of LD caki in
relative clauses, let us now further examine the relationship between the interpretations
of LD caki in a relative clause and the whole relative clause that contains it. Our observations about the (non-)obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki in relative clauses can
be summarized as follows: LD caki in the relative clause receives a non-de se interpretation only when the predicate of the relative clause is not interpreted relative to the belief
worlds of the attitude holder, which is the antecedent of caki (de re), while LD caki must
receive a de se interpretation when the relative clause containing caki is interpreted with
respect to the attitude holder’s belief worlds (de dicto).
Given our assumption that the world variable in relative clauses need not be bound
by the closest binder, the two possible readings and one impossible reading of (4), repeated
below as (21), can be represented as in (22) with different indexing on the world pronoun
within the relative clause.5

Here, the co-indexing between LD caki and its antecedent in (22b) does not mean that LD caki in the
relative clause is free or directly bound by the matrix subject. The co-indexing merely indicates that caki is
not construed de se but is coreferential with the long-distance antecedent. A mechanism for long-distance
binding of LD caki in relative clauses (in addition to other environments) will be proposed in Chapter 6.
5
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(21)

(de se)

S1: John thinks, "That woman who hit me is actually kind."

S2: John thinks that a girl he has newly met in class is very kind and nice. Unbeknownst to John, however, they met at a party the other night and she hit him
(non-de se)

while he was so drunk.

S3: John finds Mary very kind. One day, John watches a video and sees Mary
hitting a guy. John recognizes that it is Mary and thinks, “That woman who is
hitting that guy is actually kind." Unbeknownst to John, the guy on the video was
John himself and Mary was actually giving him a massage.

((non-de se) de re)

Johni -un [[cakii -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top self-acc hit-adn woman-nom kind-comp think
‘Johni thinks that the woman who hit himi is kind.’ (!S1, !S2, #S3)
(22)

a.

De se interpretation of caki in the RC
λw0 Johnj thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [the woman [who hit self1 w2 ]] is nice w2 ]

b.

Non-de se interpretation of caki in the RC
λw0 Johnj thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [the woman [who hit selfj w0 ]] is nice w2 ]

c.

(Non-de se) De re interpretation of caki in the RC
*λw0 Johnj thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [the woman [who hit selfj w2 ]] is kind w2 ]

The structure in (22a) yields a de dicto reading of the predicate in the relative clause,
given that the world pronoun that is associated with the verb ‘hit’ is co-indexed with
the lower binder λw2. This particular structure also yields a de se interpretation of LD
caki in the relative clause, since the reflexive is bound by the local individual abstractor
λx1 . Accordingly, this structure corresponds to the reading under ‘S1’ in (21). On the
other hand, the LF in (22b) yields a de re reading of the embedded verb ‘hit’, which means
that there exists someone who hit John in the actual world, although there may be no one
who hit John in John’s belief worlds, as described in ‘S2’ in (21). When the predicate in the
relative clause is interpreted relative to the actual world, LD caki in the relative clause is
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associated with its long-distance antecedent without being bound by the local individual
abstractor, and thus receives a non-de se interpretation.6 Lastly, the structure like (22c),
which corresponds to the reading under the scenario ‘S3’ in (21), is not available. Here
the verb ’hit’ in the relative clause that contains caki is interpreted with respect to John’s
belief worlds (de dicto), whereas caki is not construed de se.
There is one additional interpretation that cannot be derived from the sentence in
(21): caki is read de se while the predicate of the relative clause is true in the actual world
(de re). Suppose a situation where John is watching a video of himself and thinks, "Oh,
that woman who is massaging me is very kind". Unbeknownst to John, the woman was
actually hitting him. The sentence in (21) cannot be used in this particular scenario. While
John has a de se attitude in this scenario, the predicate of the relative clause in the attitude
report is not contained in John’s thought. Since John only used the expression ‘the man
who is massaging me’ instead of ‘the woman who is hitting me’ in his thought—although
the two descriptions denote the same person in the same situation on the video, caki in
the relative clause in (21) cannot be construed de se.

(23)

Impossible de se interpretation of caki in the RC
*λw0 Johnj thinks w0 [λx1 λw2 [the woman [who hit self1 w0 ]] is kind w2 ]

Importantly, the unavailability of the de se reading in some cases like (23) provides important evidence that de se interpretations of certain elements—at least LD caki in Korean—
can only be derived from a dedicated de se LF, contra Perry (1977) and others.
The patterns we saw above can be schematically illustrated as in (24).

Given that LD caki in the relative clause can be associated with the matrix subject without a de se
interpretation in attitude reports, we need an account how LD caki is associated with its long-distance
antecedent in this case. This issue will be dealt with in Chapter 6, where we provide a syntactico-semantic
account for logophoric binding of LD caki.
6
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(24)

Caki in a RC under an attitude verb (where DPi = caki)
a.

!RC predicate: de re & caki: non-de se
λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP λx1 λw2 [DP ... [RC ... cakii ... w0 ]] V w2 ]

b.

!RC predicate: de dicto & caki: de se
λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP λx1 λw2 [DP ... [RC ... caki1 ... w2 ]] V w2 ]

c.

%RC predicate: de dicto & caki: (non-de se) de re
*λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP λx1 λw2 [DP ... [RC ... cakii ... w2 ]] V w2 ]

d.

%RC predicate: de re & caki: de se
*λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP λx1 λw2 [DP ... [RC ... caki1 ... w0 ]] V w2 ]

Given this pattern, I propose descriptive generalizations of the relationship between the
de re or de dicto reading of the predicate in the relative clause containing caki and the
(non-)obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki in the relative clause.

(25)

Generalizations of the relationship between de se and de dicto
a.

Generalization I: Obligatory de se under de dicto
The LD reflexive caki must be construed de se when the predicate in the same
clause is read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.

b.

Generalization II: Obligatory non-de se under non-de dicto
The LD reflexive caki must be construed non-de se when the predicate in the
same clause is not read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.

Our generalizations capture the close relationship between the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki and de dicto reading of the predicate in the clause that contains caki.
Interestingly, LD caki must receive a non-de se interpretation when the predicate in the
same clause is not interpreted de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki. As noted
in (25), a de dicto reading of the embedding predicate must be determined with respect
to the antecedent of caki. Given this, a structure like (22c) cannot be derived because LD
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caki is not construed de se while the predicate in the same clause (the relative clause) is
part of John (i.e., the attitude holder and the antecedent of caki)’s attitudes. Moreover, the
special non-de se interpretation of caki only in relative clauses can also be explained by
the behavior of the intensional variables in relative clauses. That is, only relative clauses
under an attitude verb allow the world variable within its scope to be interpreted relative
to either the actual world (de re) or the attitude holder’s belief worlds (de dicto). In the
rest of this section we will examine carefully whether our generalizations hold for more
complex data including multiple embeddings and multiple occurrences of caki.

5.4.2

Doubly-embedded sentences

In order to examine our generalizations in (25), let us consider how LD caki contained in a
relative clause would be interpreted given the interpretation of its predicate when there is
more than one attitude verb in a sentence. We will show that our generalizations dubbed
‘Obligatory de se under de dicto’ and ‘Obligatory Non-de se under non-de dicto’ hold for
doubly-embedded sentences as well.
As we saw earlier, LD caki in the most embedded clause can refer to either the
matrix or intermediate subject under multiple embeddings, as illustrated in (26). LD caki
under multiple embeddings must be construed de se with respect to its referent. Thus,
the coreference reading between the matrix subject John and caki in (26) is only felicitous
when John’s speech contains Tom’s thought about him in a first-personal way: e.g., ‘Tom
thinks Mary likes me’. Under the coreference reading between the intermediate subject
Tom and caki, the sentence can be used only when John says that Tom has a de se attitude:
e.g., John said, ‘Tom thought, ’Mary likes me.”

(26)

Johni -un Tomj -i Mary-ka cakii/j -lul cohahanta-ko sayngkakhanta-ko
John-top Tom-nom Mary-nom self-acc like-comp
think-comp
malhayssta.
said
‘Johni said that Tomj thinks that Mary likes himi/j .’
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The truth-conditions of each of the de se reading in (26) can be derived from the structures
in (27) and (28), respectively.

(27)

Coreference between the matrix subject and caki
a.

LF: λw0 John said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tom thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 Mary likes caki1
w4 ]]

b.

[[(27a)]]g = λw. ∀<y,w’>∈SayJohn,w : [∀<z,w”>∈DoxT om,w0 : Mary likes y
in w”]

(28)

Coreference between the intermediate subject and caki
a.

LF: λw0 John said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tom thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 Mary likes caki3
w4 ]]

b.

[[(28a)]]g = λw. ∀<y,w’>∈SayJohn,w : [∀<z,w”>∈DoxT om,w0 : Mary likes z in
w”]

LD caki appearing in a relative clause can also find any subject in the higher clauses
as its antecedent under multiple embeddings, as shown in (29). Contrary to caki in (26)
with the obligatory de se interpretation, LD caki in the relative clause can receive a non-de
se interpretation under some particular situations, as we saw already.

(29)

Johni -un [Tomj -i [[[cakii/j -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko
John-top Tom-nom self-acc
hit-adn woman-nom kind-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta].
think-comp
said
‘Johni said that Tomj thinks that the woman who hit himi/j is kind.’
First, let us consider the case in which LD caki is coreferent with the matrix subject.

There are a number of structures to examine depending on the interpretation of caki (de
se vs. non-de se) and the predicate of the relative clause (with a world variable co-indexed
with λw0 , λw2 , or λw4 ).
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(30)

LF: λw0 Johni said [CP1 λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks [CP2 λx3 λw4 [the woman [who hit
self1/i w0/2/4 ]] is kind w4 ]]

Given our generalizations, we expect caki to receive an obligatory non-de se interpretation
when the verb phrase in the same clause is not interpreted de dicto with respect to the
antecedent of caki, the matrix subject. Moreover, we predict that caki would only allow
a de se reading but not a (non-de se) de re reading when the relative clause is interpreted
relative to John’s belief worlds. These predictions are borne out.

(31)

Coreference between the matrix subject and caki in the RC
a.

!RC predicate: de re & caki: non-de se
Context: John and Tom met a woman at a party. Tom thought she was very
kind after talking to her, and told John: "That woman we met at a party is
very kind." When Sue asked John about the party, he said: "I don’t remember
anything about the party, but Tom thinks the woman we met is kind." Unbeknownst Tom and John, however, the woman they met was the one who hit
John a while ago.
LF: λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit selfi w0 ]] is kind w4 ]]

b.

%RC predicate: de re & caki: de se
Context: John and Tom met a woman at a party. Tom thought she was very
kind after talking to her, and told John: "That woman we met at a party is
very kind." John also remembered her as the one who gave him a massage,
and said: "Tom thinks the woman who gave me a massage is kind." Unbeknownst to John, she hit him rather than gave him a massage.
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LF: λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit self1 w0 ]] is kind w4 ]]
c.

!RC predicate: John’s de dicto & caki: de se
Context: Tom told John: "Mary is a kind person." John thought that Mary
is the one who hit him the other day and John doesn’t like her because of
that. John said: "Tom thinks the woman who hit me is kind. I don’t think
she is kind, though." Unbeknownst to John, however, Mary is the one who
protected him.
LF: λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit self1 w2 ]] is kind w4 ]]7

d.

%RC predicate: John’s de dicto & caki: non-de se
Context: Tom told John: "Mary is a kind person." John thought Mary was
the one who was hitting a guy on a video he watched. John doesn’t like
her because of that, and said: "Tom thinks the woman who hit the guy on
the video is kind. I don’t think she is kind, though." Unbeknownst to John,
however, the guy on the video was John himself and Mary was helping him
out instead of hitting him.
LF: #λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit selfi w2 ]] is kind w4 ]]

The contrast between (31a) and (31b) supports our second generalization ‘Obligatory nonde se under non-de dicto’, while the contrast between (31c) and (31d) confirms the first
generalization ‘Obligatory de se under de dicto readings’. The content of the relative clause
in (31a) and (31b)—that is, there is an individual x and x hit John—is true only in the
actual world. In this case, caki must be associated with the matrix subject without being
7

More concretely, we may also need to indicate how the subject in the most embedded clause is construed
de re with respect to the intermediate subject, given that Tom also has a de re belief about Mary. One possible
LF that captures Tom’s de re belief about Mary (with an additional de re LF for the trace) may be as follows:
e.g. λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who hit self1 w2 ]] λ5 t5 is kind
w4 ]].
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construed de se. On the other hand, the verb phrase of the relative clause is interpreted
relative to John’s belief worlds in both (31c) and (31d). In such cases, John’s direct speech
must include the definite description with the first person pronoun (e.g., ‘the woman who
hit me’) in order to use the LD reflexive caki in the attitude reports. Thus, a non-de se
construal of caki is ruled out in (31d).
There are two more structures that need to be considered: the cases in which the
world variable in the relative clause is interpreted relative to the intermediate subject’s
belief worlds. As shown below, LD caki must be construed de se in these cases.

(32)

a.

!RC predicate: Tom’s de dicto & caki: de se
Context: At a party, Tom had a nice conversation with Mary and thought
she was very kind, although he saw Mary hitting John (In fact, Mary was
protecting John). Next day, Tom told John: "There was this girl, Mary, who
hit you last night, but she was actually very kind." John does not remember
anything about the party and said: "Tom thinks the woman who hit me is
kind."
LF: λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit self1 w4 ]] is kind w4 ]]

b.

%RC predicate: Tom’s de dicto & caki: non-de se
Context: At a party, Tom had a nice conversation with Mary and thought
she was very kind, although he saw Mary hitting a guy (In fact, Mary was
protecting him.). Next day, Tom showed a photo of the party to John and
told John: "There was a girl, Mary, who hit this guy in the photo last night.
But she was actually very kind." John does not remember anything about the
party and said: "Tom thinks the woman who hit this guy in the photo is kind."
Unbeknownst to Tom and John, the guy in the photo was actually John.
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LF: #λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit selfi w4 ]] is kind w4 ]]

This is an interesting case because it looks like the content of the relative clause is included
in the intermediate attitude holder’s de dicto beliefs instead of the actual antecedent of
caki’s. However, a careful examination reveals that these cases involve John’s de dicto
reports about Tom’s de dicto beliefs. For instance, the description about the woman with
the relative clause is expressed in John’s reports as well—as ‘the woman who hit me’ or ‘the
woman who hit that guy’ in the contexts of (32). If John made a de re report about Tom’s
de dicto attitudes, he would not use the same description that Tom used, but instead would
use his own description to describe Mary from his perspective. Suppose, for instance, that
John remembers that the woman Tom is referring to is the one who saved him instead of
hit him. Then, John could make a de re report about Mary with his own term rather than
using Tom’s expression as ‘Tom thinks the woman who saved me is kind’, although Tom
thinks ‘The woman who hit John is kind.’ Thus, the entire sentence under the context in
(32a) is a de dcito report of John’s speech that involves a de dicto report of Tom’s belief
(i.e., the iterated de dicto reports). Accordingly, the obligatory de se interpretation of caki
in (32) also supports our generalization ‘Obligatory de se under de dicto’. The (im)possible
structures of doubly-embedded cases in which LD caki in the relative clause finds the
matrix subject as its antecedent can be schematized as in (33).

(33)

In a doubly-embedded sentence (where DPi = caki)
a.

!RC predicate: de dicto & caki: de se
λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
caki1 ... w2/4 ]] V-w4 ]]

b.

%RC predicate: de dicto & caki: non-de se
*λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
cakii ... w2/4 ]] V-w4 ]]
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c.

!RC predicate: de re & caki: non-de se
λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
cakii ... w0 ]] V-w4 ]]

d.

%RC predicate: de re & caki: de se
λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
caki1 ... w0 ]] V-w4 ]]

Next, let us examine the cases under the coreference between the intermediate subject Tom and and LD caki in the example in (29). First, we predict that caki must be
interpreted de se when the predicate in the relative clause is interpreted de dicto with respect to Tom—the antecedent of caki. Second, we also predict that caki would receive an
obligatory non-de se interpretation when the verb phrase in the same clause is not interpreted relative to Tom’s belief worlds but by the actual world (de re) or John’s—another
attitude holder in the higher clause—belief worlds (de dicto with respect to John). These
predictions are confirmed by our data shown in (34).

(34)

a.

!RC predicate: Tom’s de dicto & caki: de se
Context: At a party, Tom had a nice conversation with Mary and thought
she was very kind, although he thought she’s the one who hit him earlier (In
fact, Mary protected him.). Next day, Tom told John: "There was this girl,
Mary, who hit me last night, but she was actually very kind." John does not
remember anything about the party and says: "Tom thinks the woman who
hit him is kind."
LF: λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit self3 w4 ]] is kind w4 ]]

b.

%RC predicate: Tom’s de dicto & caki: non-de se
Context: At a party, Tom had a nice conversation with Mary and thought she
was very kind, although he thought Mary was the one who was hitting a guy
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on a video he watched. Next day, Tom told John: "There was this girl, Mary,
who hit some guy on the video I watched. But she was actually very kind."
Unbeknownst to Tom, John knew that the guy on the video was Tom, and
Mary was helping him out instead of hitting him on the video. John said:
"Tom thinks the woman who hit him is kind."
LF: #λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit selfj w4 ]] is kind w4 ]]
c.

!RC predicate: John’s de dicto & caki: non-de se
Context: Tom told John: "Mary is a kind person." John thought Mary is the
one who hit Tom the other day and John doesn’t like her because of that.
John said: "Tom thinks the woman who hit him is kind. I don’t think she
is kind, though." Unbeknownst to John, however, Mary is the one who protected Tom.
LF: λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit selfj w2 ]] is kind w4 ]]

d.

%RC predicate: John’s de dicto & caki: de se
Context: At a party, Tom had a nice conversation with a woman and thought
she was very kind. Next day, Tom told John: "The woman who I had a conversation at the party was very kind." John actually saw Tom talk to a woman
at the party and thought she is the one who hit Tom a while ago. John said:
"Tom thinks the woman who hit him is kind."
LF: λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit self3 w2 ]] is kind w4 ]]

e.

!?RC predicate: De re & caki: non-de se
Context: John and Tom met a woman at a party. Tom thought she was very
kind after talking to her, and told John: "That woman we met at a party is
very kind." When Sue asked John about her, he said: "I don’t know about
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her, but Tom thinks she is kind." Unbeknownst Tom and John, however, the
woman they met was the one who hit Tom a while ago.
LF: ?λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit selfj w0 ]] is kind w4 ]]8
f.

%RC predicate: De re & caki: de se
Context: At a party, Tom finally met the girl who he thought protected him
earlier and thought she was indeed very kind. Next day, Tom told John:
"There was this girl, Mary, who protected me earlier, and she was indeed
very kind." John does not remember anything about the party and says: "Tom
thinks the woman who protected him is kind." Unbeknonwst to Tom and
John, Mary did not protect Tom but hit him.
LF: λw0 Johni said w0 [λx1 λw2 Tomj thinks w2 [λx3 λw4 [the woman [who
hit self3 w0 ]] is kind w4 ]]

The possible and impossible readings shown in (34) can be schematically represented as
in (35).

(35)

In a doubly-embedded sentence (where DPj = caki)
a.

!RC predicate: DPj ’s de dicto & caki: de se
λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
caki3 ... w4 ]] V-w4 ]]

b.

%RC predicate: DPj ’s de dicto & caki: non-de se
*λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
cakij ... w4 ]] V-w4 ]]

8
This reading does not sound as good as the one in (34c), indicating that there may be an additional
restriction for the world variable binding in the relative clause.
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c.

!RC predicate: Not de dicto w.r.t. DPj & caki: non-de se
λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
cakij ... w?0/2 ]] V-w4 ]]

d.

%RC predicate: Not de dicto w.r.t. DPj & caki: de se
λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
caki3 ... w0/2 ]] V-w4 ]]

Again, when caki is replaced with the third person pronoun ku in the multiple embedding case, the sentence can be used in all of the contexts we saw above, indicating that
there is no restriction on the de se or de re construal for the third person pronoun unlike
LD caki.

(36)

Johni -un [Tomj -i [[[kui/j -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko
John-top Tom-nom he-acc
hit-adn woman-nom kind-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta].
think-comp
said
‘Johni said that Tomj thinks that the woman who hit himi/j is kind.’

The data presented in this subsection support our generalizations, repeated below.

(37)

Generalizations of the relationship between de se and de dicto
a.

Generalization I: Obligatory de se under de dicto
The LD reflexive caki must be construed de se when the predicate in the same
clause is read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.

b.

Generalization II: Obligatory non-de se under non-de dicto
The LD reflexive caki must be construed non-de se when the predicate in the
same clause is not read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.

In fact, these generalizations hold for LD caki that appears directly under attitude verbs.
These cases fall under the first generalization ‘Obligatory de se under de dicto’. We have
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seen that there is a widely accepted generalization on main predicates under the intensional variable theory: that is, main predicates are always read de dicto since world pronouns in VP need to be co-indexed with the closest binder. Given this, LD caki in a complement clause of attitude verbs must always be construed de se because the predicate of
the clause that contains caki is always interepreted de dicto with respect to the subject in
the immediately embedding clause or the subject in the higher clause by transitivity. For
instance, recall that LD caki in a sentence like ‘Lit. John thinks that Mary likes caki’ must
be construed de se with respect to its LD antecedent, John. Thus, it can only be used in this
attitude report when John holds a belief like ‘Mary likes me.’ instead of ‘Mary hates me.’
(although perhaps Mary hates John in the actual world) or ‘Mary likes that guy.’ (while
John is not aware that that guy is John himself). LD caki under multiple embeddings is
also not an exception. For example, suppose a situation where Tom thinks Mary likes
John. John can report Tom’s de dicto belief as ‘Tom thinks Mary likes me.’ (although John
himself thinks Mary hates him). This whole situation can be reported as ‘Lit. John1 said
Tom thinks Mary likes caki1 .’, and caki is expected to be read de se, because the predicate
of the most embedded clause is contained in John’s de dicto report of Tom’s de dicto belief.
While Generalization I holds for LD caki in general, Generalization II in (37) specifically captures the property of LD caki in relative clauses. We have seen that the peculiar
properties of LD caki in relative clauses are derived not from LD caki itself but from the
special intensional status of relative clauses. Since the world pronoun in relative clauses
does not have to be bound by the nearest binder, the predicate of the relative clause may
not be read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki. We have seen that caki cannot
be construed de se in such cases and must receive a non-de se interpretation, as Generalization II states.
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5.5

Disjoint readings of multiple caki’s

This section discusses another seemingly peculiar property of LD caki in relative clauses
with respect to the interaction with another LD caki in the same complement clause. First,
we will present that LD caki in relative clauses does not have to be coreferential with
another caki in the same complement clause. Then, more importantly, we will show that
LD caki in a relative clause cannot be exempt from another general restriction on multiple
LD caki’s that they need to be coreferential under the de se construal. The behavior of
multiple LD caki’s under the de se construal is not derived from Generalizations I & II, but
follows from an independent constraint, that is, our proposed binding conditions for LD
caki.
Recall that multiple caki’s in the same complement clause only allow a coreference
reading and must be interpreted de se when they find a long-distance antecedent under
attitude environments. The example in (38), repeated from (14) in Chapter 3, illustrates
this.

(38)

John-i
[Bill-i [caki-uy emmeni-ka caki-lul silhehanta]-ko
John-nom Bill-nom self-gen mother-nom self-acc hate-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta.
think-comp
said
a.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himi .’

b.

‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himj .’

c. *‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisi mother hates himj .’
d. *‘Johni said that Billj thought that hisj mother hates himi .’
Given this, let us consider new examples involving multiple caki’s and a relative
clause under multiple embeddings. In the example below, multiple caki’s appear in the
most embedded clause: one inside the relative clause and the other directly under the
attitude predicate ‘think’. There are three important points regarding this example. First,
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caki in the relative clause does not have to be coreferent with another caki in the same
embedded clause, as shown in (39c)-(39d).9 This is in contrast to the obligatory coreference
reading of multiple caki’s seen in (38).

(39)

John-un [Mary-ka [[[caki-lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
caki-lul cohahanta]-ko
John-top Mary-nom self-acc hit-adn woman-nom self-acc like-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta.
think-comp
said
Lit. ‘John said that Mary thinks that the woman who hit self likes self.’
a.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi likes himi .

b.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit herj likes herj .

c.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi likes herj .

d.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit herj likes himi .

Second, as expected from our discussion in the previous section, caki in the relative
clause in (39) does not need to receive a de se interpretation, while another caki that is
in the immediate scope of the attitude verb must be interpreted de se (e.g., (40b), (40d),
(40e)). For example, both caki’s can refer to John, whereas only the latter one gets a
de se interpretation, as in the following situation: John said, ‘Mary thinks Sue likes me.’
(Unbeknownst to John, Sue is the woman who hit him). Similarly, a disjoint reading, as
in (40e), can be derived from a situation where John says, ‘Mary thinks Sue likes her.’
(Unbeknownst to John, Sue is the woman who hit him) and Mary thinks, ‘Sue likes me.’
Third, the multiple caki’s in (39) still need to be coreferent in order for both caki’s
to be interpreted de se (e.g., (40a)/(40c) vs. (40g)). In other words, the sentence in (39)
with the multiple occurrence of LD caki cannot be used under a situation where both
John and Mary hold a de se belief, respectively, as following: John says, ‘Mary thinks the
woman who hit me likes her’, while Mary thinks, ‘Sue, the woman who hit John, likes
me.’ Therefore, when multiple caki’s find the different antecedents, the one in the relative
In addition, caki in the object position can take the subject DP, ‘the woman who hit self’, as its local
antecedent.
9
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clause can only receive a non-de se reading. All the (im)possible readings of the multiple
reflexives in (39) are listed below.

(40)

a.

Johndese . . . Johndese

b.

Johnnon−dese . . . Johndese

c.

Marydese . . . Marydese

d.

Marynon−dese . . . Marydese

e.

Johnnon−dese . . . Marydese

f.

Marynon−dese . . . Johndese

g. *Johndese . . . Marydese
h. *Marydese . . . Johndese
The available readings of multiple caki’s in (40) can be schematically illustrated as in (41).10

(41)

a.

λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
caki1/i/j ... ]] V-w4 ... caki1 ... ]]

b.

λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
caki3/i/j ... ]] V-w4 ... caki3 ... ]]

The LFs of the impossible readings of multiple caki’s in (40g) can be schematized as in
(42).

(42)

a. *λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
caki1 ... ]] V-w4 ... caki3 ... ]]
b. *λw0 DPi att-verb1 [CP1 λx1 λw2 DPj att-verb2 [CP2 λx3 λw4 [DP ... [RC ...
caki3 ... ]] V-w4 ... caki1 ... ]]

The Generalizations I & II are not sufficient to rule out the impossible readings in (42). For
10

Although the world variable in the relative clause is not provided in detail in (41), the interpretations
of the relative clause (de dicto or de re) and caki (de se or non-de se) fall under our Generalizations I & II.
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instance, given our generalizations, the LD reflexive in the relative clause is expected to
both co-refer with the matrix subject and receive a de se interpretation in (42a) unless the
predicate of the relative clause is interpreted relative to the actual world (de re). Regardless
of the indexing of the world variable that is associated with the predicate in the relative
clause, however, caki in the relative clause in (42a) cannot be interpreted de se with respect
to the matrix subject when another caki is bound by the closer binder λx3 , and thus, is
interpreted de se with respect to the intermediate subject.
This behavior of LD caki in the relative clause follows from our system of de se
construals and long-distance binding conditions for LD caki. We have assumed that the
de se interpretation of LD caki in the relative clause is also derived from the dedicated
de se construal for LD caki. Therefore, in order for LD caki in the relative clause to be
interpreted de se, it still must be bound by the closest abstractor that bears the special
feature [log]. Having a caki that is interpreted de se with respect to the intermediate
subject indicates that there is a legitimate abstractor for LD caki in the lower clause (e.g.,
λx3 [log] in (42)). Therefore, any other LD caki in the same clause must also be bound by
the same binder, instead of the one that is in the higher clause, to satisfy our proposed
binding conditions for LD caki. The problem that has not been solved yet is how LD caki
in the relative clause can be associated with its long-distance antecedent without being
construed de se. We will come back to this issue in Chapter 6.

5.6

Obligatory non-de se readings of the 3rd person pronoun

In this section, we discuss cases where the third person pronoun cannot receive a de se
interpretation when co-occurring with a LD caki in the same complement clause. Based
on the data presented in this section, I will make further claims about the use of obligatory
de se expressions and dedicated de se construals. In particular, we will see that a dedicated
de se LF is pragmatically preferred over a de re LF and a dedicated de se expression is also
preferred over an expression that can optionally be interpreted de se.
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5.6.1

Competition between a dedicated and a non-dedicated de se LF

Although it is controversial whether a dedicated LF is necessary for de se attitude reports
with linguistic expressions that only allow a de se reading, it has been widely assumed
that a de se reading of non-de se elements (that is, expressions that allow either a de se or
a pure de re reading like the third person pronoun) can be derived from a de re structure.
An important theoretical question that deserves further investigation is whether a de se
interpretation of a non-obligatory de se element like the third person pronoun can always
be derived from a de re LF. In this subsection, I will provide crucial evidence that it cannot
in some cases, based upon empirical data on the behavior of the third person pronoun and
LD caki in Korean.
We can observe interesting interactions between the third person pronoun and LD
caki when caki in the relative clause is replaced with the third person pronoun in a multiple
embedding case. In (43), while ku ‘he’ is coreferential with the matrix subject, LD caki can
refer to either John or Mary.

(43)

Johni -un [Maryj -ka [[[kui -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
cakii/j -lul cohahanta]-ko
John-top Mary-nom he-acc hit-adn woman-nom self-acc like-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta.
think-comp
said
Lit. ‘Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi likes selfi/j .’

Let us first examine the case where the third person pronoun in the relative clause and caki
are disjoint in reference: ku ‘he’ refers to John, while caki refers to Mary. Interestingly, the
third person pronoun and LD caki behave like multiple cakis in (39): that is, they cannot
be interpreted de se with respect to different antecedents. In other words, it has to be
the case that the third person pronoun referring to the matrix subject receives a non-de se
interpretation, whereas caki is interpreted de se with respect to the intermediate subject.11
The same restriction holds when the feminine third person pronoun kunye ‘she’—which co-refers with
Mary—is used: kunye ‘she’ must receive a non-de se interpretation, while caki is interpreted de se with
respect to John. Similarly, we get the same pattern when caki in the relative clause remains and the latter
11

175

(44)

Non-coreference between ku ‘he’ and caki
S1: Mary told John: "The woman who hit you the other day likes me." Later, John
told this to a friend of him: "Mary thinks the woman who hit me likes her."
(‘he’: de se w.r.t. John, caki: de se w.r.t. Mary)
S2: Mary told John while watching TV: "The woman who is hitting that guy on
TV likes me." Later, John told this to a friend of him: "Mary thinks the woman
who hit some guy on TV likes her." Unbeknownst to Mary and John, the guy on
TV was John.

(‘he’: (non-de se) de re w.r.t. John, caki: de se w.r.t. Mary)

Johni -un [Maryj -ka [[[kui -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
cakij -lul cohahanta]-ko
John-top Mary-nom he-acc hit-adn woman-nom self-acc like-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta.
think-comp
said
‘Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi likes herj .’ (# S1, !S2)
Again, there is no such restriction when caki is replaced with the third person pronoun kunye ‘she’. The multiple pronouns in (45) can be interpreted de se with respect to
their own referent, respectively, as illustrated in ‘S1’ in (45).

(45)

Multiple pronouns with different de se referents
S1: Mary told John: "The woman who hit you the other day likes me." Later, John
told this to a friend of him: "Mary thinks the woman who hit me likes her."
(‘he’: de se w.r.t. John, ‘she’: de se w.r.t. Mary)
S2: Mary told John while watching TV: "The woman who is hitting that guy on
TV likes me." Later, John told this to a friend of him: "Mary thinks the woman
who hit some guy on TV likes her." Unbeknownst to Mary and John, the guy on
TV was John.

(‘he’: (non-de se) de re w.r.t. John, ‘she’: de se w.r.t. Mary)

caki is replaced by the third person pronoun.
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Johni -un [Maryj -ka [[[kui -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
kunyej -lul
John-top Mary-nom he-acc hit-adn woman-nom she-acc
cohahanta]-ko sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta.
like-comp
think-comp
said
‘Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi likes herj .’
(!S1, !S2)12
Given that (45) differs from (44) only in one element (i.e., kunye ‘she’ vs. caki), the unavailable de se interpretation of the third person pronoun in (44) must be closely related
to the existence of the obligatory de se element LD caki.
The obligatory non-de se interpretation of the third person pronoun seen in (44)
challenges the common view that a de se interpretation of the third person pronoun can
always be derived from de re without employing any dedicated machinery for de se interpretations (e.g., Percus and Sauerland 2003, Anand 2006). If the ‘de se as a special de re’
route is always available for elements like pronouns, we would expect the third person
pronoun in a sentence like (44) to be able to receive a de se interpretation, contrary to
the fact. Hence, our data provide important evidence that a de se interpretation cannot
always be freely derived from a de re LF. Then, the question is when and why a de se
interpretation is blocked from a de re LF.
Regarding the relationship between a dedicated de se and a de re LF, Schlenker (2005)
provides an insightful pragmatic principle, stated under (46).

(46)

Prefer De Se!
Whenever this is compatible with the situation which is reported, prefer a De Se
over a De Re Logical Form.

(Schlenker 2005)

The novel data presented in this subsection support Schlenker’s pragmatic competition
between a de re and a dedicated de se LF. More precisely, our data show that the ‘de se as a
12
Additionally, kunye ‘she’ can also be interpreted (non-de se) de re, while ku ‘he’ receives a de se or a de
re interpretation.
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special de re’ route is not just dispreferred, but actually blocked when a structure employs
the dedicated de se route. Given this, I provide a stronger version of pragmatic principle
for the dedicated de se LF, as follows.

(47)

Obligatory De se LF!
Whenever a de se LF is employed in the structure at least for one element, a de se
interpretation of all the other elements cannot be derived from a de re LF.

The obligatory non-de se interpretation of the third person pronoun in (44) can be explained under this principle, since the structure of the sentence with LD caki involves an
obligatory de se construal. On the other hand, multiple pronouns in the same clause can
be interpreted de se with respect to different referents under a de re construal, because a
de se construal is not required in this case.

5.6.2

Competition between the 3rd person pronoun and caki

This subsection investigates a competition between an obligatory de se element and a
non-obligatory de se element that is compatible with a de se interpretation. Assuming
that there are both types of elements in a language, which element would be used to
report a de se attitude? If there is no restriction on the use of these elements to convey a
de se interpretation, we would predict that an obligatory and non-obligatory de se element
can both be used in a sentence with a de se reading. We will see in this subsection that if
a language has an obligatory de se expression, then it is preferred in de se attitude reports.
We have not yet examined a coreference reading of the third person pronoun and
caki in a sentence like (43), which is repeated below. When they are coreferent as in (48),
one might wonder whether the third person can receive a de se interpretation, while LD
caki must. Interestingly, although we saw in (36) that the third person pronoun ku in
relative clauses can freely receive a (non-de se) de re or de se reading, it is very difficult for
the third person pronoun to be interpreted de se in (48)—where there is a reflexive caki in
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the same complement clause that is obligatorily construed de se.

(48)

Coreference between ku ‘he’ and caki
S1: John says: "Mary thinks the woman who hit me likes me."
(‘he’: de se, caki: de se)
S2: John says: "Mary thinks Sue likes me." Unbeknownst to John, Sue is the one
(‘he’: non-de se, caki: de se)

who hit him the other day.

S3: John says: "Mary thinks that woman on TV who is hitting a guy likes me."
Unbeknownst to John, the guy on TV is John himself.

(‘he’: de re, caki: de se)

Johni -un [Maryj -ka [[[kui -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
cakii -lul cohahanta]-ko
John-top Mary-nom he-acc hit-adn woman-nom self-acc like-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta.
think-comp
said
‘Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi likes himi .’
(# S1, !S2, !S3)

The only impossible reading of (48) seems to indicate that both the third person pronoun
and LD caki cannot be interpreted de se with respect to the same referent. Assuming that
the ‘de se as a de re’ route is blocked for the third person pronoun due to our pramatic
principle ‘Obligatory de se!’, there is still a possibility of the dedicated de se construal for
the third person pronoun. Why, then, is it impossible for the pronoun to be construed de
se in a sentence like (48)?
I demonstrate that there is a pragmatic competition between an obligatory de se
expression and a non-obligatory de se element when a language has both type of elements.
That is, given that an obligatory de se expression caki is already used in the clause to
unambiguously report John’s de se belief, the use of the third person pronoun, instead of
the dedicated de se expression caki, in the relative clause strongly implies that John does
not have a de se belief about the content of the relative clause. In fact, when caki in (48)
is replaced with another third person pronoun, then multiple third person pronouns can
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again freely interpreted (non-de se) de re or de se.13 This pragmatic competition is stated
below.

(49)

Obligatory De se expression!
Whenever an obligatory de se expression is used in an attitude report, a nonobligatory de se expression in the same complement clause cannot be interpreted
de se.

The novel observation presented in this subsection reveals an interesting aspect of the use
of the obligatory de se expressions in comparison with the elements that allow a de se/de
re ambiguity in attitude reports.

5.7

Conclusion

To summarize, I proposed the two generalizations of the relationship between de se and
de dicto readings. LD caki in the relative clause can receive a non-de se interpretation
even when embedded under an attitude verb because of the special intensional property
of relative clauses.
Before we leave this section, it should be pointed out that LD caki contained in a
larger DP usually cannot be exempt from the obligatory de se construal. Given that LD
caki in a relative clause can get a non-de se interpretation even under attitude verbs, one
may wonder whether the same pattern would be found when LD caki is embedded in a
larger DP. As shown in (50), LD caki is still subject to the obligatory de se interpretation
when it appears in the genitive phrase.
13

(i)

The example with multiple third person pronouns is provided below:
Johni -un [Maryj -ka [[[kui -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
kui -lul cohahanta]-ko sayngkakhanta]-ko
John-top Mary-nom he-acc hit-adn woman-nom he-acc like-comp
think-comp
malhayssta.
said
‘Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi likes himi .’
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(50)

S1: John thinks, "The wife of my friend Bill is kind."
S2: John met Mary at a party and thought she was very kind. Unbeknownst to
John, Mary is the wife of his friend Bill.
John-un [[caki chinkwu]-uy pwuin]-i chakhata-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top caki friend-gen wife-nom kind-comp think
‘Johni thinks that the wife of hisi friend is kind.’ (!S1, # S2)

In Chapter 6, we will see that our syntactico-semantic approach to long-distance binding
of LD caki can capture this contrast. Briefly speaking, relative clauses can host an operator
that mediates between LD caki and its long-distance antecedent, while genitive phrases
cannot, due to the lack of CP layer. Therefore, LD caki cannot be licensed in a genitive
construction unless it is construed de se under an attitude verb.
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CHAPTER 6

LOGOPHORIC BINDING

6.1

Introduction

In our discussion on LD caki so far, we have primarily focused on its obligatory de se
interpretation in attitude environments. Recall that we have assumed that LD caki is a
variable with special feature [log] that needs to be bound by a de se binder, which is
introduced under an attitude verb, that also bears the same feature. I have shown that
our account correctly captures some key aspects of the LD reflexive caki in attitude environments, including the obligatory de se interpretation, the obligatory co-reference of
multiple clausemate caki’s, and the relationships between controlled subjects (both overt
and null) and the LD reflexive caki in control constructions.
However, we have also seen that caki can appear in the environments without attitudes (e.g., relative clauses, adverbial clauses, etc.) and still find a LD antecedent. Moreover, we also saw in the previous chapter that LD caki can be interpreted non-de se in
an attitude environment when it is directly embedded in a relative clause. Therefore,
our analysis of LD caki binding faces an immediate problem when we consider the longdistance dependency between caki and its antecedent in non-attitude environments because of the absence of the de se binder in the non-attitude environments.
There are two ways to approach the problem of LD caki in the non-attitude environments. Firstly, one may assume that LD caki appearing in relative or adjunct clauses
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is distinct from LD caki under attitude verbs. In this view, we can maintain our account
presented in the preceding chapters for the latter LD caki and propose a new account
for the former LD caki. On the other hand, one may consider LD caki in both attitude
and non-attitude environments as the same type of LD reflexive. In that case, our semantic/syntactic analysis of LD caki requires some major modifications to be extended
to non-attitude environments. Based on data that show LD caki is subject to the notion
of logophoricity in both attitude and non-attitude environments, we will take the latter approach. Thus, we need to modify our previous account to capture the long-distance
binding of LD caki in both attitude and non-attitude environments, as well as the relationship between the obligatory de se interpretation of caki only in attitude environments. In
addition, we need to account for the long-distance dependency between caki appearing in
a relative clause and its antecedent when the anaphor does not get a de se interpretation
even in an attitude environment.
In this chapter, I develop a syntactico-semantic analysis of long-distance binding
in terms of the notion of logophoricity. The main goals of our analysis are to account
for the facts that (i) LD caki can be long-distance bound both under attitude verbs and in
non-attitude environments, (ii) LD caki needs to be coreferent with a logophoric center
when it is long-distance bound, (iii) LD caki must get a de se interpretation when it occurs under attitude verbs, and (iv) LD caki appearing in a relative clause can be exempt
from an obligatory de se interpretation even in attitude environments. The first three issues on long-distance anaphors have, in fact, drawn considerable attention for decades.
Notwithstanding extensive research, to my knowledge, a satisfactory mechanism has not
yet been proposed that can capture the consistent long-distance binding in both attitude
and non-attitude environments, as well as the obligatory de se interpretation only in attitude environments. Moreover, the last issue is an entirely novel observation from this
study, which cannot be explained by any existing analysis of long-distance binding.
Our first specific question is what the syntactic mechanism is that is responsible for
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long-distance binding of caki in both attitude and non-attitude environments. The second question concerns what the semantic mechanism is that is responsible for the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki in attitude environments. To answer these questions,
based upon previous syntactic work on logophoric binding (Koopman and Sportiche 1989,
Anand 2006, Sundaresan 2012, Charnavel 2017, a.o.), I will first argue for a local binding
approach to long-distance anaphors like LD caki. That is, LD anaphors like caki are not
directly bound by their long-distance antecedents, but rather by a local operator that mediates between LD anaphors and their antecedents. For the de se interpretation of LD
caki, while I maintain the property approach as a dedicated de se mechanism for caki, I
distinguish the de se mechanism from the machinery that is responsible for long-distance
binding of caki.
I will begin by providing some background on the notion of logophoricity. Then in
Section 6.3, I will show that the long-distance dependency between caki and its antecedent
is consistently subject to this notion. That is, the reference of the LD reflexive caki must
be understood as a logophoric center. Specifically, an antecedent of LD caki in attitude
environments must be the one whose speech or thoughts are represented in the clause
that the reflexive appears, while in non-attitude environments it must be the one whose
perspective or point of view is taken in the phrase containing the reflexive. In 6.4, I will
present a syntactico-semantic analysis of logophoric binding of LD caki. The new account
will diverge from our previous analysis in which the binder of caki is responsible for both
its de se interpretation and LD dependency. Under our new account, these two properties
of caki are derived by two separate binders: a local logophoric binder for LD dependency
and a de se binder, which is identical to the one in our previous account, for the obligatory
de se interpretation.
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6.2
6.2.1

Background on logophoricity
The notion of logophoricity: Clements (1975) and Sells (1987)

The notion of logophoricity was originally introduced by Hagège (1974) and Clements
(1975) for logophoric pronouns in certain African languages, which must be co-referential
with the one "whose speech, thoughts, feelings, or general state of consciousness are reported" (Clements 1975, p.141). For instance, as illustrated in (1), the logophoric pronoun
yè in Ewe must refer to the attitude holder, e.g., Kofi in (1).

(1)

The logophoric pronoun yè in Ewe
Ewe

Kofi be yè-dzo.
Kofi say LOG-leave
‘Kofii said that hei left.’

(Clements 1975, p.142)

Clements (1975) proposes that logophoric pronouns in African languages exhibit
the following set of cross-linguistic properties (Clements 1975, p.171–2).

(2)

The cross-linguistic characterization of logophoric pronouns
a.

Logophoric pronouns are restricted to reportive contexts transmitting the
words or thoughts of an individual or individuals other than the speaker/narrator;

b.

The antecedent does not occur in the same reportive context as the logophoric
pronoun;

c.

The antecedent designates the individual or individuals whose words or thoughts
are transmitted in the reported context in which the logophoric pronoun occurs.

The first property states the fact that logophors in African languages are third person and
they can only occur under a limited number of speech/attitude verbs. The second one re-
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gards the long-distance dependency between logophoric pronouns and their antecedents:
that is, they cannot appear in the same clause. The last property shown in (2c) points
out the characteristic of the antecedents of logophoric pronouns: the speaker of reported
speech or attitude holder.
Although long-distance reflexives in many languages can be distinguished from logophoric pronouns in African languages — mainly due to their wider distribution than
logophoric pronouns, which are limited to the reportive contexts — the notion of logophoricity has been adopted and extended to account for long-distance reflexives in a
numbder of languages (e.g., Maling 1984, Kameyama 1985, Sells 1987). Based on the properties of the long-distance reflexives in Icelandic, Italian, and Japanese, as wells as logophoric pronouns in some African languages, Sells (1987) defines the notion of logophoricity with three primitive notions, as shown in (3). Under his analysis, when an element
such as a logophoric pronoun or long-distance reflexive is sensitive to logophoricity, the
referent of that element should be understood as at least one of these three notions. Sells’
notion of logophoricity can be adopted for a much wider range of elements, because it is
not restricted to the reportive contexts.

(3)

source: one who is the intentional agent of the communication
self: one whose mental state or attitude the content of the proposition describes
pivot: one with respect to whose (space-time) location the content of the proposition is evaluated

(Sells 1987, p.457)

Sells proposes that the first two primitive notions of logophoricity are specified by certain embedding verbs. In other words, verbs of communication specify their subject as a
source, while psychological verbs can only represent a self role. Contrary to the source
and self, the pivot role is not specified by certain types of embedding predicates, but
instead may arise constructionally under particular interpretations or situations. To illustrate each of these primitive notions of logophoricity, let us consider the following three
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examples of the long-distance reflexive zibun in Japanese from Sells (1987).

(4)

a.

source
Takasii -wa Taroo-ni [Yosiko-ga zibuni -o nikundeiru koto]-o hanasita.
Takasi-top Taroo-dat [Yosiko-nom self-acc be-hating C]-acc told
‘Takasii told Taroo that Yosiko hated himi .’

b.

self
[Yosiko-ga zibuni -o nikundeiru koto]-ga Mitikoi -o zetuboo
e
[Yosiko-nom self-acc be-hating C]-Nom Mitiko-acc desperation to
oiyatta.
drove
‘That Yosiko hated heri drove Mitikoi to desperation.’

c.

pivot
Takasii -wa [Yosiko-ga zibuni -o tazunete-kita node] uresigatta.
Takasi-top [Yosiko-nom self-acc visit-came because] happy
‘Takasii was happy because Yosiko came to visit himi .’

In (4a), zibun occurs in the complement clause of the communication verb ‘tell’ and is
coreferential with the matrix subject, which bears the source role given the lexical property of the embedding verb. In (4b), zibun in the subject clause can co-refer with the
matrix object Mitiko, who is specified as the one whose mental state is represented in
the sentence (i.e., self) by the psychological predicate.1 In (4c), zibun appearing in the
because-clause can co-refer with the matrix subject because it can easily be understood
as a pivot, the one whose point of view is taken by the external speaker, owing to the
motion verb ‘come’ in the because-clause.
Sells argues that there is an implicational or hierarchical relationship between these
three roles, that is, source > self > pivot. If an individual can be understood as a source,
it is implicated that that individual also satisfies the self and pivot roles. On the other
Strictly speaking, the matrix subject of certain attitude verbs such as believe, think, etc. bears the
self role instead of the source role. However, these attitude verbs behave more similar to the verbs of
communication than to psych-verbs in that they specify their subject instead of object as a self. Sells (1987)
does not discuss the difference between attitude verbs and psych-verbs in representing the self role.
1
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hand, even though an individual can satisfy a pivot role in a sentence, it is not guaranteed
that that individual can also be understood as a source or self.
These logophoric roles also play an important role in explaining cross-linguistic
variation. Sells claims that the requirement of these logophoric roles for logophoric elements may vary across languages. For instance, only those referents that bear the source
role can be qualified as an antecedent of logophoric elements in some languages (e.g., Icelandic; Maling 1984), whereas in other languages an individual can serve as an antecedent
of a logophoric element if it can be understood as a pivot (e.g., Japanese).2
The term "logophor" has also been used for anaphors that are exempt from Condition A of the binding theory (Chomsky 1981). It has been well-known that anaphors
in English can be exempt from syntactic constraints on binding in certain environments,
such as picture-noun reflexives (Postal 1971, Kuno 1972b, Zribi-Hertz 1989, Pollard and
Sag 1992, Reinhart and Reuland 1993, a.o.). For instance, even though the reflexives myself and herself in (5) do not have an antecedent in the local domain that can properly bind
them, the sentences in (5) have been reported to be grammatical.

Exempt anaphors in English

(5)

a.

A picture of myself would be nice on that wall.

b.

Lucie thought that a picture of herself would be nice on that wall.

c.

The queen demands that books containing unflattering descriptions of herself
will be burned.

(Reinhart and Reuland 1993, p.682)

Pollard and Sag (1992) argue that such exempt anaphors often find an "individual whose
viewpoint or perspective is somehow being represented" (Pollard and Sag 1992, p.274) as
their antecedents, which resembles the notion of logophoricity. In a series of work (Reinhart and Reuland 1991, 1993), Reinhart and Reuland also distinguish "logophors" from
Given the hierarchy between the logophoric notions, the long-distance reflexive zibun in Japanese can
thus refer to any individual who bears a source, self, or pivot role.
2
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anaphors in that the former is not governed by Condition A but discourse-oriented. Under their account, an anaphor can be used as a logophor only when it is not subject to
the grammatical constraints, such as the c-command relationship and locality condition.
Although there may be additional conditions in order for anaphors in English-type languages to be exempt from Condition A, Charnavel and Zlogar (2016) show that the notion
of logophoricity is a necessary condition for exemption from Condition A.

6.2.2

Logophors and awareness

One of the common properties of logophoric elements that have been noted in the literature is that a logophoric element can be used only in a situation in which the referent of
its antecedent is aware of the content of the clause that contains the logophoric element,
the so-called "awareness condition" (Kuno 1972b, Abe 1997, Huang and Liu 2001, a.o.).
We have seen that this observation is closely related to the de se interpretation of these
elements.
It should be familiar by now that long-distance reflexives like caki in Korean, ziji in
Chinese, and zibun in Japanese are subject to the awareness condition within the scope
of attitude verbs: that is, they receive a de se interpretation. What is more controversial
is whether such a logophoric element needs to satisfy the awareness condition when occurring in non-attitude environments as well. Kuno (1972b) examines the LD reflexive
zibun in Japanese in various positions, both in attitude and non-attitude environments,
and proposes that zibun must satisfy the awareness condition regardless of the type of
environments in which it appears. For example, zibun appearing in an adverbial clause—a
non-attitude environment—can find the matrix subject as its long-distance antecedent in
(6). Kuno argues that the sentence like (6a) must also be derived from a direct discourse
by John using the first person pronoun, as in (6b).
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(6)

a.

Johni -wa [Mary-ga zibuni -o mita toki]-wa byooki datta.
John-top Mary-nom self-acc saw when-top sick was
‘Johni was sick when Mary saw himi .’

b.

John: "Boku-wa [Mary-ga boku-o mita toki]-wa byooki datta."
I-top
Mary-nom I-acc saw when-top sick was
‘I was sick when Mary saw me.’
(Kuno 1972b, p.181)

According to Kuno, the following sentences with zibun in an adverbial or relative clause
are ungrammatical “because the referent of the matrix sentence could not have been aware
of the action or state represented by the constituent sentences involving zibun" (Kuno
1972b, p.183).

(7)

a. *Johni -wa [zibuni -ga sissinsita toki] boku-no oyazi-no byooin-ni
John-top self-nom fainted when I-gen father-gen hospital-to
katugi-komaremasita.
was-taken
‘Johni was taken to my father’s hospital when (he was aware that) hei fainted.’
b. *Johni -wa [[zibuni -o korosita] otoko]-to izen boku-no ie-de
atta
John-nom self-acc killed
man-with before I-gen house-in met
koto-ga-aru.
had
‘Johni had met before in my house the man who (he was aware) killed himi .’
c. *Johni -wa [zibuni -ga yopparatta toki dake] watakusi-ni yasasiku narimasu.
John-top self-nom drunk-is when only I-to
kindly become
‘Johni becomes tender to me only when (he is aware that) hei gets drunk.’
(Kuno 1972b, p.183)

Similarly, Huang and Liu (2001) also propose that logophoric binding of ziji is subject to the ‘awareness/consciousness condition’ in Chinese. According to them, while
ziji occurring in an adjunct clause co-refers with the subject of the main clause in both
sentences in (8), only the sentence in (8b) is degraded. They argue that the sentence in
(8a) involves a legitimate logophoric binding of ziji, since the antecedent Zhangsan can
be characterized as a logophoric center (i.e., pivot) and he is aware of the content of
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the because-clause containing ziji. In (8b), on the other hand, since nothing implies that
Zhangsan is aware of the event stated in the adjunct clause, the awareness condition is
not satisfied.

(8)

a.

Yinwei Lisi piping zijii , suoyi Zhangsani hen shengqi.
Because Lisi criticize self so
Zhangsan very angry
‘Because Lisi criticized himi , Zhangsani was very angry.’

b.

??(Dang) Lisi piping zijii de shihou, Zhangsani zheng zai kan shu.
(at)
Lisi criticize self DE moment Zhangsan right at read book
‘At the moment Lisi was criticizing himi , Zhangsani was reading.’
(Huang and Liu 2001)

However, Kuroda (1973) presents evidence against Kuno’s (1972) claim that zibun
requires an antecedent who is aware of the content of the clause that contains zibun.
According to Kuroda, the example in (9), in which zibun occurs in a relative clause, is
felicitous even under the situation where Oedipus does not know that Jocasta bore him
in that house.

(9)

Oedipusi -wa [Jocasta-ga zibuni -o unda] ie-de
ima-wa kodomotati-to
Oedipus-top [Jocasta-nom self-acc bore] house-loc now-top children-with
koohuku-soo-ni kurasite-imasu.
happily
living-is
‘Oedipusi now lives happily with his children in the house where Jocasta bore himi .’
(Kuroda 1973)

Similarly, Pollard and Xue (2001) also present an example that shows that ziji in a relative
clause is not subject to the awareness condition in Chinese. As shown in (10), ziji can still
refer to the matrix subject Zhangsan in a context like ‘S2’, where the matrix subject is not
aware of the existence of the guy who saved him.

(10)

S1: Zhangsan can identify Fred, the man who saved his life by "That man saved
my life!"

191

S2: Zhangsan is trapped in a burning building and faints. When he wakes up, he
is safely outside. He thinks he was lucky, but in fact was saved by a passerby.
Zhangsani zai mei you jian-guo jiu-le
zijii ming de na-ge ren
Zhangsan again not have see-perf save-perf self life DE that-cl person
‘Zhangsani didn’t see again the personj who saved hisi life.’ (!S1, !S2)
(Pollard and Xue 2001)

Note that, both in (9) and (10), Oedipus or Zhangsan is not the one whose speech or
mental attitude is reported, thus neither a source nor a self. Rather, they (Oedipus in
(9) and Zhangsan in (10)) can be understood as the one from whose point of view the
sentence is uttered, that is, a pivot. Based upon this observation, Sells (1987) argues that
the awareness condition is not required when zibun finds a pivot antecedent, since the
speaker can "report things of which some person is presently unaware from that person’s
own point of view" (Sells 1987, p.471).
What we have seen so far can be summarized as follows: First, the antecedent of a
logophoric element in non-attitude environments can only be understood as a pivot (but
not source or self). Second, the awareness condition can be violated in cases where a
logophoric element finds a pivot antecedent in non-attitude environments.

6.2.3

Logophoricity vs. empathy

We have seen that pivot denotes the one from whose point of view or (spatio-temporal)
location the report is made (Sells 1987). Sells notes that pivot is similar to the notion
of "empathy" proposed by Kuno and Kaburaki (1977). According to Kuno and Kaburaki,
"empathy" is associated with a person who the speaker places himself/herself closer to or
takes angles from when describing an event under discussion. The notion of empathy is
defined below.
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(11)

Empathy
Empathy is the speaker’s identification, with varying degrees (ranging from degree 0 to 1), with a person who participates in the event that he describes in a
sentence.

(Kuno and Kaburaki 1977, p.628)

Kuno and Kaburaki (1977) show that the notion of empathy can effectively capture
the difference between two giving verbs in Japanese, yaru and kureru. While both yatta
and kureta in (12) mean ‘give-pst’, the two sentences in (12) differ with respect to whose
perspective or point of view is taken. In other words, the verb yatta is used when the
sentence is reported from the subject’s point of view, whereas another giving verb kureta
is used when the speaker takes the perspective of the dative object to describe the event.

(12)

Two giving verbs yaru and kureru in Japanese
a.

Taroo-wa Hanako-ni okane-o
yatta.
Taroo-top Hanako-to money-acc gave
‘Taroo gave money to Hanako.’

b.

Taroo-wa Hanako-ni okane-o
kureta.
(Dative-Centered)
Taroo-top Hanako-to money-acc gave
‘Taroo gave money to Hanako.’
(Kuno and Kaburaki 1977, p.630)

(Subject-Centered)

Given this contrast, Kuno and Kaburaki (1977) further propose that the long-distance reflexive zibun in Japanese must co-refer with an empathy locus – a referent who the speaker
empathizes most with. For example, the (un)grammaticality of the sentences in (13) can
be explained with respect to empathy. That is, the verb kureta in (13a) ensures that the
speaker is taking the perspective of the subject (thus, Taroo is the empathy locus), and
the reflexive zibun is coreferent with the empathy locus. On the other hand, zibun is not
coreferent with the empathy locus in (13b): Hanako is the empathy locus given the use of
the verb yatta, but zibun co-refers with Taroo instead of Hanako.
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(13)

a.

Tarooi -wa [Hanako-ga zibuni -ni kasite kureta] okane-o
tukatte
Taroo-top Hanako-nom self-to
lending gave
money-acc spending
simatta.
ended-up
‘Tarooi has spent all the money that Hanako had lent to himi .’

b. *Tarooi -wa [Hanako-ga zibuni -ni kasite yatta] okane-o tukatte simatta.
(Kuno and Kaburaki 1977, p.635)

Similarly, deictic motion verbs (e.g., come vs. go) also indicate whose point of view
is represented in the sentence (Kuno and Kaburaki 1977, Kuno 1987, Sells 1987, a.o.). The
examples in (14) illustrate the contrast between the embedded verbs ‘come’ and ‘go’ in
the same because-clause. Sells (1987) argues that the antecedent of zibun in an adjunct
clause should be understood as the one whose point of view is represented. He explains
that (14b) is ungrammatical because it is difficult to understand the matrix subject Takasi
as the one whose perspective is taken due to the motion verb ‘go’ in the adjunct clause.

(14)

‘Come’ vs. ‘Go’
a.

Takasii -wa [Yosiko-ga zibuni -o tazunete-kita node] uresigatta.
Takasi-top [Yosiko-nom self-acc visit-came because] happy
‘Takasii was happy because Yosiko came to visit himi .’

b.

*Takasii -wa [Yosiko-ga zibuni -o tazunete-itta node] uresigatta.
Takasi-top [Yosiko-nom self-acc visit-went because] happy
‘Takasii was happy because Yosiko went to visit himi .’ (Sells 1987, p.465)

Moreover, an empathy locus is usually understood as a deictic center as well (Culy
1997, Sells 1987, Oshima 2007). For example, when a spatial preposition (e.g., ‘to the right
(of)’, ‘in front (of)’, etc.) co-occurs with zibun in a sentence, that expression is interpreted from the perspective of the referent of zibun, since the use of zibun denotes that
the speaker empathizes with the referent of zibun. This is illustrated in (15).
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(15)

a.

Taroi -wa {karei -no/φ} migigawa-no otoko-to hanasi-ta.
Taro-top he-gen/φ right-gen
man-with speak-pst
‘Taro spoke to the man to his right (from Taro’s perspective).’
‘Taro spoke to the man to the right of him (from the speaker’s perspective).’

b.

Taroi -wa zibuni -no migigawa-no otoko-to hanasi-ta.
Taro-top self-gen right-gen
man-with speak-pst
‘Taro spoke to the man to his right (from Taro’s perspective).’
??‘Taro spoke to the man to the right of him (from the speaker’s perspective).’
(Oshima 2007)

The contrast between (15a) and (15b) shows that the spatial expression must be interpreted
from the perspective of the empathy locus when there is an empathy-sensitive element
(e.g., zibun), while it can also be interpreted from the speaker’s point of view with an
empathy-neutral element (e.g., ‘he’).
Although there are some expressions like giving verbs in Japanese and motion verbs
that relatively clearly indicate who the speaker empathizes with or whose point of view
the speaker takes in describing an event, it is not always straightforward to detect who the
perspective holder or empathy locus is in a sentence. For example, Sells (1987) (following
Kuroda (1965)’s judgment) observes the contrast between a because- and when-clause in
(16): only the former can contain the LD reflexive that co-refers with an argument in the
main clause. Sells, following Iida and Sells (1988), argues that zibun in the because-clause
in (16a) can find the matrix subject as its antecedent, because “the use of node ‘because’
(but not toki ‘when’) implicates the external speaker and thereby allows that speaker to
take the point of view of the matrix subject" (Sells 1987, p.466). That is, Takasi in (16a)
can easily be understood as a pivot or an empathy locus.

(16)

a.

Takasii -wa [Yosiko-ga mizu-o
zibuni -no ue-ni kobosita node]
Takasi-top [Yosiko-nom water-acc self-gen on-loc spilled because]
nurete-simatta.
wet-got
‘Takasii got wet because Yosiko spilled water on himi .’
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b. *Takasii -wa [Yosiko-ga mizu-o
zibuni -no ue-ni kobosita toki]
Takasi-top [Yosiko-nom water-acc self-gen on-loc spilled when]
nurete-simatta.
wet-got
‘Takasii got wet when Yosiko spilled water on himi .’
(Sells 1987, p.455)

However, the contrast seen in (16) cannot merely be reduced to the type of adjunct clauses,
since zibun can occur in a when-clause in some cases. Nishigauchi (2014) points out that
the sentence with zibun in the when-clause gets improved when an evidential auxiliary
soo ‘be likely’ is used in the adjunct clause, as shown below.

(17)

Mari-ga zibuni -ni mizu-o
kake soo-ni nar-ta
toki, Takasii -wa
Mari-nom self-dat water-acc pour likely become-pst when, Takasi-top
subayaku nige-ta.
quickly evade-pst
Lit. ‘When Mari was about to pour water on self, Takashi quickly stepped aside.’
(Nishigauchi 2014, p.164)

This shows that LD reflexive binding can be affected by a number of different elements
and situations with respect to perspective or point of view. That is why there is a wide
variation in acceptability judgments of sentences in which LD reflexives find a pivot or
empathy locus as its antecedent.
One issue regarding pivot or empathy is whether it can be understood as one aspect
of logophoricity (e.g., Sells 1987, Huang and Liu 2001, Charnavel and Zlogar 2016) or as an
a distinct notion (e.g., Culy 1994, 1997, Oshima 2004, 2007). This issue is closely related to
how we treat LD reflexives like zibun in Japanese and caki in Korean. For instance, Oshima
(2004) argues that a dichotomic analysis of these reflexives (e.g., anaphoric vs. logophoric,
local vs. long-distance) is not sufficient (contra Abe 1997, Kameyama 1985), based on the
assumption that the notion of logophoricity and empathy need to be distinct. Instead,
he proposes that the LD reflexive zibun in Japanese can be used in three different ways:
anaphoric, empathic, and logophoric. On the other hand, based on Sells’ (1987) notion of
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logophoricity, Charnavel and Zlogar (2016) divide pivot, as a logophoric notion, into two
separate logpophoric centers: ‘empathy locus’ and ‘deictic center’.3
In the remainder of this chapter, following Sells (1987), we will treat pivot or empathy cases as logophoric and provide a unified account of logophoric binding. Moreover,
we will also take into account the difference between the two types of environments of LD
anaphors—attitude (a source or self antecedent) and non-attitude (a pivot antecedent).

6.3

The long-distance reflexive caki and logophoricity

In the previous sections, we have seen that long-distance reflexives in many languages
refer to an individual who can be understood as a logophoric center (e.g., source, self,
pivot). According to the notion of logophoricity, all the cases of the LD reflexive caki
in attitude environments shown in the previous chapters are where caki, as a logophoric
element, finds a source or self antecedent. Like the LD reflexives in other languages,
such as Chinese ziji and Japanese zibun, caki can not only occur in attitude environments,
but also occur in non-attitude environments in which caki finds a pivot antecedent. This
section examines the logophoric properties of the LD reflexive caki in both attitude (e.g.,
complements of attitude verbs) and non-attitude environments, such as relative clauses
and adjunct clauses.

6.3.1

LD caki in attitude environments

6.3.1.1 Source or self antecedents
When LD caki appears in attitude environments, it always finds a logophoric center as its
antecedent who can be understood as the one whose speech or thought is represented in
a sentence (source or self). Since a subject of an attitude verb can always be understood
as a source or self, they are always qualified as an antecedent of LD caki. As we saw
3

In addition, Charnavel and Zlogar (2016) combine Sells’ source and self as ‘attitude holder’.
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before, LD caki can also find a non-subject LD antecedent only when it is a logophoric
center.4

(18)

Source or self antecedents
a.

Johni -un [Billj -i [Mary-ka cakii/j -lul cohahanta-ko] malhayssta-ko]
John-top Bill-nom Mary-nom self-acc like-comp
said-comp
sayngkakhanta.
think
‘Johni thinks that Billj said that Mary liked himi/j .’

As we saw before, LD caki under the multiple attitude verbs can find any subject as its
antecedent in (18). When caki refers to Bill, Bill must be understood as the speaker of the
most embedded clause containing the reflexive. On the other hand, when caki refers to the
subject of the matrix verb ‘think’, the content of the clause containing caki is representing
John’s thought.5 Therefore, the antecedent of the reflexive in this case is understood as
the self.6

6.3.1.2

Awareness condition

As we discussed in detail in the previous chapters, another property of LD caki in attitude
environments is that it must receive a de se interpretation. Therefore, LD caki can only be
used when the attitude holder’s direct speech or thought contains the first person pronoun
to refer to herself: Bill said ‘Mary likes me’, or John thought ‘Bill said that Mary liked me’
in (18). By contrast, I will show in the next subsection that LD caki in a non-attitude
environment behaves quite differently, although it still requires a logophoric center as its
antecedent.
Japanese zibun behaves like Korean caki, while Chinese ziji is strictly subject oriented. Therefore, even
though a non-subject element can be understood as a logophoric center, it cannot serve as an antecedent of
ziji in Chinese.
5
In this actual world, it could be that what Bill said was not Mary likes John, but Mary likes Jack.
6
Given the hierarchical relationship between the notion of logophoricity that Sells proposed, an element
that is a source or self can also be understood as a pivot. Therefore, if a (spatio-temporal) perspective
sensitive element co-occurs with the LD reflexive, it must be interpreted relative to the antecedent of the
reflexive.
4
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6.3.2

LD caki in non-attitude environments

This subsection discusses non-attitude environments of caki in which caki can take a longdistance antecedent. First, we have seen in Chapter 5 that LD caki can appear in relative
clauses and co-refer with the matrix subject. Another possible non-attitude environment
for LD caki is adjunct clauses. It has been reported in the literature that the LD reflexives
in a number of languages (e.g., Chinese, Icelandic, Italian, Japanese, etc.) can also occur
in adjunct clauses (Kuno 1972b, Sells 1987, Maling 1990, Abe 1997, Huang and Liu 2001,
Giorgi 2006, Nishigauchi 2014, a.o.).
LD caki can also appear in adjunct clauses, such as if, because, when-clauses, etc.
and find its long-distance antecedent from the main clause, as illustrated in (19).

(19)

a.

If -clause
John-i
cakii -lul tto piphanha-myen, Maryi -nun teisang kaman.issci
John-nom self-acc again criticize-if
Mary-top anymore stand
anh-ulkesi-ta.
not-fut-decl
Lit. ‘ If John criticizes selfi again, Maryi won’t stand it anymore.’

b.

Because-clause
John-i
cakii -lul piphanhay-se, Maryi -to ku-lul piphanhayssta.
John-nom self-acc criticize-because Mary-also he-acc criticized
Lit. ‘ Because John criticized selfi , Maryi also criticized him.’

c.

When-clause
John-i
cakii -lul piphanhal-ttay, Maryi -nun ku-lul
John-nom self-acc criticize-when Mary-top he-acc
chingchanhako-iss-ess-ta.
praise-prog-pst-decl
Lit. ‘ When John criticized selfi , Maryi was praising him.’

In this subsection, I will show that caki in the (gapless) relative clauses or adjunct clauses
finds a pivot or empathy locus as its antecedent. We will also see that the awareness
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condition is not necessary for LD caki binding in non-attitude environments. Lastly, it
will be shown that the behavior of LD caki in adjunct clauses is not identical to those in
(gapless) relative clauses within the scope of attitude verbs. In contrast to the latter types
of clauses, caki in an adjunct clause needs to receive a de se reading when the adjunct
clause is embedded under an attitude verb.

6.3.2.1 Pivot antecedents
It is not as straightforward as in the attitude environments to characterize the antecedents
of LD caki as a logophoric center in non-attitude environments like relative and adjunct
clauses. I will show that LD caki in relative and adjunct clauses also need to find a logophoric center as its antecedent in Korean (Sells 1987, Huang and Liu 2001, Pollard and
Xue 2001). In particular, we will see that caki in non-attitude environments must find a
pivot antecedent.
Let us first consider cases in which LD caki appears in the relative clauses. In the
example (1) in Chapter 5, repeated below as (20), the referent of caki, John, cannot be understood as a source or self, since the sentence does not represent any speech, attitudes
or feelings of John.

(20)

Johni -i
[cakii -lul piphanha-n] salam-ul mannassta.
John-nom self-acc criticized-adn person-acc met
‘Johni met the person who criticized himi .’

On the other hand, the antecedent of caki in (20) can still be understood as the one who
the speaker empathizes with or takes a perspective from in describing the event. This
can be shown rather clearly with an expression that denotes a spatial perspective, as we
saw in (15). Consider the following Korean examples with a directional expression. The
contrast between the third person pronoun and LD caki with the same relative directional
phrase is clear, as shown in (21).
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(21)

a.

Johni -i
[kui -uy olunccok-ey iss-nun] salam]-kwa akswuhayssta.
John-nom he-gen right-at
be-adn person-with shook.hands
‘Johni shook hands with the person who was on hisi right side (from John’s
perspective).’
‘Johni shook hands with the person who was on hisi right side (from the
speaker’s perspective).’

b.

Johni -i
[cakii -uy olunccok-ey iss-un] salam]-kwa akswuhayssta.
John-nom self-gen right-at
be-adn person-with shook.hands
‘Johni shook hands with the person who was on hisi right side (from John’s
perspective).’
*‘Johni shook hands with the person who was on hisi right side (from the
speaker’s perspective).’

Similar to the Japanese examples in (15), the sentence with caki, as in (21b), only allows
the directional expression to be interpreted from the perspective of the referent of caki
instead of the speaker of the utterance, which indicates that the antecedent of caki is the
one whose point of view or spatial perspective is taken by the speaker to describe the
event, i.e., pivot. Given this, we will assume that long-distance caki in a relative clause
must be co-referent with a logophoric center.
Next, let us turn to the adjunct clauses as another non-attitude environment of LD
caki. Based on Sells (1987), we can provide at least two pieces of evidence in support of the
pivot antecedents for LD caki in the adjunct clauses. First, LD caki in an adjunct clause
can easily find a LD antecedent when the referent of its antecedent is understood as the
one whose point of view is represented in the sentence. The contrast derived from the
deictic motion verbs ‘come’ and ‘go’ seen in (14) can be found in Korean too.7
As Sells (1987) notes, the coreference reading of John and LD caki in (22b) can be acceptable under a
certain context in which John can still be understood as the deictic locus. For instance, the sentence in (22b)
can be acceptable under a situation where John is out of town and Mary went to John’s town to see him.
Without such a supporting context, however, there is a clear contrast between (22a) and (22b).
7
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(22)

a.

Johni -un [Mary-ka cakii -lul pole wa-se]
kippessta.
John-top Mary-nom self-acc to.see come-because happy
‘Johni was happy because Mary came to see himi .’

b.

??Johni -un [Mary-ka cakii -lul pole ka-se]
kippessta.
John-top Mary-nom self-acc to.see go-because happy
?? ‘Johni was happy because Mary went to see himi .’

Another diagnostic for the pivot provided in Sells (1987) involves an expressive
term like ‘beloved.’ That is, an expression like ‘beloved X’ in a sentence is interpreted from
the perspective of the logophoric center. Given the fact that the expression salanghanun
‘beloved’ in the example (23) is interpreted relative to John (that is, John’s beloved Mary,
instead of the speaker’s beloved Mary), John can be understood as a pivot and serve as
an antecedent of LD caki in the ‘because’-clause.

(23)

Johni -un [salanghanun Mary-ka cakii -eykey phyenci-lul cwe-se]
John-top beloved
Mary-nom self-dat
letter-acc gave-because
kippessta.
was.happy
Lit. ‘Johni was happy because the beloved Mary gave a letter to himi .’
a.

‘Johni was happy because hisi beloved Mary gave a letter to himi .’

b. *‘Johni was happy because myi beloved Mary gave a letter to himi .’

The main goal of this subsection was to show that the notion of logophoricity is necessary
for LD caki appearing in the non-attitude environments as well. We have seen that LD
caki in the relative and adjunct clauses requires a logophoric center (in particular, a pivot)
as its long-distance antecedent.

6.3.2.2

No awareness condition

In this subsection, I will show that LD caki in the non-attitude environment does not
have to satisfy the awareness condition, contrary to LD caki in the attitude environment.
First, we have already seen that LD caki in the relative clauses can be used when the
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antecedent of caki is not aware of the content of the clause in which caki occurs. The
illustrative example is repeated below as (24).

(24)

S1: John met a person who he identifies as “That person criticized me!"
S2: John met Tom. Unbeknownst to John, Tom is the person who criticized John.
Johni -i
[cakii -lul piphanha-n] salam-ul mannassta.
John-nom self-acc criticized-adn person-acc met
‘Johni met the person who criticized himi .’ (!S1, !S2)

In some prior work, it has been argued that the awareness condition holds for LD
caki appearing in the adjunct clauses in Korean (e.g., Lee 1973). According to Lee (1973),
(25a) is degraded compared to (25b), since the antecedent of caki cannot be understood as
a sentient subject.

(25)

a. ?*Honswusangthay-ey ppaci-n Chelswui -nun [Yenghuy-ka cakii -lul
coma-at
fall.in-Rel Chelswu-top Yenghuy-nom self-acc
cikhyepo-nun kawuntey] swumciessta.
watch
while
died
‘Chelswui , who fell in a coma, died while Yenghuy was watching himi .’
b.

Wiphwungtangtangha-n Chelswui -nun [Yenghuy-ka cakii -lul
stately.looking-Rel
Chelswu-top Yenghuy-nom self-acc
cikhyepo-nun kawuntey] swumciessta.
watch
while
died
‘Chelswui , who looks stately, died while Yenghuy was watching himi .’
(Lee 1973)

However, the contrast seen in (25) is not so clear to many Korean speakers, and (25a) is
equally acceptable as (25b) to the native speakers of Korean I consulted including myself.
Although the matrix subject may not be conscious in (25a), the speaker of the utterance
can still take his perspective to report the situation.
We can further provide evidence against the awareness condition for LD caki in the
adjunct clauses. The sentence in (27) is a corresponding Korean example of the Chinese
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example in (8b), repeated below as (26), except that the awareness condition is explicitly
violated by the adverb ‘without knowing anything’ in the main clause. Huang and Liu
(2001) argue that (26) is degraded because the two concurrent events do not implicate any
possible awareness of Zhangsan toward the event of Lisi criticizing him. Note that caki in
the when-clause in (27) can still refer to John, while it is clearly expressed that John was
not aware of the event of Mary criticizing him.

(26) ??(Dang) Lisi piping zijii de shihou, Zhangsani zheng zai kan shu.
(at) Lisi criticize self DE moment Zhangsan right at read book
‘At the moment Lisi was criticizing himi , Zhangsani was reading.’
(Huang and Liu 2001)
(27)

Mary-ka cakii -lul piphanhal-ttay, Johni -un amwu-kesto moluko
Mary-nom self-acc criticize-when John-top anything
not.know
cako-iss-ess-ta.
sleep-prog-pst-decl
Lit. ‘When Mary was criticizing selfi , Johni was sleeping without knowing anything.’

In fact, Huang and Liu (2001) also note that (26) is acceptable for some speakers in Chinese as well. That is, some speakers can take the perspective of Zhangsan or empathizes
with him with the same sentence. This shows that speakers vary in how much they can
empathize with a protagonist in a sentence, especially when there is no other expressions
related to perspective or point of view or a relavant context. When the awareness condition is satisfied, the protagonist who is aware of or conscious about the described event
can always easily be understood as a pivot or empathy locus, and thus can be more easily
acceptable as an antecedent of the LD reflexives. However, that does not mean that the
speaker can never take a point of view of an internal protagonist who is not aware of
the relevant event, although it may not be as easy or obvious as the cases in which the
awareness condition is satisfied.
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6.3.2.3

Adjunct clauses under attitude verbs

Recall that caki in the (gapless) relative clauses does not have to be interpreted de se even
when embedded under an attitude predicate. By contrast, caki in an adjunct clause must
receive a de se interpretation when the adjunct clause is embedded under an attitude verb.
In (28), without the presence of the attitude verb, caki inside the if-clause can refer to the
matrix subject John regardless of whether John is aware of the event of Mary inviting him.
In other words, the sentence in (28) is felicitous when John does not know what makes
him able to go to the party. On the other hand, when the if-clause is embedded under
an attitude verb and caki in the if-clause co-refers with the matrix subject, caki must be
interpreted de se, as illustrated in (29).

(28)

Mary-ka caki1 -lul chotayhaci anhumyen, John1 -un phathi-ey kaci moshal
Mary-nom self-acc invite
not.if
John-top party-to go cannot
kesi-ta.
will-decl
Lit. ‘If Mary doesn’t invite self1 , John1 won’t be able to go to the party.’

(29)

S1: John says, "I won’t be able to go to the party unless Mary invites me."
S2: John says, "I won’t be able to go to the party unless Mary invites that guy."
(Unbeknownst to him, that guy is John himself.)
John1 -un [Mary-ka caki1 -lul chotayhaci anhumyen, pro1 phathi-ey kaci
pro party-to go
John-top Mary-nom self-acc invite
not.if
moshal kesi-la]-ko
malhayssta.
cannot will-decl-comp said
Lit. ‘John1 said that he1 won’t be able to go to the party unless Mary invites self1 .’
(!S1, #S2)

In fact, the adjunct case is not different from the relative clause cases in that LD caki can
never be interpreted (non-de se) de re under attitude verbs. The only difference between
the adjunct and relative cases is that the predicate of the if-clause containing caki can only
be understood as part of the de dicto attitudes of the antecedent of LD caki, contrary to
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the relative clause. Therefore, the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki in the adjunct
clause also falls under our generalization proposed in Chapter 5, namely, ‘Obligatory de
se under de dicto’.
There is another important finding about the interpretation of LD anaphors in an
adjunct clause embedded under an attitude verb, which was originally observed by Pollard
and Xue (1998) for Chinese ziji.8 That is, LD caki prefers a source antecedent over a pivot
one whenever there is more than one logophoric center in a sentence. In (30a), caki can corefer with Tom when the speaker takes Tom’s perspective to report the sentence. When
the sentence in (30a) is embedded under an attitude verb, as in (30b), there is now more
than one logophoric center in the sentence: the matrix subject John as a source or Tom
as a pivot. The reading of (30b) that is immediately possible is the coreference reading
between John, as a source, and caki. Even though it is not entirely impossible for caki
to co-refer with Tom (a pivot antecedent) under a particular context, it is significantly
less preferred than the reading where caki finds a source antecedent. Moreover, LD caki
receives an unambiguous de se reading when it co-refers with the matrix subject in (30b).

(30)

a.

Mary-ka cakii -lul piphanha-myen, Tomi -un kaci-anh-ulkes-ita.
Mary-nom self-acc criticize-if,
Tom-top go-neg-fut-decl
‘If Mary criticizes himi , Tomi won’t go.’

b.

John-un [Mary-ka caki-lul piphanha-myen Tom-i
John-top Mary-nom self-acc criticize-if
Tom-nom

8

The original Chinese example presented in Pollard and Xue (1998) is provided below. Although they
mark the co-indexing between Wangwu and ziji as ungrammatical, they note in their footnote 22 that it can
be acceptable for some speakers if "the speaker makes a deliberate effort to take the point of view of the
intermediate subject Wangwu." Instead of focusing on the logophoric roles of the matrix and intermediate
subjects, Pollard and Xue (1998) provide a syntactic account.
(i)

Zhangsani shuo [[ruguo Lisij piping zijii/j/∗k [Wangwuk jiu bu hui qu]]].
Zhangsan say
if
Lisi criticize self
Wangwu then not will go
‘Zhangsani says that if Lisij criticizes himi/∗k /himselfj Wangwuk won’t go.’
(Pollard and Xue 1998, p.306)
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kaci-anh-ulkes-ila]-ko malhayssta.
go-neg-fut-decl-comp said
‘Johnj said that if Mary criticizes himj/?i Tomi won’t go.’9

The preference for the source antecedent in (30) supports Sells’ claim that there is a
hierarchical implication between the three primitive notions of logophoricity: source >
self > pivot. Given that it is also possible for LD caki to find a pivot under a specific
context, the preference may not be due to a grammatical reason.
Our observations on LD caki provided so far are: (i) it must find a logophoric center
as its antecedent (source or self in the attitude environments and pivot in the nonattitude environments), (ii) LD caki must receive a de se interpretation once it appears in
(or directly under) an attitude environment and the predicate of the clause containing it
is part of a de dicto attitude of the antecedent of caki, (iii) a source or self antecedent
is preferred over a pivot antecedent, and (iv) determining a pivot antecedent largely
depends on other perspective-sensitive expressions in the sentence or the context.

6.3.3

Logophoricity and the (non-)de se interpretation of caki

This subsection focuses on the correlation between the type of logophoric center and
the (non-)de se interpretation of LD caki. In particular, I will show that LD caki must
receive a de se interpretation when it finds a source or self antecedent, while it gets a
non-de se reading when its antecedent is a pivot. Since the discussion of a (non-)de se
interpretation is only relevant with the existence of attitude environments, let us now
confine our attention to the attitude environments.
In Chapter 5, we have seen that LD caki does not have to be interpreted de se in the
attitude environments when it directly appears in a relative clause. Relative clauses are
the sole exceptional environment in which LD caki can be exempt from the obligatory
de se interpretation under the attitude environments. We also provided the interesting
9

The local subject Mary can also serve as an antecedent of caki.
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generalizations of the relationship between de se and de dicto in (25) in Chapter 5, which
are repeated below as (31).

(31)

Generalizations of the relationship between de se and de dicto
a.

Generalization I: Obligatory de se under de dicto
The LD reflexive caki must be construed de se when the predicate in the same
clause is read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.

b.

Generalization II: Obligatory non-de se under non-de dicto
The LD reflexive caki must be construed non-de se when the predicate in the
same clause is not read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.

For example, LD caki in the relative clause in (32) can receive a de se or non-de se interpretation. It must be interpreted de se when the predicate ‘criticize’ is contained in John’s
belief (de dicto). On the other hand, LD caki must receive a non-de se reading when the
description with the relative clause is chosen by the speaker given the actual world (de
re).

(32)

(de se)

S1: John thinks, "Mary likes the person who criticized me."

S2: John saw Mary talking with Tom and thought: "Mary likes Tom." Unbeknownst to John, Tom criticized John a while ago.

(non-de se)

Johni -un [Mary-ka [cakii -lul piphanha-n salam]-ul cohahanta]-ko
John-top Mary-nom self-acc criticized-adn person-acc like-comp
sayngkahanta.
think
‘Johni thinks that Mary likes the person who criticized himi .’ (!S1, !S2)
Based on our discussion of the logophoric properties of the antecedents of LD caki,
let us now consider how the antecedent of LD caki in the relative clause (with or without
the de se interpretation can be characterized with respect to logophoricity. First, when
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LD caki in the relative clause is interpreted de se within the attitude environment, its
antecedent is always understood as a source or self, as we saw before. For example, the
sentence in (32) is a belief report that correctly states John’s belief in a situation where
John holds a de dicto belief like ‘Mary likes the person who criticized me.’ In this case, LD
caki in (32) receives a de se interpretation, and the antecedent of caki—that is, John—is the
one whose thought is represented in the sentence (i.e., self).10 More precisely, we need
to focus on the clause that immediately contains LD caki, that is, the relative clause. The
antecedent of caki can still be understood as a self with particular respect to the relative
clause, since John is the one whose thought is represented in describing the relative clause,
which immediately embeds LD caki.
Next, consider another situation where John thinks, ‘Mary likes Tom.’ Unbeknownst
to John, Tom is the one who criticized him before. I, as the speaker with the actual information about Tom, can properly report John’s belief using the sentence in (32). In this
case, LD caki must receive a non-de se interpretation since the predicate of the relative
clause is not part of John’s de dicto belief. How can we, then, characterize the antecedent
of caki in terms of logophoricity? Again, we need to focus on the relative clause itself
as opposed to the entire embedded clause. In this case, John cannot be understood as
a self in describing the content of the relative clause, since ‘the person who criticized
self’ is not contained in John’s thought. Instead, the antecedent of caki can still be understood as a pivot. In other words, John can be understood as the individual who the
speaker empathizes with or takes perspectives from in describing the relative clause. To
confirm this, let us add another perspectival element in the relative clause and see how it
is interpreted. An element like local involves a (spatial) perspective sensitive expression,
whose meaning must be anchored to a certain reference location (Mitchell 1986, Partee
1989).11 Suppose that John lives in Boston, while the speaker of the sentence in (33) lives
10
If we change the embedding attitude verb to a speech verb like malhata ‘say’, then the antecedent of
caki is understood as a source.
11
In particular, according to Mitchell (1986), expressions like local, foreign, visiting, from out of state, home
involve a spatial perspective that does not merely depend on physical locations; rather, their meanings
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in Amherst. When caki co-refers with John in (33a), ciyek sinmwun ‘local newspaper’ in
the same relative clause can most naturally be interpreted as Boston’s local newspaper,
indicating that John is the one whose spatial perspective is taken in describing the relative clause. By contrast, ‘local’ can be anchored to either the utterance location (that
is, Amherst) or John’s location (that is, Boston) when the third person pronoun is used
instead in the relative clause.

(33)

a.

Johni -un [Mary-ka [ciyek sinmwun-eyse cakii -lul piphanha-n
John-top Mary-nom local newspaper-on self-acc criticized-adn
salam]-ul cohahanta]-ko sayngkahanta.
person-acc like-comp
think
(i) ‘Johni thinks that Mary likes the person who criticized himi on the local
(from John’s point of view) newspaper.’
(ii) *‘Johni thinks that Mary likes the person who criticized himi on the local
(from the speaker’s point of view) newspaper.’

b.

Johni -un [Mary-ka [ciyek sinmwun-eyse kui -lul piphanha-n
John-top Mary-nom local newspaper-on he-acc criticized-adn
salam]-ul cohahanta]-ko sayngkahanta.
person-acc like-comp
think
(i) ‘Johni thinks that Mary likes the person who criticized himi on the local
(from John’s point of view) newspaper.’
(ii) ‘Johni thinks that Mary likes the person who criticized himi on the local
(from the speaker’s point of view) newspaper.’

The data in (33) demonstrate that the antecedent of LD caki with a non-de se interpretation
can be understood as the one whose point of view is taken (pivot) in describing the clause
that immediately embeds caki.12 In addition to the generalizations about de se and de dicto,
depend on "socio-cultural organization of space" (Mitchell 1986, p.41).
12
Recall that there is a hierarchical relationship between the three primitive notions of logophoricity,
according to Sells (1987): source > self > pivot. Given this hierarchy, we would predict that the perspectival element ‘local’ should also be anchored to the matrix subject even when the antecedent of caki is
understood as a source or a self. Suppose that John has the following belief: ‘Mary likes the person who
criticized me on the local newspaper.’ In this case, the relative clause is part of John’s de dicto thought, and
caki in the relative clause must be interpreted de se and finds a self antecedent. As predicted, ‘local’ must
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the data above suggest a three-way relationship between de se, de dicto and the type of
antecedent in terms of logophoricity, as illustrated below.

(34)

A three-way relationship between de se, de dicto, and logophoricity
a.

Generalization I: Obligatory de se under de dicto with a source or self antecedent
The LD reflexive caki must be construed de se when the predicate in the
same clause is read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki, and its
antecedent can only be understood as a source or self.

b.

Generalization II: Obligatory non-de se under non-de dicto with a pivot antecedent
The LD reflexive caki must be construed non-de se when the predicate in the
same clause is not read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki, and
its antecedent can only be understood as a pivot.

The multiple caki case under multiple embeddings provide further evidence in support of our new observation that LD caki with a de se interpretation finds a source or
self antecedent, while LD caki with a non-de se interpretation takes a pivot antecedent
in attitude environments. The example in (35) contains one caki in the relative clause
and another one directly under the attitude verb. Therefore, the immediate logophoric
domain of the multiple caki’s are different: the relative clause for the former caki and the
complement clause of the verb ‘think’ for the latter caki. Recall that the LD reflexive directly within the scope of the attitude verbs always receives a de se interpretation because
the predicate in the same clause is always read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of
caki. In other words, John’s speech or Mary’s thought in (35) must contain the first person
pronoun, given the actual antecedent of caki: e.g., John said something like ‘Mary thinks
be anchored to the location of the self antecedent of caki, supporting the hierarchical relationship between
the logophoric notions proposed by Sells (1987).
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X likes me’ or Mary thought, ‘X likes me’, while the description of X may vary. Naturally,
then, the antecedent of the latter caki in (35) is understood as a source or self. Similarly,
the LD reflexive in the relative clause must receive a de se interpretation when the predicate of the relative clause—that is, the immediately embedding clause of caki—is read de
dicto with respect to John or Mary, as ‘the person who hit me’. Again, the antecedent of
caki in this case is also characterized as a source or self.

(35)

John-un [Mary-ka [[caki-lul piphanha-n salam]-i
caki-ul
John-top Mary-nom self-acc criticized-adn person-nom self-acc
cohahanta]-ko sayngkahanta]-ko malhayssta.
like-comp
think-comp
said
Lit. ‘John said that Mary thinks that the person who criticized self likes self.’
a.

Johni said Maryj thinks the person who criticized himi de se likes himi de se .

b.

Johni said Maryj thinks the person who criticized himi non-de se likes himi de se .

c.

Johni said Maryj thinks the person who criticized herj de se likes herj de se .

d.

Johni said Maryj thinks the person who criticized herj non-de se likes herj de se .

e.

Johni said Maryj thinks the person who criticized himi non-de se likes herj de se .

f.

Johni said Maryj thinks the person who criticized herj non-de se likes himi de se .13

By contrast, the antecedent of LD caki with a non-de se interpretation in the relative
clause cannot be understood as a source or self with respect to the immediate logophoric domain that contains LD caki. To demonstrate this, let us consider a scenario in which
the reading in (35b) can be derived. In this reading, both caki’s refer to the same referent,
John, while only the latter one receives a de se interpretation. One possible context is
as follows: At a party, Mary thought some guy named Tom was being especially nice to
As we have seen before, multiple caki’s in the same complement clause cannot be interpreted de se with
respect to different attitude holders due to the independent binding conditions of LD caki. Therefore, the
following interpretations cannot be derived from the sentence in (35):
13

(i)

a.
b.

*Johni said Maryj thinks the person who criticized himi de se likes herj de se .
*Johni said Maryj thinks the person who criticized herj de se likes himi de se .
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John, so she told John: "I think that guy Tom likes you." Next day, John said to a friend
of his: "Mary thinks the guy I met at a party likes me." Unbeknownst to both John and
Mary, Tom was the one who criticized John a while ago. Under this particular context,
we can felicitously report the situation using the sentence in (35). While John is the antecedent of both caki’s in this case, the logophoric meaning of the same referent, John,
varies relative to each logophoric domain. With respect to the relative clause, which is the
immediate logophoric domain of the former caki, John cannot be understood as a source
because ‘the person who criticized self’ is not part of John’s direct speech. Instead, John
can still be understood as a pivot, the one whose point of view or perspective the speaker
takes to report the relative clause. On the other hand, John is the one who makes the report (source) with respect to the complement of the embedding verb ‘think’, which is the
immediate logophoric domain of the latter caki. Therefore, we can draw the same generalization from the data involving multiple cakl’s: LD caki is associated with a source or
self antecedent when it is interpreted de se, whereas it finds a pivot antecedent when it
gets a non-de se interpretation.
To summarize, our key observations in this section are listed below.

(36)

Summary
a.

LD caki directly embedded in the complement of an attitude verb must be
interpreted de se, and in this case its antecedent is always understood as a
particular logophoric center, i.e. source or self.

b.

LD caki directly embedded in the relative clause must be interpreted de se
when the predicate of the relative clause is interpreted de dicto with respect
to the antecedent of caki, and in this case its antecedent is always understood
as a particular logophoric center, i.e. source or self.

c.

LD caki directly embedded in the relative clause must be interpreted non-de
se when the predicate of the relative clause is not read de dicto relative to the
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antecedent of caki, and in this case its antecedent is always understood as a
particular logophoric center, i.e. pivot.

6.4

Logophoric operators

In this section, I develop a syntactico-semantic analysis of long-distance anaphor binding
based on the notion of logophoricity. In particular, I follow and extend the local binding
approach for the long-distance binding and further propose a semantic analysis that can
capture the (non-)de se interpretation of LD caki in attitude environments. The core ideas
of our analysis will be that: (i) LD caki is uniformly bound by a local logophoric operator that mediates between the anaphors and its long-distance antecedent, as opposed to
being directly bound by its antecedent, (ii) the logophoric operator links the LD caki to
a logophoric center whose perspective is taken in describing the clause containing caki,
and (iii) logophoric binding mechanism is distinct from but closely related to the de se
mechanism in attitude environments.
Under our new proposal, there will be a two-layered system for logophoric binding
and the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki. While the property analysis will remain
unchanged for the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki, we will propose that it is not
caki itself anymore that is directly bound by the de se binder but a null pronominal element
that directly binds caki.

6.4.1

Syntactic analysis: Local logophoric operators

Based upon previous syntactic analyses on logophoric binding, this section proposes a
local binding approach for the long-distance reflexive caki in Korean. In the syntactic literature, a number of studies have claimed that logophors or LD reflexives that are coreferent with a long-distance antecedent are not directly bound by their antecedents but
by a silent logophoric operator that mediates them (Koopman and Sportiche 1989, Adesola 2005, Anand 2006, Nishigauchi and Kishida 2008, Sundaresan 2012, Nishigauchi 2014,
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Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, Charnavel 2017, a.o.).
The logophoric operator binding approach can be divided into two groups depending on the location of the operators: non-local and local logophoric operators. The first
group argues that the null operator that mediates between LD anaphors and their antecedents are located at the CP periphery that is directly below the clause containing the
antecedent (Koopman and Sportiche 1989, Anand 2006). In other words, the distance between the operator and logophoric elements may be long-distance in multiple embedding
cases, while the distance between the operator and the antecedent is always local. By
contrast, the second group proposes a local operator approach (Nishigauchi 2005, 2014,
Sundaresan 2012, Charnavel and Zlogar 2016, Charnavel 2017). That is, logophoric operators are always located in the left periphery of the clause that contains a logophoric
element. Under this approach, then, a logophoric element is always bound by a local
operator, while the operator may associate it with a long-distance antecedent.
Following the latter approach, I assume that the LD reflexive caki is uniformly bound
by a local logophoric operator that occurs in the left periphery of the clause that directly
contains LD caki. Given the observation that LD caki must be coreferent with an individual whose mental or physical perspective is represented in the clause where the reflexive
occurs, I also assume that the logophoric operator projects a pronominal element, the one
whose perspective is taken in describing the clause containing caki (Speas 2004, Nishigauchi 2005, 2014, Charnavel 2017). While the local null operator consistently binds the
LD reflexive in the same clause, the pronominal element that is projected by the logophoric operator is associated with a logophoric center. In Korean, we can assume that any
CP, including CP complements of attitude verbs, (gapless) relative clauses, and a number
of adjunct clauses, can host a logophoric operator in their left periphery.14
14
The question of where exactly the logophoric operator posits in the left periphery is orthogonal to our
approach. Following Cinque (1999) and (Speas 2004), Nishigauchi (2014) proposes a number of point of view
related projections that can project a null pronoun in their Spec, which is the local binder for the LD reflexive
zibun in Japanese: Speech Act Phrase, Evidential (Mood) Phrase, Epistemological Phrase, Evaluative (Mood)
Phrase, Benefactive Phrase, Deixis Phrase. On the other hand, Sundaresan (2012) argues for one projection
(Perspectival Phrase) that is responsible for logophoric/perspectival binding.
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Local binding of LD caki by logophoric operators (first attempt)

(37)

a.

Logophoric operator under an attitude verb
Johnk thinks [CP prok [op-logj Mary likes selfj ]]15

b.

Logophoric operator in a relative clause
Johnk met [the guy [CP whoi [ prok [op-logj ti saved selfj ]]]]

c.

Logophoric operator in an adjunct clause
[CP prok [op-logj Because John criticized selfj ]], Maryk got upset.

Given the syntactic assumptions put forth above, we can account for the facts that
LD caki can appear in a number of different clauses that allow a logophoric operator
and find a long-distance antecedent by being bound by the local logophoric operator.
However, our system has not yet been fully worked out with respect to the the relationship
between the (non-)obligatory de se interpretations of caki and the types of the embedded
clauses. In other words, the pure syntactic account cannot explain why LD caki must
receive a de se interpretation when it appears in the complements of attitude verbs and
how it can be exempt from the obligatory de se interpretation under the (gapless) relative
clauses.

6.4.2

Semantic analysis: Perspective predicates

Based upon the syntactic assumptions I have provided in the previous section, this section
develops a semantic account for the logophoric operators. Most of the syntactic work
on logophoric binding assumes that logophoric operators are null pronominal elements
that directly bind a logophoric elements (e.g., Nishigauchi 2005, 2014, Sundaresan 2012).
However, we need a more sophisticated semantic analysis that can derive the fact that LD
caki is associated with an individual whose mental or physical perspective is represented
15

The co-indexing between the matrix subject and the pronominal element in the embedded clause merely
indicates that they are "linked" in some way. In the next subsection, I will show how they are "linked" under
our semantic assumptions.
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in the clause that contains the LD reflexive.
Anand (2006) proposes that a logophoric operator is a lambda abstractor, while logophoric elements are individual variables that need to be bound by the logophoric operator. This base-generated operator that is co-indexed with a logophoric element turns a
propositional complement into a property (type <e,st>).

(38)

[[OP-logj α]]g = λx. [[α]]g[j7→x]

(Anand 2006, p.50)

Since Anand (2006) considers logophors/LD anaphors only under attitude verbs that receive an obligatory de se interpretation, he argues that the property created by the logophoric operator takes a special referential item, the author of the index. The CENTER
takes an index, which is bound by the closest index binder, as its argument and returns the
speaker of that index. Therefore, logophoric elements bound by the logophoric operator
ultimately denote the speaker of a particular index, and thus get a de se reading.

(39)

[[CENTER]]g = λi. auth(i)

(Anand 2006, p.50)

Note, however, that we consider both attitude and non-attitude environments. A de se
interpretation may be irrelevant in the latter cases. In other words, LD antecedents of
caki in non-attitude environments does not denote the speaker of some index. Instead,
we need to associate the LD relfexive with a (mental or physical) perspective holder.
Based on the prior syntactic and semantic work cited above, Charnavel (2017) provides a local binding approach to exempt anaphors. Specifically, she argues that exempt
anaphors are bound by a local logophoric operator, which takes a clause P as complement
and a null pronominal element as subject denoting perspective centers. The null pronoun,
then, locally binds the exempt anaphor and is coreferent with the actual antecedent. The
denotation of the logophoric operator is provided in (40).

(40)

[[OPLOG ]] = λP. λx. P from x’s perspective
217

(Charnavel 2017)

This account captures the facts that exempt anaphors are understood as perspective centers and the clause containing an exempt anaphor is described from the perspective of the
antecedent of the exempt anaphor. However, this analysis lacks an account of the obligatory de se interpretation of exempt anaphors in attitude environments. Our account will
incorporate some of the insights from the proposals in Anand (2006) and Charnavel (2017),
but will diverge from their proposals in a number of ways.
First, following Anand (2006), I assume that logophoric operators are individual
abstractors. Then I specifically argue that these operators are introduced by a covert
perspective-predicate, whose semantics denote relations between individuals and properties. The logopphoric operator that is coindexed with LD caki within its scope turns
its complement of type <t> into a property type. The perspective predicate takes this
property, and the subject of the predicate saturates this property. Therefore, LD caki is
bound by the subject of the perspective predicate. Moreover, I further argue the perspective predicate has a presuppositional meaning that P(x) is true from x’s perspective. This
captures the fact that the complement of the perspective predicate containing LD caki is
described from the perspective of the antecedent of caki, that is, the subject of the perspective predicate.

(41)

The semantics of the covert P(erspective)-pred
Jp-predKg = λP. λx: P(x)=T from x’s perspective. P(x) = T

For instance, the embedded clause that contains caki in a sentence like Lit. John1 thinks
Mary likes caki1 would have a presuppositional meaning, as in (42).

(42)

Jp-pred [op-logj Mary likes cakij ]Kg (pro1 ) =
a.

Assertive meaning: Mary likes g(1), where g(1) = John

b.

Presupposition: Mary likes g(1) from g(1)’s perspective
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Therefore, if the referent of the free variable, i.e., the subject of the perspective predicate,
is not a perspective holder, the complement clause containing caki cannot be defined.
Given this, we now revise the LFs of the sentences with LD caki as following.

(43)

Local binding of LD caki by logophoric operators (second attempt)
a.

Logophoric operator under an attitude verb
[John thinks [CP prok p-pred [op-logj Mary likes selfj ]]], where prok = John

b.

Logophoric operator in a relative clause
[John met [the guy [CP whoi [prok p-pred [op-logj ti saved selfj ]]]]], where
prok = John

c.

Logophoric operator in an adjunct clause
[[CP prok p-pred [op-logj Because John criticized selfj ]], Mary got upset],
where prok = Mary

Under our current account, LD caki always appears within the scope of the perspective predicate and it denotes a perspective holder by being bound by the logophoric
operator under the P-Pred. There is one last problem that the current proposal has not
yet provided a solution: how is the obligatory de se interpretation of LD caki derived in
attitude environments? Since denoting a perspective holder does not guarantee a de se
interpretation, we still need a mechanism for de se construals. Recall that we proposed
one mechanism in Chapter 3 that is responsible for both the de se interpretation of caki
and long-distance binding, under the property approach and our proposed licensing conditions for LD caki. However, this account cannot be adopted for LD caki in non-attitude
environments. Therefore, I distinguish the two mechanisms from each other. Specifically,
while I argue for the local binding approach for the LD reflexives, which can cover the
consistent long-distance dependency between caki and its antecedent as well as the characteristic and role of the antecedent of caki as a perspective holder, I maintain the property
approach for the de se construal of LD caki.
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Now I propose that it is not caki itself but the pronominal element, which is projected
by the perspective predicate, that is bound by the individual abstractor under an attitude
predicate. The difference between the attitude and non-attitude environments comes from
the property of the pronominal element, the subject of the perspective predicate. First,
the pronominal element directly under attitude verbs must be bound by a closest binder
with the feature [log]. These binding conditions are not for LD caki anymore, but for the
subject of the perspective predicate. Second, the one in the relative clause can be free or
bound.16 Given the presuppositional meaning of the perspective predicate, the sentence
will not be defined when the subject of the perspective predicate refers to an individual
who is not a perspective holder. Since the pronominal element in the relative clause need
not be bound, it can have a non-de se interpretation.

(44)

Local binding of LD caki by logophoric operators (final)
a.

Logophoric operator under an attitude verb
John thinks [CP λ1 pro1 p-pred [op-logj Mary likes selfj ]]

b.

Logophoric operator in a relative clause
John met [the guy [CP whoi [pro1 p-pred [op-logj ti saved selfj ]]]], where
g(1)=John

c.

Logophoric operator in an adjunct clause
[CP pro1 p-pred [op-logj Because John criticized selfj ]], Mary got upset,
where g(1)=Mary

A sample derivation of the obligatory de se reading of caki under the attitude verb in (45)
is shown in (47b), based on the semantics of the attitude verb think in (46) and the LF
structure of (45) as in (47a).
16

I admit the stipulative nature of this analysis. I will have to leave to future sutdy the source of this
distinction between the complements of attiude verbs and relative clauses.
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(45)

Johni -un [Mary-ka cakii -lul cohahanta]-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top Mary-nom self-acc like-comp
think
‘Johni thinks that Mary likes himi .’

(46)

JthinkKg = λP<e,st> . [λx. λw. ∀<y, w0 > ∈ Doxx ,w : P(y)(w0 ) =T],
where Doxx,w = {<y, w’>: it is compatible with what x thinks in w that w’ is a
world x might be living in and y is the one who x identifies in w as herself in w’}

(47)

a.

LF structure of (45):
λw w John thinks [λ1 λ2 w2 pro1 p-pred [op-log3 Mary likes self3 ]]

b.

[[(47a)]]g = λw. ∀<y, w0 > ∈ DoxJohn,w : Mary likes y in w’

Note that the truth-conditions of the sentence like (45) derived from our new LF structure
with the perspective predicate and logophoric operator are identical to our old version.
However, the binding mechanism for LD caki and the de se mechanism are now distinct
in our current system.

6.4.3

Consequences

6.4.3.1 Caki in complements of attitude verbs
Given our syntactic and semantic assumptions about local logophoric binding of LD caki,
I would like to point out some advantageous consequences of our analysis. Previously,
we assumed that LD caki is a variable that is bound by an individual abstractor that is
introduced by an attitude verb, and thus it unambiguously gets a de se reading under attitude verbs. Instead, our current system assumes that LD caki is uniformly bound by the
local logophoric operator, while the subject of the perspective predicate, a bound variable
under attitude verbs, is bound by the de se binder. The only difference between the previous and current approaches lies in the binder of caki: an individual abstractor introduced
below an attitude verb vs. a local logophoric operator. Since the bound variable element
(that is, the subject of the perspective predicate) is bound by an individual abstractor that
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is introduced by an attitude verb, we can maintain the obligatory de se construal of caki
under attitude verbs. That is, it is identical in either case that LD caki is interpreted as the
one who the attitude holder identifies as himself/herself (a de se counterpart).
Recall that our previous assumption about LD caki was that LD caki, which is a
variable that bears the special feature [log], needs to be bound by a closest abstractor that
also bears the same feature. Since we assumed that individual abstractors under attitude
verbs can optionally take the [log] feature, LD caki can be bound by an abstractor in the
higher clause only when the closer binder does not bear the [log] feature. Instead of the
reflexive itself, now we assume that the subject of the perspective predicate is subject
to this licensing conditions. Note that the LD reflexive is uniformly bound by the local
logophoric operator that is introduced by the perspective predicate.

(48)

Single caki under multiple embeddings
a.

John thinks [λ1 Mary says [λ2 [log] pro2 p-pred [op-log3 Mary likes self3 ]]]
(coreference between caki and Mary)

b.

John thinks [λ1 [log] Mary says [λ2 pro1 p-pred [op-log3 Mary likes self3 ]]]
(coreference between caki and John)

The LD anaphor in the most embedded clause can refer to either the matrix or intermediate subject given by which abstractor the variable pro is bound.

(49)

Multiple caki’s under multiple embeddings
a.

John thinks [λ1 Mary says [λ2 [log] pro2 p-pred [op-log3 self3 ’s father likes
self3 ’s mother]]]

b.

(coreference between multiple caki’s and Mary)

John thinks [λ1 [log] Mary says [λ2 pro1 p-pred [op-log3 self3 ’s father likes
self3 ’s mother]]]

(coreference between multiple caki’s and John)

Strictly speaking, we do not need the optional [log] feature on the binder to account for the
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obligatory coreference of multiple caki’s in our current account, because multiple caki’s
in the same complement clause must be bound by the same local logophoric operator. We
will see shortly, however, that we still need the featural condition for the subject of the
perspective predicate.

6.4.3.2 Caki in (gapless) relative clauses
The most interesting and novel data we saw before involve a LD caki in a (gapless) relative
clause embedded under an attitude verb. Our local logophoric binding account predicts
that LD caki in a (gapless) relative clause can receive a non-de se reading even under an
attitude verb, because the subject of the perspective predicate that appears in the relative
clause can be free, in contrast to the one under attitude verbs. It can also receive a de se interpretation when the pronominal subject is bound by the individual abstractor. Consider
the illustrative example in (4) of Chapter 5, repeated below as (50).

(50)

Johni -un [[cakii -lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
chakhata-ko sayngkakhanta.
John-top self-acc hit-adn woman-nom kind-comp think
‘Johni thinks that the woman who hit himi is kind.’

There are two possible structures for this sentence, and the only difference is how the
subject of the perspective predicate is interpreted.

(51)

The de se and non-de se LF of caki in RCs
a.

The de se LF
John thinks [λ1 [log] [the woman [ whoi [pro1 p-pred [op-logj ti hit selfj ]] is
kind ]]

b.

The non-de se LF
John thinks [λ1 [log] [the woman [ whoi [pro3 p-pred [op-logj ti hit selfj ]] is
kind ]], where g(3)=John

223

As shown above, when pro is used as a free variable, LD caki receives a non-de se interpretation while it can refer to John. On the other hand, LD caki is interpreted de se when
the pronominal subject of the perspective predicate is bound by the individual abstractor
(λ1 ) in the left periphery of the complement clause of the verb ‘think’.
Our proposed account also correctly predicts that LD caki in a DP like ‘caki’s sister’
must be interpreted de se in a sentence like ‘John thinks caki’s sister is nice.’ Since only
CPs can host a logophoric operator (at least in Korean), caki in a DP like ‘caki’s sister’ must
be bound by the logophoric operator appearing in the left periphery of the complement
clause, which associates caki with a de se center.
Lastly, let us examine how our analysis of local logophoric binding would explain
the novel data we saw in Chapter 5 that involve multiple caki’s: one inside a relative clause
and the other directly under an attitude verb. The relevant example (39) in Chapter 5 is
repeated below as (52). The LF for each reading of this sentence is provided in (53). While
LD caki’s are unambiguosuly bound by the local logophoric operator in the relative clause
and the complement clause, respectively, the interpretation of the pronominal elements
can vary.

(52)

John-un [Mary-ka [[[caki-lul ttayli]-n yeca]-ka
caki-lul cohahanta]-ko
John-top Mary-nom self-acc hit-adn woman-nom self-acc like-comp
sayngkakhanta]-ko malhayssta.
thinks-comp
said
Lit. ‘John said that Mary thinks that the woman who hit self likes self.’
a.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi dese likes himi dese .

b.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi non−dese likes himi dese .

c.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit herj dese likes herj dese .

d.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit herj non−dese likes herj dese .

e.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi non−dese likes herj dese .

f.

Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit herj non−dese likes himi dese .

g. *Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit himi dese likes herj dese .
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h. *Johni said that Maryj thinks that the woman who hit herj dese likes himi dese .
(53)

LFs of the sentence in (52)
a.

Johnde se – Johnde se
John says [λ1 [log] Mary thinks [λ2 pro1 p-pred [op-log3 [the woman [ whoi
[pro1 p-pred [op-log4 ti hit self4 ]]]] likes self3 ]]]

b.

Johnnon-de se – Johnde se
John says [λ1 [log] Mary thinks [λ2 pro1 p-pred [op-log3 [the woman [ whoi
[pro5 p-pred [op-log4 ti hit self4 ]]]] likes self3 ]]], where g(5) = John

c.

Maryde se – Maryde se
John says [λ1 Mary thinks [λ2 [log] pro2 p-pred [op-log3 [the woman [ whoi
[pro2 p-pred [op-log4 ti hit self4 ]]]] likes self3 ]]]

d.

Marynon-de se – Maryde se
John says [λ1 Mary thinks [λ2 [log] pro2 p-pred [op-log3 [the woman [ whoi
[pro5 p-pred [op-log4 ti hit self4 ]]]] likes self3 ]]], where g(5) = Mary

e.

Johnnon-de se – Maryde se
John says [λ1 Mary thinks [λ2 [log] pro2 p-pred [op-log3 [the woman [ whoi
[pro5 p-pred [op-log4 ti hit self4 ]]]] likes self3 ]]], where g(5) = John

f.

Marynon-de se – Johnde se
John says [λ1 [log] Mary thinks [λ2 pro1 p-pred [op-log3 [the woman [ whoi
[pro5 p-pred [op-log4 ti hit self4 ]]]] likes self3 ]]], where g(5) = Mary

g.

%Johnde se – Maryde se
*John says [λ1 [log] Mary thinks [λ2 [log] pro2 p-pred [op-log3 [the woman [
whoi [pro1 p-pred [op-log4 ti hit self4 ]]]] likes self3 ]]]

h.

%Maryde se – Johnde se
*John says [λ1 [log] Mary thinks [λ2 [log] pro1 p-pred [op-log3 [the woman [
whoi [pro2 p-pred [op-log4 ti hit self4 ]]]] likes self3 ]]]
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In order to properly bind both caki’s in (53), two logophoric operators are required: one
in the CP periphery of the complement of the attitude verb and the other in the relative
clause. The existence of the two logophoric operators and the property of the pronominal elements as the subject of the perspective predicate can account for the interesting
facts seen in (53). The first important point regarding (53) was that caki directly under
the attitude verb must be interpreted de se with respect to either the matrix subject or the
intermediate subject, while the one in the relative clause does not. This fact can be derived
from the fact that the pronominal element located in the left periphery of the most embedded clause under the verb ‘think’ must be bound, whereas the one in the relative clause
can be bound or free. Second, multiple caki’s in (53) can find different referents owing to
the two separate logophoric operators. Third, multiple caki’s need to be coreferential in
order for them to be interpreted de se, given our assumption that when the pronominal
element projected by the logophoric operator is bound by a de se binder under an attitude
verb, it must be bound by a closet binder that bears the [log] feature. For example, if one
of the caki’s is interpreted de se with respect to the intermediate subject, the other should
also be because it implies that there exists an individual abstractor with the [log] feature
under the intermediate verb ‘think’, which is the closest suitable binder for the bound
variable type element in the subject position of either perspective predicate.

6.5

Conclusion

This chapter proposed a new account of logophoric binding of the LD reflexive caki. Having shown that LD caki requires a logophoric center/perspective holder as its antecedent
regardless of in which environment it appears, I have argued that LD caki is always bound
by a local logophoric operator that is introduced by a covert perspective predicate. The
major divergence from the analysis presented in the previous chapters is that there are
now two separate mechanisms for de se and long-distance binding, respectively. In our
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new two-layered system for de se and logophoricity, a logophoric element like LD caki
must be bound by a local logophoric operator and the perspective predicate that introduces the binder of caki plays an important role in linking caki to a perspective holder.
The de se binder appearing under an attitude verb is still the source of the obligatory de
se interpretation of the LD reflexive in the attitude environments.
Furthermore, we explained that the difference between the complement of attitude
verbs and relative clauses comes from the property of the subject of the perspective predicate. The subject of the perspective predicate appearing directly under attitude verbs
must be a bound-variable type element, which then must be bound by a de se binder. On
the other hand, the pronominal element in the subject position of the perspective predicate appearing in a relative clause can be free or bound. Therefore, LD caki in the relative
clause can co-refer with a LD antecedent without a de se interpretation when its binder,
the subject of the perspective predicate, is a free variable. Again, the free variable still
needs to refer to a perspective holder in order to satisfy the presupposition introduced by
the perspective predicate.
To summarize, our system has the following advantageous consequences: (i) given
the semantics of the perspective predicate, it predicts that the antecedent of LD caki must
be understood as the perspective holder of the clause containing the reflexive, (ii) it correctly derives the de se or non-de se interpretation of caki depending on the clause it appears, and (iii) it also predicts that if multiple caki’s within the scope of the same attitude
verb are interpreted de se, then they need to find the same referent.
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CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSION

This chapter provides a summary of this thesis by first reminding the readers of the research questions we raised in Introduction.

(1)

The main research questions
a.

How do multiple (same or different kinds of) de se expressions behave and
interact with each other in one language?

b.

As widely assumed, can a de se interpretation of any element be freely derived
via a de re LF?

c.

What are the relationships between de se ascriptions and other notions that
reflect perspective in grammar?

Regarding the first question, based upon the property approach to de se that we developed
in Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 we proposed a unified account for the multiple de se expressions including PRO, controlled pronouns, and (non-)controlled LD reflexive caki. While
it is identical that these de se expressions must be bound by a de se binder, the question of
by which binder they are bound was dependent on the lexical properties of the elements
or structural properties of the environments they appear. In particular, we saw that controlled subjects must be bound by the closest de se binder due to the structural property of
the obligatory control construction, whereas LD caki needs to be bound by a binder with
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the special feature [log], regardless of whether it is controlled or not.
The second question in (1) was mainly discussed in Chapter 5. First, we have shown
that there is a special case where the LD reflexive caki cannot receives a de se interpretation. The novel generalizations of the correlation between de se and de dicto that we
presented in Chapter 5 are repeated below.

(2)

Generalizations of the relationship between de se and de dicto
a.

Generalization I: Obligatory de se under de dicto
The LD reflexive caki must be construed de se when the predicate in the same
clause is read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.

b.

Generalization II: Obligatory non-de se under non-de dicto
The LD reflexive caki must be construed non-de se when the predicate in the
same clause is not read de dicto with respect to the antecedent of caki.

Since a relative clause is the only possible environment where the predicate can be interpreted quite freely, LD caki in a relative clause receive a non-de se reading when the
predicate of the relative clause is not interpreted de dicto with respect to the antecedent
of caki.
Moreover, we proposed two pragmatic competitions regarding de se ascriptions,
based on the empirical evidence of how the third person pronoun interacts with the obligatory de se expression caki. That is, a ‘de se as a special de re’ route is blocked when a dedicated de se machinery is being used in the same construction, and a non-de se expression
cannot be interpreted de se when a clausemate de se expression is used that refers to the
same referent.
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(3)

Obligatory De se LF!
Whenever a de se LF is employed in the structure at least for one element, a de se
interpretation of all the other elements cannot be derived from a de re LF.

(4)

Obligatory De se expression!
Whenever an obligatory de se expression is used in an attitude report, a nonobligatory de se expression in the same complement clause cannot be interpreted
de se.

Lastly, Chapter 6 was devoted to the relationship between the two notions of our
main interest: de se ascriptions and the notion of logophoricity. We have proposed a
two-layered system for these two notions. First, there is a covert perspective predicate
appearing in the clause where LD caki occurs. Its role is to (i) introduce the logophoric
operator that locally binds caki and turns its complement into a property type, (ii) triggers
a presupposition that its property-type complement P(x) is true from x’s perspective, and
(iii) projects a null pronominal element in its subject position. The denotation of the covert
perspective predicate is shown below.

(5)

The semantics of the covert P(erspective)-pred
Jp-predKg = λP. λx: P(x)=T from x’s perspective. P(x) = T

Throughout the dissertation until Chapter 5, we assumed that an element gets an obligatory de se interpretation if it is bound by an individual abstractor that is introduced under
an attitude verb. Under our new system presented in Chapter 6, the subject of the perspective predicate must be bound by a de se binder in the attitude environments, and thus, LD
caki directly embedded under an attitude verb is ultimately interpreted de se. By contrast,
the subject of the p-pred in a relative clause can be free or bound. When it is free, LD caki
is exempt from the de se interpretation, while it can still refer to a matrix argument who
is a perspective holder. Our account correctly captures the distinct but close relationship
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between the de se ascription and notion of logophoricity.
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